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Recent regulatory changes have led to the transformation of Mumbai's real estate industry. Since 
the liberalization of India's real estate sector in 2005, Mumbai has seen an unprecedented flow of 
finance capital into the production and sale of new real estate to meet the city's housing needs. 
The prerequisite for such investments is that land be commoditized, i.e., delinked from its socio-
spatial specificities so it can be traded on global financial markets. However, in a context like 
Mumbai, this is especially difficult because property rights are unclear, and the rules of land 
development uncertain. Using Mumbai as a case study, this project examines how real estate 
developers operationalize the imagination of commoditized land, often through narratives of the 
developmental hero, by describing their work as acts of heroism in a context where development 
would otherwise be impossible, in order to establish a market for land. An eighteen-month 
ethnographic study reveals that a new professional class of developers who strive to commodify 
land against all the odds (as opposed to effectively producing and selling new real estate), has 
emerged dominant against incumbent and financially responsible development firms in Mumbai. 
This group's struggle to follow through with the execution of projects has paradoxically resulted in 
several abandoned projects in the city and driven away financial investors from participating in 
further real estate production.  
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1.  MUMBAI’S REAL ESTATE PARADOX 
Recent regulatory changes have led to the transformation of Mumbai’s real estate 
industry. The first of many big changes that followed since was the legalization of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in “urban township construction” in 2002, and further 
liberalization of the policy in 2005, by the Indian government. Around the same time, 
the Securities and Exchange Board of India also began allowing venture capital funds 
to invest in real estate, which until then was subject to heavy restrictions, thereby 
spurring the emergence of domestic real estate investment funds (Searle, 2016, p. 31). 
As a result, Mumbai, along with few other metropolitan cities in India, witnessed an 
unprecedented flow of finance capital towards the development of new real estate. 
Private, large-scale production and consumption of real estate, and housing, in 
particular, replaced what had otherwise been a state-led project. This shift was 
critical in that it not only promised to deliver millions of new housing for a new post-
liberalization middle class but also signaled a newfound footing on the global 
economic stage for India (Fernandes, 2006, p. 59).  
Fifteen years later, however, the reality on the ground looks bleak. Not only does the 
demand for housing remain as high as ever before in Mumbai, but hundreds of real 
estate projects lie unfinished, abandoned, and/or unsold (Parkin, 2019).  
Furthermore, investments into real estate development from both local and 
international sources have thinned out, despite sustained demand for housing and 
commercial real estate in the city (L. Mishra, 2019). Worse still, several developers, 
many of whom emerged as a consequence of the liberalization of the real estate sector, 
have filed for bankruptcy since 20171, leaving thousands of small investors and home 
buyers stranded (Trivedi, 2019). This spate of unforeseen events cast doubt on the 
                                                        
1 In the two years between 2017- 2019, real estate topped the bankruptcy chart in India, with over 
235 companies (mostly from Mumbai and Delhi) admitted for resolution under the Insolvency and 
Bankruptcy Code, see John (2019). 




logic of neo-liberal urban production, wherein capital is channeled into locally 
embedded assets, namely real estate (Weber, 2010), through the creation of 
anchoring coalitions by local experts, namely real estate developers (Searle, 2018).  
Mumbai presents a peculiar case of a glitch in the marketization of real estate 
development. Attempts to “fix” over-accumulated (finance) capital into Mumbai’s real 
estate development in order to yield high rents from it, seem to have derailed. While 
Mumbai may well be an exceptional case in this regard, that does not necessarily limit 
its usefulness for theorizing. The extremity of the case is an advantage insofar as it 
provides a window into mechanisms and processes that would be otherwise 
obscured (Quinn, 2017, p. 76). The relevant question for logical generalizability in 
this kind of study is whether there is reason to believe these findings are more widely 
applicable (Luker, 2010, pp. 51–75). That is, can the glitch in the marketization of real 
estate development, as seen in Mumbai, offer important insights into the often-
overlooked obstacles that guide urban spatial (re)distribution? To investigate this 
question, I focus my conceptual concerns on land, i.e., the primary unit under 
consideration in real estate development. In particular, my project explores the social 
work that goes into the commodification of land, and the constraints encountered 
along the way. The research question driving this dissertation is: What explains the 
impediments to the marketization of land in Mumbai, despite the increased 
availability of funding, easing of regulations pertaining to land-use/development, and 
sustained demand for new real estate?  
In his classic 1944 book The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi problematized the 
commodification of land, labor, and money (Polanyi, 2001, pp. 71–80). One of 
Polanyi’s most important contributions to critical social science was the proposition 
that land, labor, and money are fictitious commodities, as they are not produced for 
sale on the market. According to Polanyi, the liberal propensity to treat them as if they 
were real commodities is a major source of contradictions and crisis-tendencies in 
capitalist development. Polanyi, therefore, argued that the development of market 
societies over the past two hundred years had been shaped by a double movement. 




On the one side is the movement of laissez-faire – the efforts by a variety of groups to 
expand the scope and influence of self-regulating markets. On the other side has been 
the movement of protection – the initiatives, again by a wide range of social actors, to 
insulate the fabric of social life from the destructive impact of market pressures (ibid).  
While the double movement pertaining to the commodification of land has long been 
the topic of interest of rural sociologists and development scholars (Kautsky, 1988; 
McMichael, 1987), in recent times, it is sociologists who study land grabs who have 
brought a renewed interest to the topic (Fairbairn, 2013; Levien, 2013; McMichael, 
2014). These scholars recognize a Polanyian double movement pitting those seeking 
to buy and sell land against those seeking to live off it. As financiers, states and elites 
participate in land grabs to profit from rising land prices, they are faced with 
resistance by peasants, small agrarian land landlords, and slum residents who seek 
to protect their livelihood from the encroachment of laissez-faire forms of market 
organization upon society.  
Contestations over land grab are not uncommon in Mumbai, a city where over fifty 
percent of the population resides in slum properties that are unrecognized by 
municipal authorities 2 . Over the last three decades, slum residents and housing 
activists in Mumbai have been able to effectively mobilize movements to resist 
unwanted (re)development and forced evictions, even when large amounts of money 
were riding on projects (Nijman, 2012; Weinstein, 2014b). However, the obstacles to 
land commodification that we see today in the form of unfinished projects cannot be 
attributed to land-related conflicts per se, and especially not contestations over land 
grab. This is because, the occupiers and acquirers of land, it has been demonstrated, 
are not always polarised in their interests, even in the case of slum redevelopments 
(Newman, 2019; Weinstein, 2014a). Rather, hurdles are produced inadvertently by 
                                                        
2 Several scholars, such as Bhan (2017); Angotti (2006); Arabindoo (2011), have critisised the use of 
the term “slum” as derogatory toponym and have charged those employing it with analytic impression. 
Remaining mindful of these concerns, I employ and engage with the term slum, because its local 
equivalent jhopadpatti has social and political significance in Mumbai. Besides, the term, unlike any 
other, signifies a space outside of, but tightly intertwined with formal governance institutions and 
property markets, which is an important distinction for this dissertation. 




the patchy and incoherent institutions guiding land commodification, which I argue, 
have to be studied by broadening the conceptual meaning of the Polanyian double-
movement, to recognise obstacles within as opposed to external reactions to laissez-
faire.  
My fifteen months of ethnographic fieldwork reveals that it is in the elemental 
practices of land development that market actors encounter problems of land 
commodification, in forms that are not quite as visible or confrontational as a social 
movement. Coordinating land exchange, evaluating projects, seeking approvals, and 
securing finance: all the core practices that lead to the development of new real estate, 
are riddled with tensions and irritations that stem from the commodification of land. 
This is mainly because, and as I demonstrate in this thesis, the practices of land 
development a) cannot be institutionalized (i.e., determined by a fixed set of rules 
and/or norms), b) do not follow a linear/ predictable sequence of unfolding and c) 
are guided by parallel logics that address the multiple meanings and uses associated 
with land. As a consequence, efforts to commodify land continually run into 
complications, even when there is no explicit opposition to it. 
The market for land and real estate development is nevertheless organized around 
the promise of commodified land, and in order to uphold this promise, an imagination 
of land free from social ties must necessarily be established. In Mumbai however, 
establishing such imagination is just as difficult as it is necessary because unlike in 
advanced capitalist countries where land has been subject to a cadastral process, i.e., 
measured, demarcated and protected so it can exist in parcels as property, property 
rights and land titles continue to be ambiguous in India. As a result, the sale and/or 
development of land is often a cumbersome process involving lengthy negotiations 
between multiple parties over the ownership and use of land. Market actors, 
therefore, are primarily concerned with a future, wherein land is commodified, as 
opposed to a future, wherein the price of (commoditized) land is higher. In other 
words, the commodification of land is the name of the game in Mumbai’s land market. 




The very capacities that constitute the global nature of finance capital, the investors’ 
ability to invest from abroad and their ability to move capital quickly, is made possible 
by the work of developers who serve as intermediaries in the process (Searle, 2018). 
Local real estate developers play a crucial role, since they potentially internalize risks 
associated with buying and rezoning land, thereby enabling global finance to “land” 
in Indian cities (Halbert & Rouanet, 2014). However, clearing land and getting 
permissions to build on it aren’t actually institutionalized practices, i.e., cannot be 
bought as a service with guaranteed success. In response local developers, I found, 
operationalize the imagination of commodified land, often through narratives of the 
“developmental hero,” by describing their work as acts of heroism in a context where 
development would otherwise be impossible, to establish a market for land, and 
strengthen their position in the market structure. Mobilizing finance, negotiating with 
slum residents, overcoming bureaucratic red tape: all the standard activities of an 
Indian developer, serve as props to the hero narrative, which concertizes the 
imagination of land as a commodity. 
The importance conferred on developers by the fore fronting of land commodification 
has had tangible impacts on Mumbai’s real estate industry, including on inter-firm 
dynamics. Over the past fifteen years, a new professional class of developers who 
strive to commodify land against all odds (as opposed to effectively producing and 
selling new real estate) has emerged dominant against incumbent and/or financially 
responsible development firms in Mumbai. These developers took up over 50% of the 
industry’s market share in a short time and were recipients of much of the new 
sources of financing available for real estate development at the time. Their struggle 
to follow through with the execution of projects has, however, resulted in several 
abandoned projects in the city and driven away financial investors from participating 
in further real estate production. The reason for their failure is the splitting of 
agendas between land commodification and real estate development, which I argue, 




is characteristic of land markets, and perpetuated by the valorization3 of real estate 
developers. In other words, the social work of commodifying land paradoxically 
obstructs the treatment of land as a commodity and creates obstacles in the 
marketization of real estate development.  
To summarize, in seeking to unravel Mumbai’s real estate conundrum, this project 
undertakes an empirical inquiry into the commodification of urban land. In particular, 
the project examines how land is developed from the perspective of the real estate 
developer, by focusing on key practices of land development and identifying the 
structural determinants behind those practices. The theoretical aim of such an 
endeavor is twofold: first, to build on the understanding of land markets from a 
sociological perspective by drawing on the frames of ‘double movement’ and ‘future 
imaginaries’; and second, to address the shortcomings of economic sociology, by 
incorporating the ‘limits of nature’, or rather, the specificities of land, within the 
analysis of economic systems.  I therefore propose that the nature and consequence 
of obstacles to market processes are just as important to study as the flows of finance 
capital, and the political agitations against the deployment of such capital for land 
grab, for a nuanced understanding of land markets and urban spatial transformations. 
2.  RESEARCHING THE REAL ESTATE TURN IN INDIA 
The construction of globally familiar landscapes of malls, office towers, and high-rise 
housing complexes in Indian cities have inspired important works that chronicle the 
impacts of liberalization on urban production. In particular, scholars have traced 
changes in the state apparatus that have made these landscapes of liberalization 
possible by identifying the emerging configurations of state power and state–society 
relationships that characterize urban restructuring in India (Batra, 2005; Baviskar, 
2003; Dasgupta, 2003; Fernandes, 2000; Nair, 2005). While the state is a key actor in 
this process as it privatizes public assets, appropriates land for private construction 
                                                        
3 There is an intended double take on the word: Valour as in hero, and Valorisation of capital as in, 
increase in value of capital assets through the application of value-forming labour in production, as 
conceived by Marx in chapter 4 of Capital Vol. 1.  




and opens up urban development projects to private interests (Dupont, 2011; 
Ghertner, 2011; Shatkin, 2016; Weinstein, 2014b),  the state is not the only institution 
working to bring international capital into Indian urban restructuring. Private sector 
actors — bankers, contractors, developers, architects, lawyers, marketing agents, 
brokers, international property consultants and others—join politicians, bureaucrats 
and planners in this project (Boanada-Fuchs, 2018; Searle, 2010, 2016). Scholars 
have, however, only begun to study the role of private players in shaping practices of 
urban development in India.  
Two bodies of work that identify the networks of (private) intermediaries involved 
in the capitalistic production of urban built form in the Indian context are especially 
noteworthy. Researching the development of business properties in Bengaluru, India, 
Ludovic Halbert and Hortense Rouanet conceptualize property markets as ‘the 
contested construction of more or less long networks’ across space and scale (Halbert 
& Rouanet, 2014, p. 474). These transcalar territorial networks (TTNs), they argue, 
assemble the resources required for anchoring or landing global capital to facilitate 
property development at the city-scale. Anthropologist Llerena Searle has also 
analyzed these networks and their impact on urban development in India, 
characterizing them as ‘material and discursive assemblages’ (Searle, 2018, p. 529). 
By closely studying the host of actors – investors, developers, and their consultants – 
involved in real estate development, Searle reveals the chains of intermediaries that 
transform fixed, illiquid parcels of land into financial assets open to mobile capital. 
Searle’s work is particularly important, in that it illuminates how overcoming the 
fundamentally illiquid nature of land and real estate is complex, and how it takes 
work to make real estate into finance.  
Yet, while Halbert and Rouanet emphasize the positive contributions local 
intermediaries play in ‘filtering away’ risk for global investors, Searle notes that local 
intermediaries can also generate risks and slow transactions, thus contributing to 
illiquidity. The underlying hypothesis in Halbert and Rouanet’s work is that TTNs 
internalize a series of (perceived) risks that foreign investors are either incapable or 




reluctant to take and that they associate with the local–regional specificities of the 
property markets of the South. By collecting and selecting data to inform investment 
decisions, unraveling legal issues, and shaping representations of the city, TTNs, they 
argue, contribute to the “simplification of the messy complexity of local commercial 
property markets into a limited number of apparently homogeneous sub-markets” 
(Halbert & Rouanet, 2014, p. 481). Searle, however, highlights the “contradictions of 
mediation” within the structure of the chains of intermediaries. Using a case study of 
an Indian real estate investment fund, Trikona Capital, Searle demonstrates how 
efforts to disentangle the network of intermediaries embroiled the fund in legal 
disputes in jurisdictions around the world and in new relationships with lawyers, 
judges and arbitrators, thus frustrating their attempt to turn fixed property into 
globally mobile capital (Searle, 2018, pp. 536–538). 
Though the interpretations of their effects vary, the use of the network approach and 
emphasis on intermediaries has usefully drawn attention to the local actors whose 
agency helps fix foreign capital to the built environments of cities. However, despite 
their intention to reveal the chains of financing at a localized scale, both bodies of 
work focus almost exclusively on the highest rung of actors in the network, namely 
global financiers and elite real estate developers with direct access to foreign capital. 
Referring to a real estate conference in Delhi that resembled a ‘courting ritual’, Searle 
justifies her approach to “study up”, by describing the Indian real estate boom as 
resulting from the ‘perfect marriage’ between foreign capital and Indian elites. By 
creating business partnerships, devising deal structures, lobbying for new 
regulations and planning construction, Searle notes that it was these elites who 
forged routes of accumulation that attracted foreign money to India (Searle, 2014, 
p. 63). Halbert and Rouanet, similarly suggest that opening the ‘black box’ of the 
transnational investment chains requires adoption of a research methodology that 
attempts to “follow the money”, by paying attention to the (explicit) relationship 
between local development firms and foreign finance investors (Halbert & Rouanet, 
2014, p. 475). 




The follow-the-money approach, however, is prone to shortcomings, especially when 
employed in cities of the South. To begin with, despite its well-intentioned aim to 
investigate how the production of built environment is affected by the globalization 
of finance capital, the approach sustains a top-down, imperialist imagination of urban 
development in post-colonial contexts by focusing extensively on links to foreign 
investments when describing the recent flurry of development activity in these 
contexts in general. The approach also ignores that institutional finance can only be 
selectively utilized in a given project in peripheral economies, due to high borrowing 
costs. Moreover, by assuming extant network ties between investors and developers 
as given, the approach fails to acknowledge the disruptions occurring within 
organizational structures of nascent, quickly evolving real estate industries. As a 
result, the fundamental question of why certain ties develop in the first place, or what 
attributes make some developers attractive for (foreign) funding over others, is 
neglected. These questions, as I demonstrate in this thesis, have significant effect on 
the commodification of land, and the operation of urban land markets. 
In recent years, a growing number of scholars have demonstrated that globalization 
of real estate is not solely triggered by formal (and institutional) procedures and 
practices of ‘market making’, by focusing instead on the role of other, smaller financial 
intermediaries, including expatriate and migrant communities, and middle-class 
retirees. Marieke Krijnen, for example, highlights how the Lebanese diaspora’s 
resourcefulness in capturing value through their cross-border service networks, has 
fuelled housing production in Beirut (Krijnen, 2018). Similarly, Gertjan Wijburg et al 
describe a pattern of real estate globalization where transnational remittances, 
rather than institutional investments or mortgage finance, steer Cuba’s emerging 
property market (Wijburg, Aalbers, & Bono, 2020). These works, among others 
(Hayes, 2015; Kutz & Lenhardt, 2016; Sigler & Wachsmuth, 2015), highlight that 
investments into the development of built environments in Global South cities are not 
exclusive to ‘routes of accumulation’ forged by local elites and institutional investors 
from the Global North, and that a variety of middle-class investors having personal 




ties with the Global South, play an under-estimated and under-studied role in the 
process.  
While this thesis does not contribute directly towards efforts to develop a “multipolar” 
understanding of urban production in an age of globalized and financialized 
capitalism (Mosciaro, Pereira, & Aalbers, 2019), it nevertheless extends the network 
approach further downward to focus on local real estate developers separate from 
their links to foreign finance capital. The thesis acknowledges Mumbai’s developers 
as a heterogeneous group of actors capable of pulling together resources through 
assorted means, to produce new real estate. Insofar as foreign funding is significant 
for boosting real estate production, the thesis analyses how structures of hierarchies 
are formed and reformed within the field of developers, and how developers 
distinguish themselves when competing for finance capital. Through a detailed 
sorting exercise of all active developers in the city, the thesis reveals that the 
partnerships between local developers and foreign or local investors is not simply a 
reflection of (elite) network ties, but rather a function of the co-construction of 
imaginaries of commodified land, and the critical role a certain type of developer 
figure plays in operationalizing this imagination. In the next section I discuss why the 
imaginary of commodified land is significant, by delving into land’s theorization. 
3.  THEORIZING LAND MARKETS FROM AN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 
PERSPECTIVE 
While the sociological study of markets has been applied to a wide range of 
transactions and exchanges, including those not typically viewed as market 
transactions, such as child-rearing (Zelizer, 1994), organ trade (Cohen, 1999) and 
artistic production (Peterson & Anand, 2004), economic sociologists have tended to 
shy away from the study of urban land and its marketization. Brent Kaup (2015) 
argues that this is because economic sociologists continue to be constrained by the 
legacies of mid-twentieth-century sociology and that their interpretation of markets 
upholds an anthropocentric worldview, or what some call the “human exemptionalist 
paradigm”, which ignores the limits of nature on economic systems (Kaup, 2015, 




p. 280). Kaup notes that while economic sociologists recognise how mid-twentieth-
century sociological notions of an asocial market were reified in the new economic 
sociology, they largely overlook how the dismissal of the natural environment 
influenced both the new economic sociology and their own work. 
Land has neverthelesss been at the center of vibrant literatures as scholars, 
particularly in the fileds of anthropology and geography, have grappled with the 
global land rush and commodity boom of 2008 and related forms of “land grabbing” 
(Hale, 2006; Lyall, 2017; Mackey, 2005). As institutional investors looked for safe 
havens in the wake of the global financial crisis, land investment and food prices 
boomed, generating huge profits for some and great precarity for many others 
(Bartley, 2019). Theorists of the global land rush and land grabbing have, as a result, 
mostly drawn on David Harvey’s (2004) Marxist account of “accumulation by 
dispossession” (ABD) and the “spatial fix” to elaborate on the crises of capitalism. 
Marx (1990 [1887]) highlighted a “primitive accumulation” process or “the 
expropriation of […] the peasant from the soil” that begets the dynamics of capitalism. 
Harvey argues that this kind of dispossession continues with the global expansion of 
capitalism and its crises of falling profit rates.  
Harvey’s language and theory has inspired a huge swath of research on land grabbing, 
including in India (S. Doshi & Ranganathan, 2017; Guha, 2017; Levien, 2012). In 
creating a theory of contemporary dispossessions from land or other resources, the 
key question for these scholars is not the origin of the capital, but the reasons why 
capital in general requires, or more precisely attempts and achieves, forceful 
expropriation to sustain accumulation (Hall, 2013). The concept of ABD, for instance, 
is used by Mine Islar (2012) to refer to the ways ‘common resources are enclosed and 
transformed into exclusive places’; by James Fairhead, Melissa Leach and Ian Scoones 
to describe ‘the enclosure of public assets by private interests for profit, which results 
in greater social inequity’ (2012), and by Haroon Akram-Lodhi to denote market-
driven processes of dispossession (2012). Similarly, Saskia Sassen (2013, pp. 26–27) 
describes foreign demand for land as part of the systematic deepening of the current 




phase of capitalism and ‘an expansion of the operational space for advanced 
capitalism’ through the expulsion of people from a range of institutional settings in 
both the Global South and North.  
The ABD approach has, however, been critized by many other scholars, who also 
study land grab. Rebecca Smalley and Esteve Corbera (2012, p. 1041) argue that 
situating the land rush within the political economy of global agro-food networks and 
capital’s search for frontiers of accumulation understates the contribution of local 
actors in making or resisting land deals and the complicit role of domestic states and 
developers. Thomas Sikor (2012, p. 1097), too, makes the case that narrow readings 
of commodification, market expansion or accumulation by dispossession may not 
fully explain the occurrence of land grabs in some circumstances, and their absence 
in others. These critiques resonate with Nancy Peluso and Christian Lund’s (2011, 
p. 669) position that there is ‘no one grand land grab, but a series of changing contexts, 
emergent processes and forces, and contestations’. These shortcomings make the use 
of the ABD approach particularly ineffective for studying the marketization of land in 
Mumbai, where power imbalances between actors involved in land related conflicts 
are not quite so stark, and the appropriation of land and its transformation into 
commodity form, is greatly contingent on its ‘embeddedness’ in social and cultural 
meanings.  
Alternate perspectives to studying the social ordering of land markets, and 
identifying the very complexities related to land’s commodification, would require 
imagining land markets as highly demanding arenas of social interaction. Despite the 
lack of attention to land (and nature) by economic sociologists, Economic Sociology 
is in fact useful for studying land markets, for it takes as its starting point, the 
resistances to market construction, to explain the sustenance and reproduction of 
market orders. Therefore, rather than assuming markets to be naturally occurring, or 
in the case of land, assuming that land’s commodification is inevitable, economic 
sociology recognises that markets are created and also hindered by legal, cultural, 
political, and more recently, environmental frameworks, which are continually 




shifting, and hence ever faced with contention (Block, 2003, 2007; Peck, 2005, 2013; 
Quark, 2013; Schrank & Whitford, 2009). I find two frames of analyses which are 
central to Economic Sociology: ‘double movement’ and ‘future imaginaries’, to be 
particularly useful for studying land markets in Mumbai, and more so the city’s real 
estate conundrum.  
The Double Movement perspective: 
In The Great Transformation (1944), Polanyi approached land from a very different 
perspective to Marx (and Harvey). Where Marx was preoccupied with the conceptual 
question of value and of how the flow of capital enables such value to grow, Polanyi 
was preoccupied with the fluctuating historical fortunes of the socio-spatial 
institution enabling the realisation of value under capitalism: the market. Polanyi 
observed that society had ultimately not been prepared to allow markets to become 
fully disembedded from social and political institutions, and thus to become fully self-
regulating. Polanyi (2001, pp. 79–80) therefore argued that any attempt to create a 
“self-regulating market” required a great deal of state planning and force; and that the 
liberal propensity to treat land, labour and money as if they were real commodities 
was a major source of contradictions and crisis-tendencies in capitalist development- 
so great that society would eventually fight back and demand, and in some measure 
achieve, social protection against the socially destructive effects of such treatment. 
Polanyi termed this whole cycle of disembedding and re-embedding the market the 
“double movement”. 
In linear terms, it can seem as if the double movement is a counter or social backlash 
against the degradation brought about by the market, by actors with political agency 
(Block, 2008; Zhang, 2013). Or, as Jamie Peck (2013, p. 1561)  puts it, “the economy 
is the dynamic and (over)driving first mover, with society recoiling in self-protection.” 
However, Peck and several others, note that this may have not been Polanyi’s intent, 
and that the double movement can also be read as an invitation to an open-ended, 
dialectical mode of analysis, or as a logical complement to the kinds of explanatory 
and political pluralism that Polanyi espoused (Peck, 2013; Prudham, 2013). 




Therefore, the double movement perspective need not contradict Michael Levien’s 
observation that deepening commodification of just about everything manifests in all 
kinds of social opposition, but that there are precious few instances in which this has 
actually achieved substantial decommodification (Levien, 2018, p. 3). Rather, the 
double movement can be interpreted as a license for opening a methodological path 
for an expansive, relational and comparative analysis of (and between) variegated 
economies (Peck, 2013; Rankin, 2013). 
There are many ways of working with Polanyi when researching land. Miles Kenney-
Lazar (2018) for instance, in his study of re-organisation of land use in post-socialist 
Laos asserts that expelling people from land takes on-the-ground work that may 
sometimes fail. Tania Murray Li’s (2014a) work on the privatisation of property in 
upland villages of Sulawesi, Indonesia, on the other hand, highlights a “dispossession 
without accumulation” wherein land-governing institutions may emerge from within 
rather than just through top-down imposition. Several works on land development in 
the South Asian context have also focused on failures of ambitious land development 
projects. Liza Weinstein’s (Weinstein, 2014b)work is one among many writings on 
Indian cities, which understands the act of squatting, or illegal habitation as a 
potentially powerful countermovement that subverts processes of capital 
accumulation (Also see:  Benjamin, 2008; Sampat, 2015 ). These works are significant 
in that they have brought a comparative, heterodox framing to debates about 
dispossession and coercive commodification of land, by directly or indirectly 
invoking the Polanyian argument of the double movement. 
The Future Imaginaries perspective: 
Although structuralist approaches dominate in economic sociology, there have been 
some advances which deal with questions of the micro-foundations of economic 
action (Barbalet, 2010; Beckert, 2003; Storper & Salais, 1997). Such attempts usually 
make the uncertainty and indeterminacy of decision situations the starting point of 
their reasoning, and bring to the fore the need for actors to interpret the social 
macrostructures in economic actions. Given the openness of the future and hence the 




fundamental uncertainty confronting decision makers in the market, decision-
making is often anchored in fictions (of for instance, commodified land). 
Macroeconomic dynamics, as Jens Beckert (Beckert, 2016b, p. 231) most notably 
argues, are anchored in “fictional expectations,” which create motifs for engaging in 
potentially profitable but ultimately incalculable outcomes. This commands attention 
to the management of expectations as a crucial element of economic activity and to 
the institutional, political, and cultural foundations of expectations.  
In case of the land market, the fiction of commodified land motivates actors to make 
decisions and organize their activities based on the mental representations of future 
states of the world that can be different from the present- ambitious redevelopment 
of slums, for instance. The reproduction of capitalitic arrangements within land 
markets is therefore precarious not only due to the possibilities of a social backlash, 
but also because of the contingency of expectations conducive to its sustenance. 
Beckert notes that market order is constantly at risk of the uncertain future 
paralyzing actors, leading to the underemployment of production factors, and thus 
resulting in economic crises (Beckert, 2016a, p. 40). Here “crisis” is the collapse of 
expectations regarding future opportunities and a foreshortening of future 
perspectives. This resulting inactivity of actors, which Keynes (1937) termed 
“liquidity preference,” can be understood as the unwillingness of investors to engage 
in investments that would expose their wealth to unforeseeable risks. The future 
imaginaries perspective is therefore useful to examine the precarity of socio-cultural 
expectations underpinning imaginations of the counterfactual reality of commodified 
land.  
Although there are fewer examples of the use of ‘future imaginaries’ for theorizing 
land markets compared to the double movement framing, the 2008 financial crisis 
triggered by the bursting of the United States housing bubble, brought to the fore 
important insights into how imaginaries perpetuate precarity in land markets 
(Beckert, 2013; Langley, 2008; Pellandini-Simányi & Vargha, 2018). Rachel Weber’s 
(2020) study of redevelopment projects in Chicago demonstrates how techniques to 




estimate future values of land, and the assumptions underpinning land value capture 
strategies intensify development and create a reinforcing spiral of asset appreciation. 
While Weber describes protests among community residents, particularly renters 
and owners who fear higher rents or property tax bills, in her discussion of future-
oriented tax models, Llerena Serale (2018), in her work on speculative real estate 
development in India, draws on future imaginaries, not to preempt social pushback, 
but rather to explain the loss of confidence in valuation convention among financial 
investors and the crisis it spurrs at that very moment.  
Underpinning the two frames of double movement and future imaginaries is the 
fictitious element in land’s commodification. While the double movement is 
concerned with the structural responses to treating land as a commodity, future 
imaginaries builds on the micro-foundations of these structures, based on which 
actors commit to risky decisions of buying and selling land, as if it were a real 
commodity. The two frames together are useful for revealing the incredible 
coordination required at the level of individuals and social systems, to develop and 
sell land, and the inevitable challenges that accompany such efforts. Since this 
coordination work, as I demonstrate in my thesis, cannot entirely be determined by 
institutional structures, be it external legal frameworks, endogenous social norms, or 
shared cultural understandings, future expectations play a significant role in guiding 
action in the land market. On the other hand, the social basis of expectations is found 
within the market’s institutional structuring- in norms, cognitive frameworks, social 
networks, and the power structures in which market actors find themselves. The two 
frames are therefore not just useful in and of themselves, but also in relation to each 
other, when employed for analysing the land market.  
By placing the fictitiousness of land front and centre of my analysis, I seek to build on 
the undertanding of land markets, by considering some ways in which land is 
distinctive, or rather, how the specificities of land influence its capitalist consumption. 
In particular, I look at what consequences these specificities have when land is subject 
to commodification, and why these consequences are important to acknowledge. In 




doing so, I contribute to the growing body of literature that demonstrate how land is 
a “strange object” that is especially challenging to assemble as a resource available 
for global investment (Li, 2014b, p. 589). Besides the more obvious claim that land 
has multiple affordances, i.e. the cultural and emotional attachments to land are both 
varied and strong, the project seeks to empirically ground other baseline answers to 
the question of “how land is unique” (Bartley, 2019)4.  
Since time is key to the future orientation of investment in land, the thesis in 
particular explores the shifting arrangements of land exchange across time, and the 
incongruent shifts in use-value and exchange-value of land, which ultimately hinders 
the standardization of practices geared towards the institutionalized 
commodification of land (Capozza & Helsley, 1990). The project borrows from Gavin 
Bridge’s (2001, p. 2154) thesis that discrepancies in the actual use and imagined use 
of land are overcome through the construction of imaginaries of ‘frontier’ land, or 
‘under-utilized’ land which is “empty of people, histories and claims, but full of 
potential for new and improved use”. This practice, which is tied to land’s 
simultaneous global and hyper local character, David Balgley (2019) notes, is 
consistent with continuation of patronage relationships, despite its basis in the 
neoliberal project, and therefore subject to (new forms of) contention. Besides, as 
Marie Gagné’s (2019) analysis of land acquisition in Senegal shows, even if land 
becomes a resource available for global investment through patchwork solutions, or 
an assemblage of heterogenous elements (material substances, technologies, 
discourses and practices), these arrangements too shape-shift over time.  
The shifting arrangements of land exchange across time indicate not just that 
commodification of land is subject to continual hurdles, but also that land’s specificity 
obstructs the establishment of shared conventions around the social meanings of land, 
including distinct and protected property rights, which is fundamental to market 
                                                        
4  Bartley attributes land’s specificities to: its fixity; its tendency to provoke both reactionary and 
progressive social movements and coalitions; its central importance to territorial control; and price 
swings characterized by a temporal difference between rapidly changing exchange value and relatively 
inert use values. 




construction (Biggart & Beamish, 2003). In seeking to build on the understanding of 
land’s marketisation, the project therefore also addresses the shortcomings of 
economic sociology, by pointing out the ‘limits of nature’ on economic systems. More 
importantly, by situating land’s “fictiousness” as a commodity and the hinderances 
that accompany the operationalization of this fiction within as opposed to in 
contradiction to the market construct, this project responds to Gretta Krippner’s 
(2001) critique of the notion of ‘embeddedness’ as a paradigm for economic sociology. 
Therefore, rather than preserving intact the notion that somewhere there is a market 
for land devoid of conflicts and obstructions, my project uses the obstacles to land’s 
seamless commodification as the building blocks for an explanation of how the 
market for land is organized.  
4.  RESEARCH OBJECTIVE & DESIGN 
The objective of this dissertation is to develop an understanding of land markets that 
forefronts the problematic commodification of land, by broadening the concept of the 
double movement, through a practice-based approach to land development. 
Therefore, rather than focusing on the dynamics between buyers and 
owners/occupiers of landed property, I focus on the production side of property 
development, and thereby the social construction of land as a commodity. My aim is, 
largely, to demonstrate that the marketization of land is prone to numerous obstacles 
that, while not as apparent as the social retaliation against land grabs, are 
nevertheless important for developing a nuanced theory of land markets.  
In this dissertation, I highlight that the consequences of these obstacles, although 
different to the social backlash discussed by Polanyi, are critical for theoretical 
debates on land, as well as the everyday lives of people on ground. The most 
important consequences being: 1) difficulty in establishing stable worlds and 
hierarchical orders among real estate developers; 2) multiple logics of accruing 
profits, and the fragmentation of market arenas; and 3) the loose coupling of land 
commodification and real estate production/sale. These consequences are significant 
in that they undermine a project’s execution as well as the life expectancy of 




development firms. Besides, they support the idea that resistance to the 
marketization of land need not be explicit or targeted, and can manifest in implicit 
ways, in the elemental practices of land development. I, therefore, propose that 
scholars of land acknowledge the broader, more subtle obstacles to land’s 
commodification because they too bear an impact on the social life of cities- the 
abandonment of real estate projects being just one distressing example. 
To identify and get at these obstacles, I organize my research around the basic 
question: “how is land developed?”. My strategy entails deconstructing the process of 
land development into its core components (which in the case of Mumbai I have 
identified to be land acquisition, valuation, project financing, and approvals), and then 
reassembling it all back together without imposing on it the assumption that the 
different components fit together neatly. Following such an approach allows context-
specific practices to guide rather than garnish the understanding of land development. 
This, I argue, also creates an opportunity to emphasize the importance of land’s 
specificity for theory. I, therefore, study land development not as a universal process, 
but rather as a series of unique practices that (must) come together for land to be 
developed, and new real estate to be produced. In other words, I stitch together 
practices of land development that reflect the specificities of land, to then arrive at a 
process which can be referred to, for developing a generalizable theory.  
By working upwards, from practice to processes, I also attempt to break away from 
the evolutionary conceptualization of markets, which is pinned on the assumption 
that markets become “less social” with time. In the case of land markets, this would 
translate to: land exchange becomes more straightforward (i.e., free of social, political, 
or regulatory encumbrances), as the market evolves. Following such an approach also 
helped me build the case that land market practices are not linear and that the social 
arena of land market actors is fragmented and incoherent. To dig deeper into the 
social arena of land markets, I studied the four practices that are essential to land 
development in relation to the expected end goal (production of a building), and in 
relation to each other.  




One of the key questions guiding my investigation into land development practices 
was if these practices unfold sequentially. A logical sequence for a developer would 
be to first evaluate a project, then secure appropriate financing, then acquire the land, 
and then finally seek planning approvals. However, I found that Indian developers did 
not always follow this order, and most often, these practices played out 
simultaneously. For example, developers start negotiating planning approvals with 
government officials even before they have bought land, because land valuations are 
based on permissible building heights and saleable area, which often depends on the 
discretion of officials. Developers also launch projects and seek hefty deposits from 
homebuyers before they have made full payment for the land, because getting bank 
finance for the purchase of land is not possible under current banking regulations in 
India, and finance through non-banking channels is expensive. Consent acquisition, 
too, takes years and requires a developer to prepare the ground well before they are 
actually ready to execute the project. Therefore, a linear sequence of practices, I found, 
is not only hard to follow but in most instances, also impractical.   
An understanding of the non-linear and patchwork assembly of land development 
practices led me to an inquiry into the management of uncertainties in the land 
market. How do developers navigate market uncertainties when project timelines are 
not just long but also unpredictable? Is there a set of best practices, or “local 
knowledge” that developers follow? And, are practices replicable, and/or 
transferable? These questions are relevant not only for demonstrating that market 
practices may be driven by parallel logics of earning a profit but also to ascertain the 
role that institutions play in guiding market actions. To what extent do institutions 
influence the actual practice of land development? How effective are institutions in 
facilitating the smooth exchange of land? And how do developers and other market 
actors respond to both the existence and the instability of institutions? Alternately, I 
looked into the role of real estate developers in the assembly of land development 
practices. What motivates developers to participate in development work despite the 
uncertainties surrounding development practices? How are developers distinguished 
on their capabilities to execute these practices? And are developers able to 




(re)produce role positions in the market structure, even though development 
practices may not be institutionalized? 
Since this dissertation is attempting to cover large ground within the short time frame 
that a UK Ph.D. allows, there are some obvious gaps and limitations in its design. To 
begin with, the number of individual practices that I aim to study is quite too many, 
and all of which require a great deal of analysis, given how complicated these 
practices are. Secondly, it is not an easy task to stitch the different practices together, 
especially when they are not all part of a single development project. However, it is 
impossible to study one project case from start to end because the timelines can 
extend over several years. Moreover, to understand if practices are common across 
firms and projects, one would need to analyze not one, but several cases in detail, 
which again, is unfeasible given the time restrictions in a Ph.D. It is also difficult to 
access project-level details of certain practices like financing and approvals because 
of the high levels of opacity within these practices. To overcome these problems, I 
analyzed practices based on interviews mainly, and where possible, through 
participant observation (with the only exception being the practice of consent 
acquisition, for which I analyzed a specific case).  
Another limitation of focusing heavily on the practices of land development is that the 
dissertation is now oriented towards real estate developers- the only actor involved 
in all four practices in question. A host of other actors who are integral to the 
construction of land markets are therefore admittedly ignored. However, despite 
these drawbacks, the research design balances, or at least attempts to balance, 
between understanding the land market in parts and as a whole. Although connecting 
the different parts is incredibly challenging, only by doing so could I make sense of, 
or stumble upon unexpected findings about how the market for land is constructed. 
Connecting the general with the particular is not an easy task by any means, and is 
something that most researchers struggle with. What I have set out to achieve is, 
therefore, rather ambitious but an important endeavor nonetheless.  




5.  DISSERTATION STRUCTURE 
This thesis comprises of eight chapters in total, which include five empirical chapters 
in addition to a chapter on methodology, the introduction, and conclusion. Of the five 
empirical chapters, one chapter covers the historical evolution of Mumbai’s real 
estate industry and the categorization of development firms in the city. The other four 
chapters are about the practices of land development in Mumbai, i.e., one chapter 
dedicated to each of the core practices that make up the land development process. 
The four practices are consent acquisition, valuation, approvals, and financing. The 
ordering of these four chapters is not representative of the sequence in which they 
actually occur, but rather the sequence in which I choose to unpack my arguments 
and ideas in this monograph. I, therefore, begin with the practice of consent 
acquisition because it is in this chapter that I address the fundamental issue 
pertaining to land commodification: property rights and ownership. In the chapters 
that follow, I delve into more specific but related problems like commensuration of 
land value, reproduction of role positions (of development firms) vis-à-vis the shifting 
frameworks of land development, and the institutionalization of economic behavior 
among land market actors.  
In Chapter 2, the methodology chapter, I explain the reason and methodological 
process behind selecting and identifying the four practices mentioned above, as my 
empirical focus. I then explain what sort of data I collected, sources and means of 
collecting the data, the number of interviews conducted, sites and cases studied, etc. 
I also discuss how I negotiated access in order to study some of the more closely 
guarded practices like financing and approvals. Here, I reflect on the advantages and 
disadvantages of being not just local to the context but also an insider, as several of 
the people I interviewed are former colleagues, friends, or friends of my family. I 
follow this with a section describing my experience of working at a real estate 
valuation and consulting firm in Mumbai, for nine months during my fieldwork. I end 
this chapter by discussing some of the practical and analytical challenges I faced while 
carrying out my research and how I overcame these challenges. 




The first part of Chapter 3 is aimed at familiarizing the reader with Mumbai’s 
contextual background and setting the scene for the arguments that follow in the 
remaining chapters. I do this by covering the historical evolution of Mumbai’s real 
estate industry from 2005 to 2019. The year 2005 marks the beginning of economic 
liberalization in real estate in India, while the years leading up to 2019 is when a 
liquidity crisis forced several real estate firms across the city to fold. The section 
includes data on real estate production, sales, and investments in the sector to 
emphasize the paradox of FDI and the great transformation of Mumbai’s real estate 
industry. In the second part of this chapter, I sort and categorize all 2,300 active real 
estate developers in the city using filters I devised based on a status ordering that 
became evident to me during my fieldwork. Developers were categorized into five 
groups that roughly depict their “eliteness” in order to learn how the field of real 
estate developers is organized. The sorting exercise revealed that real estate supply 
(by volume as well as value) is not concentrated among a handful of elite developers, 
but rather a group that comprises of a new generation of entrepreneurial developers 
who are especially good at acquiring (inhabited) land. These findings serve as 
preliminary evidence of the significance of land commodification in Mumbai’s real 
estate industry.  
In Chapter 4, I introduce the first of the four land development practices: the practice 
of Consent Acquisition. Since this practice is organized around the very unique and 
complicated task of private developers acquiring slum land, I focus only on what is 
most relevant to the study of land markets: the coordination problem between 
developers and slum residents in carrying out the land exchange. I analyze how this 
problem is overcome by paying particular attention to the external and endogenous 
systems that are in place to resolve conflicts over (slum) land exchange. I, therefore, 
study the role of the Slum Redevelopment Authority- an institution set up to allow 
and facilitate the privatized redevelopment of slums in Mumbai and other cities in 
Maharashtra. The first part of my analysis looks at whether the rules framed by the 
SRA help mitigate the challenges of the land exchange. In the second part, I analyze 
how developers and slum residents are placed in relation to these rules- especially in 




terms of division of risks. Finally, I study how both sets of actors respond to the rules 
and how they actually get the job done. My findings suggest that coordination 
struggles in slum land exchange cannot be overcome by institutionalized practices 
alone, and requires developers to adopt an ad hoc approach to problem-solving, 
which does not guarantee success. It for this reason that developers who are 
successful in acquiring (slum) land, are rewarded generously. However, as a 
consequence, consent acquisition ends up becoming a goal in itself for many 
developers. 
Chapter 5 is the practice of Project Valuation. In this chapter, I explore the constraints 
and conditions that frame evaluation practices in Mumbai’s land market, focusing in 
particular on how socially constructed criteria for a “capable developer” produces 
land value. The first section of the chapter lays out the regulatory context and 
historical background of land evaluation in Mumbai. Here I discuss the regulations 
that govern land pricing in Mumbai. The most significant of these regulations is the 
“ready reckoner rate,” which is essentially a minimum price cap for land and property, 
set (and revised yearly) by the State in order to prevent tax evasion through 
undervaluation of property deals. In the following sections, I present my 
ethnographic findings, which reveal that real estate developers in Mumbai 
distinguish themselves from each other and get distinguished, in a context where 
shared conventions of land value are exogenously established through a base rate for 
taxation, by project count. Developers are therefore geared towards acquiring land, 
irrespective of the economic benefits of doing so, because of the social meanings and 
prestige associated with acquiring and developing land in the Indian context. I end 
the chapter by proposing that evaluation practices in Mumbai’s land market are 
guided by the social expectations riding on developers to deliver on the (future) 
imagination of commodified land and the prestige that comes with being successful 
at it. 
In Chapter 6, I discuss the practice of seeking government approvals for the use and 
development of land in Mumbai. Here I focus on how developers strive to gain 




discretionary benefits from government officials to improve/retain competitive 
advantage and thereby establish their role position in the market structure. In the 
first section, I discuss how under urgent pressures of urban transformation, the rules 
governing land development in Mumbai are faced with many disruptions from forces 
external to inter-firm dynamics, including but not limited to civil society. I then lay 
out the regulatory and bureaucratic conditions that characterize the world of real 
estate developers in Mumbai, in order to get at their conception of instability and 
control. In the following section, I analyze whether or not a hierarchical ordering in 
terms of competitive advantage exists among developers in Mumbai. I then go on to 
propose that since rules of land development in Mumbai are not just capricious but 
also difficult to enforce, contestations between firms get relegated to the back, and 
the concept of stability takes on a new meaning for market actors, wherein the focus 
is not to obstruct price-competition, but rather to strengthen the collective function 
of developers in the future imaginaries of urban development. 
In Chapter 7, I cover the last of the four practices: the practice of financing. In this 
chapter, I focus on the institutional conditions governing real estate financing and the 
practices adopted by developers to navigate and/or overcome these conditions. In 
the first part of the chapter, I explore the hurdles and contradictions in accessing 
finance for real estate development, despite the liberalization of the sector nearly 
fifteen years ago. I then go on to show how much of the funding that is available to 
developers is highly conditional and expensive, which either deters or restricts them 
from utilizing institutional finance for land development. In the following section, I 
turn my attention towards the group of young entrepreneurial developers with 
relatively weaker financial credentials that did end up receiving much of the available 
finance. In particular, I study the contractual agreements they are bound to, and the 
extent of their adherence to these agreements. My findings reveal that the rules of 
financial exchange are, in reality, difficult to impose because of the unavoidable 
stickiness between a developer and the land they are meant to commoditize/ develop. 
As a consequence, developers exploit several opportunities to earn a profit outside 
the planned sale of property. A project’s completion and its final economic outcome, 




therefore, become less consequential, since profit may be accrued by a developer, 
irrespective of the completion of the development cycle.  
In the concluding chapter, I highlight key claims of this dissertation, starting with the 
assertion that attempts to liberalize India’s real estate sector have derailed because 
they are riddled with obstacles. I then go on to remind the reader that these obstacles 
are not an external counter to the commodification of land. Instead, I postulate that 
the obstacles, one sees in Mumbai’s real estate industry, are symptomatic of the 
fragmented social arenas within which interactions in a land market take place and 
the various incoherent institutions that govern land market practices. I emphasize 
this point by recapitulating the land development process in Mumbai to make evident 
how the marketized production of real estate is funademnetally riddled with 
contradictions and complexities, and that efforts to establish an imagination of land 
free from social ties, is always hindered by a contrarian reality. Finally, I discuss how 
the developers’ critical, albeit unscrupulous, attempts to overcome obstacles are 
perceived as a heroic feat because prediction, and thereby participation in the land 
market, is pinned on the ability of a developer to deliver the imagined future of 
commodified land. I end by suggesting that in their eagerness to emerge triumphant 
against the hurdles of land commodification, developers seem to overlook the goal of 
establishing long-term institutional order, which is necessary not just for markets to 





 METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS 
1.  FINDING A RESEARCH QUESTION 
Several of the researchers who preceded me in studying post-liberalized Indian cities, 
entered the field, expecting to document a remarkable transformation (Ghertner, 
2015; Goldman, 2011; Searle, 2014, 2016). “I was basically convinced of the 
overwhelming power of global capital – and the neoliberal policies that directed it – 
to destroy communities and oversee mass displacements,” writes Liza Weinstein in 
the introduction of her book The Durable Slum, which describes the politics of 
resistance among slum residents in Mumbai (Weinstein, 2014b, p. 4). Having grown 
up in India, for me, however, the concept of transformation did not feel rapid or 
remarkable. On the contrary, within my social world of architects and urban planners 
(I trained and practiced as an architect before turning to Sociology), discussions 
usually revolved around how projects took exceptionally long to complete in India, if 
and when they did, because of bureaucratic hurdles and land-related conflicts. I, 
therefore, wanted to highlight the frictions encountered by finance capital, or what 
Anna Tsing has called “frictions of global connections” (Tsing, 2005, p. 3). When I 
began my ethnographic field research in April 2017, I was very much inspired by the 
substantivist model of economic decision-making conceived by Karl Polanyi (A. 
Jenkins, 1977).  I, therefore, imagined the goals of land market actors to be scattered, 
unpredictable, and not just about profit maximization. In particular, I was interested 
in identifying the social and cultural factors that influenced land deals in Mumbai. At 
the time, I was of the notion that market actors based their decisions on ultimate 
values, including religious beliefs, community bonds, patronage, etc.  
While such an understanding of land exchange is not entirely ill-founded, I realized a 
few months into my fieldwork that my conception of economic behavior may have 
been rather simplistic. After several interviews with developers, landowners, 
property brokers and consultants, it became clear to me that in a crowded 
commercial city like Mumbai, the land was a highly sought-after resource, and at a 




fundamental level, the goal of all actors engaging in land exchange was indeed to 
achieve maximum economic profit. However, I also learned that the field of land 
exchange is diverse and comprises of many more actors other than just buyers and 
sellers of land and property. Intermediaries or middle-men, I discovered, played a 
crucial role in Mumbai’s land market, operating as transmitters of knowledge, 
services, and political patronage, and this elaborate network of actors subjected 
exchange arrangements to high levels of uncertainty. Besides, the opacity and lack of 
stability in rules governing land exchange in Mumbai exacerbated the uncertainty 
among market actors, thereby restricting them from making decisions that always 
ensured maximum profit. Jens Beckert has argued that the acknowledgment of 
uncertainty within economic exchanges is a far more convincing starting-point for a 
sociological contribution to the understanding of economic phenomena than simply 
refuting the maximizing assumption that stands at the core of economic theory 
(Beckert, 1996, 2003). Beckert proposes that in highly contingent situations that are 
characterized by uncertainty, economic actors cannot deduce their actions from a 
clear preference ranking and thereby maximize their utility (Beckert, 1996, p. 804). 
And while I did not recognize the restrictive capacity of uncertainty among land 
market actors instantly, I was able to intuitively reject assumptions that treated real 
estate developers as economically rational actors, perhaps because of my familiarity 
with Mumbai’s peculiar development landscape. 
Mumbai, both as a field site and my home city, was a glaring reminder of the 
complications and contradictions associated with capitalistic land development. This 
is because land-use patterns in the city, at the most visible level, indicate that land 
exchanges are not always driven by the logic of the rent gap. The distribution of slums 
across the entire landscape of the city, including rich neighborhoods, is one stark 
example (see Figure 1). 





Figure 1: Heatmap of Mumbai's real estate prices and slum settlements (Compiled by Author; Data: Liases 
Foras, 2020; Map: kepler.gl) 
The concentration of relatively expensive new properties in regions that are neither 
close to jobs nor well-serviced in terms of transport infrastructure or civic amenities 
is another indicator that project locations may be determined by land availability 
rather than spending power. Having conducted several mapping exercises of housing 
typologies in Mumbai as part of my architecture training, I was aware that there are 
deficiencies in the land-use patterns proposed by Chicago-school urbanists5 . As I 
                                                        
5 The Chicago School model suggests that cities grow steadily outward from the urban core or central 
business district. Surrounding this commercial core is a "zone in transition," with factories and 




delved deeper into land-economics and real estate financing, I also started noticing 
how common it was for projects to be stalled or abandoned, and how in many cases, 
these projects, when eventually completed, looked nothing like what was initially 
planned, even when well-known developers were involved. My recognition of these 
peculiarities provoked me to study how profit-driven actors, i.e., real estate 
developers, navigated or rather struggled to navigate economic exchanges when 
developing land. To carry out such a study, I needed a deeper understanding of how 
real estate developers operate. In particular, I had to find out whether developers 
followed market indicators when deciding where and how much to build. 
To learn more about real estate developers and the logics of land development in 
Mumbai, I conducted participant observation with an Indian real estate data analytics 
and consulting firm (which I call PropConsulting), whose managing director, Manoj 
Gupta6, saw a use for a Ph.D. researcher. PropConsulting is a Mumbai-based private 
enterprise that employs over 100 people to collect first-hand data on real estate 
indicators, including property price, sales, and production of new real estate, project 
delays, developer performance, and so on. In addition to collecting and processing 
data, the firm offers consultancy services to banks, funding agencies, developers, and 
various departments of the state and central government. I was introduced to Manoj 
in 2015, when I had just begun my Ph.D. studies, by a mutual developer-friend who 
recognized our overlapping interest in land markets. Where I hoped to learn about 
real estate valuation and financing, Manoj hoped that I would contribute towards 
churning out newsletters and whitepapers to help promote the firm’s image as an 
authority on Indian real estate. Though Manoj was aware that I would be actively 
carrying out empirical fieldwork, he offered me a paid part-time position for a period 
of nine months, starting in February 2017, which roughly is when I started my 
                                                        
warehouses. Beyond this comes the tenements and apartments of the working class, next the middle-
class neighborhoods of larger homes, and ultimately the affluent commuter zones. 
6 In keeping in line with research ethics, all names mentioned in this thesis are pseudonyms. However, 
in case of public participants, firms whose identities are too obvious, or when quoting from news 
sources, real names are used. All participants were nevertheless provided with a background 
information sheet to clarify terms of participation in this research. 




fieldwork in Mumbai. While my primary tasks at PropConsulting involved doing 
research on land-use policy, urban development, and housing, as well as, assisting 
with editorial work, I was simultaneously learning about the work my colleagues in 
the business development and consulting teams did. This included learning how 
financial models of land development are used to advise clients on their decision to 
buy and/or develop land and determine the “right valuation” of a land parcel or 
property.  
It was a struggle to understand and keep up with the lingo and terms that my 
colleagues at PropConsulting used, especially when discussing financial concepts. I 
had to spend much time learning about terms like Net Present Value (NPV), Internal 
Rate of Return (IRR), and Return on Equity (ROE), and their use in valuation models. 
Though it was not necessary for me to get into the details of how these models worked, 
I wanted to because I was conscious about how my colleagues perceived me, and 
because of what Bruce Carruthers once noted about sociologists when distinguishing 
between the fields of economics and economic sociology. He writes: 
…the overwhelming majority of sociologists lack the mathematical skills necessary 
to appreciate the formal models so beloved by contemporary economists. Whether 
or not they fully understand economics, most sociologists are unsympathetic and 
unconvinced by its imperialist claims (Carruthers, 1997, pp. 1–2).  
Being a research student was also a challenge because my colleagues attached their 
own meanings to the word “research” and “student.”  For example, many of my 
colleagues, including my boss Manoj expected my study to be a comprehensive report 
that provides solutions to India’s housing problems. Most of them also assumed that 
since I am a student, they needed to teach me how the industry operates. Their 
eagerness to educate me is evident in the way they responded to my questions, not 
realizing that I was studying them just as much as I was studying what they did. This 
was probably because they imagined me to eventually follow a similar professional 
path as them.  Manoj especially encouraged me several times to return home (and to 
PropConsulting) after my studies, to “contribute to the development of India.” In fact, 
this was a recurring topic of discussion between Manoj and me. I found Manoj to be 




curiously optimistic about India’s future. “India will soon achieve double-digit 
[economic] growth,” he once claimed, and much of his optimism rested on the 
assumption that land–use will become “rationalized,” or respectively put to 
economically-productive use as the real estate industry evolves.  
The mismatch between demand potential and supply of new real estate in the country 
was, according to Manoj, an opportunity waiting to be tapped, as if real estate could 
follow the same production patterns as consumer goods. For me, the realization that 
real estate functions differently to general consumer products coincidentally came 
during a conversation with Manoj, when he unwittingly contradicted himself.  I had 
been reading several news articles about the misdeeds of “fly-by-night developers” 
while working on a report about the city’s housing shortage, and the huge potential it 
poses for real estate developers to grow their business. Conflating the opportunity to 
make money, with the opportunity to build more, I asked Manoj:  
Why don’t developers get their act together to achieve greater efficiency and 
thereby increase production? The more you build, the more financing you receive, 
and the more sales you make, by virtue of being a developer who delivers!  
In my mind, it was a win-win situation, and I couldn’t understand why developers 
didn’t see it that way. Manoj looked at me bemused and said, “Why would developers 
work to make money when they can make money without doing any work?!” Manoj’s 
comment made me realize that I also had a problematic understanding of land 
development, wherein I imagined that the sum of parts, that is, housing shortage + 
access to finance + capable developers to do the job, needed to result in new housing. 
Also implicit in that comment, and what was missing from my perception of real 
estate developers, is the Weberian idea of rationalization, which is, achieving 
maximum results with a minimum amount of effort (Hilbert, 1987). Whether the end 
goal for real estate developers is profit maximization or not, their goal is certainly not 
as straightforward as producing new property, and herein lies the fallacy upon which 
theories of land markets and property development are based. 




As time passed, and I became more familiar to the employees of PropConsulting, the 
mask of developmental optimism began to wear off. Towards the end of my fieldwork, 
India’s real estate industry was reported to be facing one of the worst slow-downs it 
had seen until date. Developers had been defaulting on their financial commitments, 
and the effects were showing across other ancillary services that support real estate 
development. At PropConsulting, I would hear murmurs of delayed payments and the 
thinning out of revenues. Local newspapers featured stories of failed projects and the 
anguish of homebuyers on a regular basis. While Manoj repeatedly claimed in media 
interviews that the sector was undergoing a “corrective” phase, as property prices in 
Indian metropolitan cities had risen beyond justification over the past five years, it 
was the underlying fragility of the industry, which had little to do with boom and bust 
cycles, that was becoming increasingly visible to me. Developers were failing at the 
task at hand, because and by Manoj’s own confession to me, there are other means for 
them to make money besides effectively producing and selling new real estate. 
Therefore, buried beneath the standard tropes of market correction and 
consolidation, it was this fragility that holds back sustained production of real estate 
that became my research focus. I felt compelled to learn what is so unique about 
Mumbai’s land development industry that it cannot sustain its growth, and how a 
developer seeks rationality in this fragile and uncertain environment, that in many 
ways, is their own doing.  
2.  MAKING SENSE OF THE FIELD 
When I started field investigations, I relied on my existing social network7 to identify 
and forge connections with useful informants. Having lived in Mumbai for over 
twenty years, and having attended Architecture school there, I had a fairly good 
understanding of both the local culture and the dynamics of the city’s building 
                                                        
7 My social network consisted of people I went to school and college with, their friends, friends of my 
parents, and extended relatives. Some of these people are either directly involved, or belong to families 
that are involved in land development. Besides, in recent years, my professional and academic interests 
also drew me closer to developers, financiers and consultants, many of whom are now part of my social 
world. 




industry.  It was, however, five individuals, who served as my gatekeepers, and who 
were exceptionally helpful and influential in my fieldwork (full interview schedule 
attached as Annex  F).  
Arjun Kapoor is one of them. Arjun is the non-executive chairman of a real estate and 
hospitality arm of a large Indian conglomerate, who I met at a conference in 2012. He 
is well known and respected among members of the Indian real estate industry (I 
know this because of the prompt and gushing responses he received to the emails he 
sent out when introducing me to my participants). My connection to him, therefore, 
proved to be most valuable, since he not only introduced me to several of my elite 
participants but also because most of these participants agreed to meet with me only 
because of my connection to Arjun.  
Vasudev Krishnan is another such person who helped me navigate the field and 
understand the topic from a financiers’ perspective. Vasu is an ex-boss of mine, from 
when I worked at a housing finance company in Mumbai in 2014. Having worked in 
the finance sector for over fifty years, Vasu has significant knowledge and experience 
in the field of development and real estate finance. Like Arjun, he is well connected 
with real estate folks in Mumbai.  
Similarly, Manoj Gupta, my boss at PropConsulting, was also helpful in establishing 
new connections and providing me insights into land valuation and project appraisals. 
Despite being a busy person, Manoj made time for long discussions and interviews 
with me at least once a week and was also generous enough to share with me the 
firm’s proprietary data that informs several assertions made in this dissertation 
(consent form for the use of this data has been reviewed by my Ph.D. supervisor).  
In addition to professional acquaintances and colleagues, my personal network of 
friends and college mates proved to be useful during fieldwork too. Rajesh Shah, who 
studied architecture with me, and now works as a liaison architect (a mediator 
between developers and government officials) in Mumbai, is one such friend. Rajesh 
served as my go-to person for all things related to building approvals and 
bureaucratic procedures and even helped me source information on development 




projects through the Right to Information platform. Since Rajesh’s father is a small-
time developer specializing in slum redevelopment work, Rajesh was also able to 
guide me through the process of slum redevelopment and direct me to pertinent 
projects for identifying as case studies. 
Lastly, my friend and ex-colleague from the housing finance company, Jayant Patil, 
offered me a lens to study land development practices from below. Jayant can be best 
described as a “fixer” or a person who is good at solving problems for others. He also 
juggles many jobs at once. While his main job is that of a field officer at the housing 
finance company, he additionally operates two uber taxis and manages the properties 
of his relatives who have been given resettlement homes in newly redeveloped slums. 
Jayant helped me gain access to the Dhobi Ghat slum (one of my case studies), as well 
as other slums in the neighborhood. He also introduced me to several of his contacts 
in Dhobi Ghat, and always insisted on accompanying me on my visits and interviews 
in the slums8. 
These social connections of mine provided me orientation in the initial stages of my 
fieldwork and saved plenty of time that would have otherwise been wasted in 
following up on unanswered emails. I say this because many of my informants, 
especially developers, responded much faster when someone important (such as 
Arjun), or someone known to them made the connection. The few times that I tried to 
contact participants directly, I failed to get a response, despite me highlighting my 
association with the LSE. Besides, I found that informants were more inclined to talk 
and reveal honest information, when someone they know, respect, or trust had 
vouched for me. I also found that the top bosses, especially at development firms, 
talked more than mid-level or junior employees. Ex-employees of a company were 
useful informants too, considering most of my meetings took place in the offices of 
the informant.  
                                                        
8 I attribute Jayant’s insistence on accompanying me to my field visits in Dhobi Ghat partly to the idea 
of protection that is synonymous with patriarchy in India. 




Having access to a great number of informants, however, meant that filtering out non-
critical actors was a long and messy process. The initial months of my fieldwork were 
spent in recognizing all the assorted actors involved in land/development deals, 
sorting them into categories, and then understanding their significance in relation to 
development outcomes. One of the strategies suggested to me at the time by Manoj, 
was to follow the distribution of profits, as it is a good reflection of power structures 
within the land market. Therefore, developers, financiers, and landowners gradually 
became my main focus, as opposed to the vast network of intermediaries who also 
play an important role in the real estate industry.  This, however, meant that I was, in 
most instances, “studying up” (Nader, 1988); rather than studying people with less 
economic and political power than myself, I was studying people with more.  
As a consequence, I often found my informants trying to place me in relation to their 
own social positions. Very often, I was asked questions about which school and 
college I attended, my contacts within the industry; who my parents are, where they 
live, the professional positions they hold, etc. While culturally, it is not unusual for 
Indians to ask personal questions pertaining to one’s caste/class when meeting for 
the first time, I saw this as a vetting process adopted by informants to determine my 
trustworthiness. This exchange of backgrounds proved useful in establishing a bond 
with many second-generation developers, and young consultants and financiers, who 
identified with me, or more so, my international education and exposure to foreign 
contexts. These were mostly men in their thirties and forties, who never failed to tell 
me about the MBA degree they earned from international universities, or the time 
they spent living and working in a foreign city. However, to build familiarity with my 
participants was not always an advantage. As a woman, I am an anomaly in a male-
dominated industry. Therefore, some, especially older informants, treated me as a 
female relative, or a prospective one (inquiring if I was married). Others tried to flirt. 
Some informants probably expected my frequent meetings with them to lead to a 
friendship eventually.  




What unnerved me most about the skewed gender dynamics in my fieldwork was that 
most of my male informants frequently resorted to the use of complicated real estate 
jargon in my presence, which I saw as an assertion of symbolic power in their 
professional field of struggle (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2004, p. 243). Informants would 
also offer indiscriminate ideas to me, for including in my thesis. “I have a theory about 
why prices in central business districts never fall..., and you must quote me for this”, 
was one such suggestion. Manoj, my boss at PropConsulting, too, had many theories 
on the science of property price, which he hopes to patent one day. Some informants 
would, on the contrary, prod me into providing answers to questions that are better 
suited for economists like, “why is there no price correction in Mumbai’s property 
market, despite the slow sales?” or “what will the impact of a vacant land tax be, in 
the Indian context?”. While I generally brushed aside these questions to prevent 
digressions, the pressure to appear knowledgeable among real estate professionals 
often took me down into rabbit holes, since it wasn’t until much later in the fieldwork 
that I had clarity about my own research agenda. 
Looking back, what helped me find orientation amidst the endless possibilities of 
research questions was my natural instinct to think like an architect and deconstruct 
land development into its primary building blocks. Therefore, while the overarching 
goal was always to get at the logic of land market practices, realizing this goal 
required me to break down my fieldwork into simpler tasks, such as identifying and 
studying how land is developed. In fact, this strategy did guide not only my fieldwork 
but also the design of my thesis, with empirical chapters being organized according 
to building practices.   
3.  FIELDWORK STRUCTURE 
 Timeframe 
Fieldwork for this project was carried out in multiple phases, between February 2017 
and October 2019. The first and longest phase lasted eleven months and was the main 
fieldwork period during which time I also conducted participant observation at 




PropConsulting. Subsequently, I made five additional field visits to Mumbai, between 
April 2018 and October 2019, with each visit being around five weeks long, thereby 
making the cumulative length of my fieldwork fifteen months. During the initial 
months of my fieldwork, I spent time exploring the field without a rigid schedule or 
agenda. Although I was working at PropConsulting a few days a week, the remainder 
of my week comprised of visits to various up-coming development projects in the city, 
and talking to those people connected to the real estate industry, who I had easy 
access to.  As weeks went by, I began to focus my research attention towards Dhobi 
Ghat, a slum redevelopment project in the city, because of a paper I was co-authoring 
at the time, on the topic.  In particular, I spent this time investigating the temporary 
exchange of land between slum residents and the real estate developer driving the 
project.  
At the end of phase one of my fieldwork, I returned to London to consolidate my 
findings and research ideas, and also prepare for the doctoral upgrade. It was then 
that I also defined the core chapters of my thesis and the connecting theme across 
these chapters. The delayed decision-making on my part, on the structure of the thesis, 
however, meant that I lacked data specific to the empirical chapters I planned to 
write-up. In the five brief trips that I made to Mumbai in the months after, I was able 
to dedicate my attention to each chapter at a time, in the order that I was writing them. 
Such a fieldwork process, although expensive and environmentally unfriendly, 
allowed me to compartmentalize my different empirical concerns and avoid 
distractions and digressions during interviews. I could, therefore, meet the same 
participant on different visits, to talk about different aspects of land development, 
which I found to be more effective than covering everything all at once. Besides, due 
to a stretched out fieldwork, I was able to check on the progress of the Dhobi Ghat 
project as it developed (or stalled rather), and also view from up close, effects of the 
economic and temporal shifts on Mumbai’s real estate industry.  





Over the course of my fifteen-month fieldwork, I conducted a total of eighty-seven 
semi-structured interviews, in addition to numerous casual conversations with 
actors who are directly or indirectly involved in land development in Mumbai. Each 
interview generally lasted up to an hour, although, in cases where I had a previously 
established bond with the participant, interviews sometimes went on for over three 
hours. Of the eighty-seven interviews, twenty-five were “repeat interviews,” with 
participants who I interviewed more than once. Therefore, in total, I interviewed 
sixty-two unique individuals, who I roughly categorize into nine groups. The 
breakdown of my interview participants, according to this grouping, is as shown 
below (Table 1).  






Legal expert 5 
Financier 4 
Govt. official / Regulator 4 
Activist 2 
Journalist 1 
Developers accounted for nearly 40% of my interviewees, followed by property 
consultants (13%) and slum residents (14.5%). Informants in the developer category 
belonged to fifteen different development firms that vary in size and status. While I 
discuss the categorisation of development firms in the next chapter, it is worth noting 




at this point that six (40%) out of the fifteen development firms to which my 
informants belong, are Group 3 firms, or what I describe as millennial firms that 
emerged post-liberalization of the sector, and followed a debt-driven growth model. 
Further breakdown of the firms, whose employees I interviewed is as follows (Table 
2). Of the 24 developer participants, eleven are owners, promoters, or CEOs of firms, 
while the remaining thirteen participants are senior-mid level employees, and at least 
half of whom have previously worked in other development firms in the city.  






















0 6 9 1 8 
Num of firms 
(Total 15) 
0 5 6 1 3 
 
Among the eight property consultants that I interviewed, four were colleagues from 
PropConsulting, while the rest were employees at competing firms or were 
professional property valuators. The nine resident participants mostly include 
persons who were affected by the slum redevelopment project that serves as my case 
study for the chapter on Consent Acquisition. Similarly, participants from the other 
groups were critical to different empirical chapters in this thesis.  Financiers and legal 
experts were important actors for the chapter on Financing, while Architects and 
Government Officials play a prominent role in the chapter on Approvals. More details 
on the significance and professional role of these actors are discussed within specific 
chapters. 
 Data Collection 
While I did not collect any first-hand data for this project, I drew on many secondary 
data such as performance history and growth trajectory of development firms, 




product differentiation among firms, approval times across different projects, and 
financial investments/ FDI flows into Mumbai’s real estate sector, and the 
distribution of these investments, to support my claims. The source of this data 
includes Government websites and departments, reports published by local and 
international consultants, and real estate data agencies in Mumbai.  Details of the 
methodology used by these original sources are discussed within relevant empirical 
chapters.  
4.  CHALLENGES FACED 
My fieldwork was not without challenges. Setting up interviews was a difficult task, 
even though I had friends and colleagues helping me get in touch with prospective 
interviewees. Finding that right contact person to make a connection, took time too, 
and was not always successful. Besides, while first meetings were always easier to set 
up, follow-up meetings, which I found to be much more useful usually, required 
persistence. Since many of my informants were busy people, it used to take me up to 
a week or two, to organize an interview with them. The pace of interviews, however, 
was erratic, ranging from six interviews in a week to zero interviews the following 
week. This was because participants (developers in particular) kept rescheduling, 
constantly changing the time and/or date of the meeting, or kept me waiting for hours 
before they actually met me, which I found to be extremely frustrating. While I ascribe 
this problem to the unprofessional attitude of developers in India, Manoj, who is far 
more used to dealing with developers than me, claims that it is common for 
developers, industrialists, and high-level businessmen who think their lives are at 
risk, to dodge appointments in order to prevent any planned attack or kidnapping.  
I was unable to work with a rigid interview schedule, therefore, and had to leave room 
for spontaneity and delays in my fieldwork planning. I often found myself running 
across the city, trying to make it to a meeting that got confirmed at the last minute. 
There was also never a clear end to my work-day, as meetings sometimes stretched 
late into the evenings. Besides, since some of my informants were also known to me 
personally, it was difficult to separate fieldwork related discussions from casual 




banter, especially when meetings ended up taking place over a glass of beer. The 
blurred separation of work and play posed an ethical concern for my research, as 
informants were not always aware of the context within which they were having that 
discussion with me. However, if something pertinent to my research was mentioned 
to me in a casual setting, then I made it a point to clarify my intension of using it for 
my dissertation. The other disadvantage of being close to my subjects, and not having 
enough analytical distance from the field, was that it perhaps hindered my reflexivity, 
and I may have tended to normalize a lot of the information I gathered from 
interviews and field study. I noticed this, for instance, in my characterization of 
institutions governing land markets in India as “lacking” in strength.  
My proximity to the field also affected my approach to establishing formal consent 
agreements with informants. Getting verbal consent from informants was not difficult 
once informants had agreed to meet or speak with me. However, to get them to sign 
consent forms was particularly awkward for me, as I am overly conscious of the 
cultural skepticism towards written contracts in India.  Therefore, in most cases, I 
emailed my informants a background information form after the interview, in case 
they needed to get in touch at a later point. In fact, participants did not want to be 
recorded either, simply because matters pertaining to land transactions are 
inevitably controversial, and in many times illegal. For this reason, I had to stick to 
hand-written notes during interviews, which meant that a lot of interview material 
got lost in the process of transcription. In an industry where deals worth millions of 
dollars are made based on handshakes and informal agreements, trust counted for 
much more than printed contracts. My informants, I felt, were less concerned about 
protecting themselves legally, than about reputational damage, or information being 
leaked to troublemakers. For me, too, my trustworthiness and physical safety were of 
greater concern than maintaining documental evidence of consent and the content of 
an interview. It was, therefore, in my best interest to be completely open about my 
identity and research intentions and to assure my informants the absolute anonymity. 




Since it is not uncommon for information on prospective land sales, illegal 
constructions, and scams involving land deals to be traded for money and favors, 
some informants were hesitant to share “valuable” information with me for free. 
These informants assumed that I would profit from the information they give me, and 
hence expected something in return for it. In two such incidents, informants wanted 
(petty) compensation in exchange for information regarding a slum’s redevelopment. 
Both times I had to decline the proposal, which meant losing the opportunity for an 
interview. Some informants also suspected me of being a housing rights activist. In 
one instance, the informant stopped taking my calls, and sent word through my friend 
Jayant’s cousin, that he was afraid of getting pulled up by the developer for talking to 
an activist. There wasn’t much I could do in that situation except take note of his fear, 
which I later recognized to be real and justified. Ironically, with my developer 
informants too, there was the risk that they would go into hiding at any point if a 
controversy broke out. In one such instance, a developer critical to my case study, and 
whom I had been in regular contact with, when accused by an activist of a land scam, 
refrained from any further communication thereafter. In fact, towards the later stages 
of my fieldwork, when the real estate industry appeared to be heading towards a 
crisis, most developers became disinclined to meet and appeared distinctly less 
sociable than the years before.  
Finally, accessing data was just as much a challenge for me as gaining access to key 
informants. While my research mainly relied on ethnographic methods, I required 
data on real estate activity in Mumbai, to substantiate and confirm the claims made 
by my informants, and test the veracity of my own propositions. However, I found 
there to be little useful data in the public domain on India’s real estate performance 
indicators, and even data which is meant to be publicly accessible like number, 
location, and pace of new developments in the city are hard to get hold of. Therefore, 
I had to source this data from private agencies such as PropConsulting or to wrest it 
from various government departments through the Right to Information (RTI) Act. 
As a result, much of the data presented in my thesis, although procured with official 
consent, is proprietary to those working at PropConsulting, and not freely accessible 




to other researchers. In fact, I realize now that carrying out paid work at 
PropConsulting as part of my fieldwork also undermined research ethics. Since I was 
both working and carrying out Ph.D. fieldwork at PropConsulting, my identity, which 
was made clear to all, may have become ambiguous to colleagues after a period of 
time. Though something to be more mindful of when carrying out future research, my 
slippage in and out of the professional world of property consulting, allowed the “self” 
and the “other” to encounter and confront one another. This was particularly 
important to me as I was also analyzing the socio-physical transformation of a city 






 MUMBAI’S REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY 
1.  MUMBAI: A CITY OF CONTRADICTIONS 
 Background 
Contemporary Mumbai is a site of great contradictions. While the city, on the one 
hand, aspires to be a top global destination for business and commerce, it struggles 
to meet the housing needs of much of its population, on the other. According to 
anthropologist Arjun Appadurai, cities like Mumbai usually attract more poor people 
than they can handle and more capital than they can absorb. He writes: 
They offer the magic of wealth, celebrity, glamour, and power through their mass 
media. But they often contain shadow economies that are difficult to measure in 
traditional terms (Appadurai, 2000, p. 628).  
Mumbai belongs to a group of cities in which global wealth and local poverty 
articulate a growing contradiction. As Architect and Urban Planner Rahul Mehrotra 
points out, Urban India has been one of the most interesting sites for the modern 
project: “a place where the notion of modernity was simultaneously embraced and 
resisted, creating a highly fractured and fragmented landscape,” he says (Mehrotra, 
2010, p. 244).  Such cities are also the site of various uncertainties about citizenship, 
as people come to them in large numbers from impoverished rural areas. Work is 
often difficult to obtain and retain. The rich in these cities seek to gate as much of their 
lives as possible, traveling from guarded homes to darkened cars to air-conditioned 
offices, always moving in an envelope of privilege through the heat of public poverty 
and the dust of dispossession (Appadurai, 2000, p. 628). Both rich and poor, however, 
emphasize the ability of people who live in Mumbai to live with, and in close proximity 
to difference. This type of cosmopolitanism, which is based on cultural and spatial co-
existence, Appadurai notes, is, in some ways, Mumbai’s self-governing cliché.  
Mumbai’s cosmopolitanism and contradictions are most visible in the city’s built 
environment and housing in particular. “The absent, the ghostly, the speculative, the 
fantastic all have their part to play in the simultaneous excesses and lacks of 




Bombay's housing scene,” notes Appadurai, comparing these absurdities, in a setting 
where housing and its lack are grossly real, to a “spectral experience” (Appadurai, 
2000, p. 635). At the geographic heart of the city, one can see India's most powerful 
industries, and some of its poorest slums (Figure 2). Billion-dollar houses in the form 
of skyscrapers exist next to vast slums covered in blue tarps that protect against the 
monsoon rains. Informal recycling units in Dharavi, Mumbai’s most famous slum, 
exist within sight of the National Stock Exchange building. In describing the 
juxtaposition of architectural structures and lived realities, Mehrotra notes in an 
interview, Mumbai is made up of different things coming together in a haphazard 
manner. “It is this co-existence of new constructions, old constructions, formal 
settlements, shanties, that can all be captured in one single frame, that gives the city 
its unique aesthetic,” he says, adding that, with globalization and the emergence of a 
post-industrial service-based economy in Mumbai, as in several other cities in India, 
urban space has been fragmented and polarised with the rich and poor jostling for 
access to amenities (Chaudhuri, 2018). The result of the State’s withdrawal from 
delivering the projected image of a globalized city, Mehrotra says, has left it to be 
“constructed on ad hoc basis by the market” (ibid). 
 
Figure 2: Areal View of Mumbai's housing contrasts (Peter Bialobrzeski, 2018) 




In Mumbai, ad hoc efforts to emulate the skyline of global cities is not limited to 
patterns of built form alone, but also transcend to the practices of real estate 
development. Awkwardly tall and narrow buildings perched atop decrepit vernacular 
structures in congested and dusty streets – a common sight all over the city today – 
represent a juxtaposition of many things: architecture styles, social classes, dwelling 
cultures, colonial histories, etc., but also building practices (see Figure 3). In the 
fifteen years since the Indian real estate sector opened to the world, fresh contrasts 
have emerged, both in how real estate is produced, and the actors behind its 
production. The financing of real estate projects is one example. Real estate 
developers in Mumbai, be they corporate firms listed on the stock market, or 
promoter-driven entities with no corporate governance in place, rely on all kinds of 
assorted and contrasting sources of finance to develop projects, ranging from 
international pension funds to resources scrambled together from members of a 
community. Besides, the channels through which funding flows into a project can also 
vary significantly, especially in degrees of legality. Likewise, project evaluation, which 
is fundamental to land’s development, is carried out through varied methods 
involving the use of calculative models that boast of transparency, alongside 
rudimentary and less transparent methods such as following comparatives or relying 
on developer intuition. The reasons for, as well as consequences of, these contrasting 
development practices, can be linked to the socio-spatial conditions that make 
Mumbai a site of contradictions, and its patchwork development over the years. 





Figure 3: Pencil Towers in Mumbai's Inner City (Author, 2015) 
2.  MUMBAI’S URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
Originally a group of seven islands inhabited mainly by the fishing community, 
Mumbai, as we know it today, is the result of reclaiming land from the sea and 
eventually linking it to the mainland. Until about 1900, Mumbai did not extend 
beyond Mahim Creek and was confined to what is known as the Island City, the 
southern part of the peninsula (Figure 4). Greater Mumbai today is spread over an 
area of 445.86 sq km (about one third the physical size of Greater London, while 
housing almost doubles its population) and comprises the peninsula bound by the 
Arabian Sea to the West, Thane Creek to the East, and Vasai Creek and Ulhas River to 
the north (Figure 5). As the city is bounded by water on three sides, the scope for 
expansion is limited and restricted only northwards. Over the past two centuries, 
economic opportunities and an entrepreneurial ethos have nevertheless drawn 
millions of migrants to Bombay, even though the small island city could not 
adequately house all of these workers and their enterprises. Mumbai’s shift from 




Fordism to “flexible accumulation,” as a result, was accompanied by simultaneous 
spatial changes that have been quite massive (Whitehead & More, 2007, p. 2428). 
While on the one hand, industrial zones, primarily housing Mumbai’s textile mills, 
were transformed into new commercial hubs, the proliferation and expansion of slum 
settlements continued unabated on the other. The geographical constraint of the 
Island City only exacerbated the fight for space and has had an adverse influence on 
land values and land use in the city, leading to dismal housing conditions, despite the 
assemblage of glitzy skyscrapers.  





Figure 4: The Island of Bombay and Colaba 
(British Library Board, Materials Towards a 
Statistical Account, volume 3, 648 as cited in 
Riding, 2018, p. 37) 
Figure 5: Greater Mumbai (Royal Dutch Geographical 
Society KNAG, as cited in Nijman, 2010, p. 6) 
 
The city’s housing problems have been on record for over 150 years. The 1872 Census 
reported that: “The houses of Bombay are far too few in number to afford proper 
accommodation for its inhabitants’’ (Sundaram, 1986, p. 56), and this has been a 
trend in every Census that followed to this day. Things did not improve after India’s 
Independence in 1947, despite the initiation of successive housing policies by the 
Indian government. In fact, in light of accelerating rural-urban migration, the scale of 




the problem got worse. In the early 1980s, the shortage of housing exceeded one 
million units, and an estimated four million people had shared access to water 
standpipes, with an average of 270 persons per standpipe (Sundaram, 1986, pp. 57–
59). Furthermore, during the population boom in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, what we now understand as slums, first emerged in the city, as Greater 
Bombay’s slum population increased from 2.2 to 5.5 million or from 41.3% to 56.6% 
of the total population, between 1976 and 1991 (Mahadevia, 1998). In the past fifteen 
years, the slum population in Mumbai has continued to expand, both absolutely and 
relatively, though the precise numbers vary depending on the source. Some estimates 
claim that approximately one million people live in kuchha housing (the more 
transient, makeshift shelters along main streets) or are completely homeless; that 
55% live in more permanent slums; about 82% of the total population live in one-
room dwellings; and over 80% of the total population live in overall substandard 
housing (P. K. Das, 2003, p. 210).  
The intensification of urban crisis post economic liberalization, led planners in 
Mumbai to draw up a technocratic approach to: “increase efficiency in all spheres of 
urban development” (Banerjee-Guha, 2002, p.122). Central areas of Dadar, Parel, 
Lalbaug, and Worli, which were the city’s manufacturing hub until two decades ago, 
saw huge land-use changes and became lucrative areas for commercial bidding (ibid). 
The problem of inadequate housing, or more accurately, the proliferation of slums in 
central, marketable areas continued to occupy policy attention in Mumbai (Echanove 
and Srivastava, 2009). The state government formulated a slum development 
program that mobilized the private real estate market to provide apartments to 
qualified settlers. Referenced by the official agency through which it is administered, 
the Slum Redevelopment Authority, the SRA Scheme – first launched in 1991 and 
revamped in 1995 – was actually quite novel for its use of land and development 
incentives to construct low-income housing. The scheme, which is still in use, entailed 
developing rehabilitation housing on the same site where an informal settlement 
previously existed, while utilizing the space that got freed up, for marketable real 
estate. Although there were some widely acknowledged problems, the program was 




actually quite popular, as it was a win for all stakeholders. Developers got access to 
Mumbai’s booming land markets. Residents got free houses. And the government got 
a solution to the slum problem with practically no public investment. The conversion 
of slum land to facilitate new commercial and residential developments has remained 
an important development objective in Mumbai, despite the accompanying conflicts 
between developers and slum residents, and the many discontents of urban 
development it produces. 
3.  LIBERALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
India’s economic liberalization is viewed as dramatic since few people had imagined 
that the economy would be transformed in its basic orientation in a matter of a few 
years (Bajpai & Sachs, 1999, p. 13). It marked both a fundamental transformation of 
India’s economic strategy and a distinct break with history (Varshney, 1998, p. 230). 
The orthodox story of India’s liberalization is that the social-political shocks of 1990-
1 (including the assassination of the then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi) provided a 
trigger that interacted with the underlying financial crisis brewing during the 1980s. 
In reality, efforts to introduce liberalization in the country can be traced back to the 
1960s, though these efforts quickly stalled and did not materialize as planned 
(McCartney, 2009, p. 207). Nevertheless, it was the year 1991 that marked a 
watershed moment when the Government of India repealed many of the protectionist 
policies of the Nehruvian socialist state. As a result: the industrial licensing regime 
was largely swept away (R. Jenkins, 1999, p. 18); key sectors of the economy were 
opened to private sector investment; taxes were reduced and the focus directed 
towards raising revenue rather than influencing resource allocation (Panagariya, 
2004, pp. 22–24); and international trade was extensively liberalized through cuts in 
import/export tariffs/quotas (D. K. Das, 2003; Pandey, 2004; Virmani, 2004). 
Subsequently, the rupee was devalued by twenty percent and maintained close to its 
equilibrium value (Krueger & Chinoy, 2004; Sen, 2003). The domestic economy was 
then opened up to FDI and, to a lesser extent, foreign portfolio investment (Khanna, 
2002, pp. 12–13). The government also shifted from direct control to indirect 




regulation of the financial sector, and resources were allocated more closely in 
accordance with private sector profit motives rather than the preferences of state 
bureaucrats. Eventually, competition in the banking sector increased with the entry 
of new private banks and the expansion of foreign banks (Sathye, 2005, pp. 12–13). 
With the reforms listed above, India opened its market to networks of global finance 
and embarked on an “externally oriented, consumption-led path to national 
prosperity” (Mazzarella, 2003, p. 5). This external orientation changed the game of 
real estate. The liberalization of the Indian economy triggered a flurry of construction, 
as developers scrambled to construct new built-space for foreign tenants, non-
resident Indians, and an Indian-nouveau riche (Searle, 2016). It was no coincidence 
that in the mid-1990s, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the US Agency 
for International Development, and a host of private consultancies began publishing 
reports highlighting the central role of the land market in putting India on track to a 
high-growth future. As a result, since the mid-1990s, beginning shortly after the 
advent of the pro-market reforms, India’s land market has been gradually liberalized, 
opening up new territories for private investment and prioritizing real estate profit 
regardless of its social or productive function. Speculative land development and the 
rentiership with which it is associated, transformed real estate into the vanguard 
segment of the Indian economy, a speculative vehicle for generating private profit and 
state revenue, and casting nonprofit-generating land uses as inherently out of place 
(Ghertner, 2015, p. 23). Liberalization, eventually, also led to the entry of global 
financial and real estate companies into Indian cities (Sujata Patel, 1995, p. xiii). The 
Financial Times, at the time, stated that many multinational companies decided they 
had to be in India. Bombay, the commercial capital, was the obvious choice, and the 
newcomers paid whatever it took to acquire the tiny supply of usable offices and 
apartments (Nijman, 2002, p. 156).  
Unsurprisingly, by the mid-1990s, Mumbai's real estate market became characterized 
by extreme volatility, extravagantly high prices, and speculative market behavior 
(Nijman, 2000, p. 575). The rise had been meteoric. Within five years from 1991, 




prices in the central business districts had risen between four to six times their 
previous levels. In June of 1996, office rents had become more than twice the going 
rates in Paris or Frankfurt, and they were well beyond the cost of office space 
established in high-cost centers like New York, London, Tokyo, or Hong Kong. But it 
was not to last. In the latter part of 1996 and in 1997, prices came roaring down again 
(ibid). The turbulence of the real estate market was the greatest in the prime business 
areas. It was there that prices rose to the highest levels, and where the decline was 
also the sharpest. Many scholars speculated that the unleashed global forces created 
a destabilizing effect on the Mumbai real estate market (Banerjee-Guha, 1994; Sujata 
Patel, 1995). While the turbulent movements in the real estate market in Mumbai and 
other Indian cities that started around 1991 appear to be related in some way to the 
liberalization and deregulation schemes that the Indian government embarked upon 
at the time, Geographer Jan Nijman, however, points out that matters were more 
complex: “they involved a range of domestic and foreign, public and private actors, 
and they were closely related to changes in the regulatory environment,” he notes 
(Nijman, 2000, p. 577). More specifically, Nijman attributes Mumbai’s real estate 
volatility not just to globalization, global capital or foreign trans-national companies, 
but also the reluctance of regulations, to render “global” something that quite literally 
symbolizes “national soil” (ibid).  
Despite regulations not being ironed out, to allow for a seamless transition into 
liberalization, India’s real estate sector appeared to have been booming in the early 
years of the transition. Recounting her impression of the new urban landscape, 
Llerena Searle writes about Delhi: 
Nonexistent 15 years ago, Indian malls now number in the hundreds, constructed 
alongside golf courses, luxury homes and corporate campuses, often in large 
‘integrated’ townships. These highly visible global landscapes have come to index 
the liberalization process and the social and cultural changes that have 
accompanied it (Searle, 2014, p. 60). 
Construction crews had become a common sight throughout the city in the late1990s. 
Bolstered by new sources of capital and eager to produce globally familiar elite 




landscapes, Indian firms snapped up industrial estates, inner-city slums, and peri-
urban agricultural land. In Mumbai, the local state began making certain highly valued 
lands available for development through a series of industrial land conversions, slum 
clearance schemes, and the de-reservation of certain public lands.  Construction 
activities in Mumbai’s island city and northern suburbs expanded, further bolstered 
by the growth of the finance industry (Weinstein, 2008, p. 23). Recognizing an 
opportunity, several enterprising private developers threw their hat in the ring. After 
a more than decade-long conflict over the fate of central Mumbai’s hundreds of acres 
of now-defunct textile mills, these developers had prevailed over the tenuously 
assembled coalition of labor unions, environmental groups, and housing activists 
(ibid). The slum redevelopment program, in particular, gave aspiring developers the 
opportunity to enter into the city’s increasingly lucrative property markets without 
actually owning land. As a result, the number of developers operating in Mumbai 
grew 457% in fifteen years (gathered from personal communication, 2018); and, 
many of the early participants in the program had little or even no building 
experience, which as I demonstrate later, bore a significant impact on the functioning 
of Mumbai’s land market.  
Of the many new entrants into Mumbai’s real estate sector were also members of 
Mumbai’s large organized crime groups (OCGs). Previously focused on traditional 
illicit activities, such as gold and consumer goods smuggling, narcotics distribution, 
and extortion and contract killings, Mumbai’s criminal organizations were well-
positioned to seize the political and economic opportunities associated with 
liberalization and globalization to emerge as an influential force in Mumbai’s land 
development sector (Weinstein, 2008, p. 24). Several factors enabled Mumbai’s large, 
well-financed mafia organizations to move into land development, joining the throngs 
of financiers and developers who had been investing in the city’s lucrative property 
markets and construction industry since the mid-1990s. As economic liberalization 
and the globalization of consumer markets suddenly reduced demand for illicit 
consumer goods, OCGs began abandoning the smuggling activities that had defined 
their organizations for the previous four decades. Opportunities for illicit land 




development was therefore created, in part, by the same set of political and economic 
reforms that opened up participation in the real estate industry and enabled 
Mumbai’s large criminal organizations to establish property development branches 
and construct shopping centers, commercial establishments and residential buildings 
(IPCS, 2005, as cited in, Weinstein, 2008). Besides, as Weinstein notes:  
Aided by their connections to local criminal organizations, embeddedness in 
political party organizations, and participation in increasingly global organized 
crime networks, OCGs had access to the financial and political resources necessary 
to compete in this increasingly lucrative sector (Weinstein, 2008, p. 25).  
Therefore, while the OCGs participation in real estate development could be viewed 
as a product of the liberalization and globalization of the Indian economy, certain 
characteristics inherent to CGs were essential to this shift, most specifically, their 
embeddedness in local communities, and their formal and informal linkages to 
political leaders.  
The influence of informal governance and criminal activity on the urban property 
markets of globalizing cities has been acknowledged by other scholars. Saskia 
Sassen’s research, for instance, illuminates some of the local political actions that 
shape land use in such contexts, including the informal political actions and illicit 
activities that affect the appropriation of urban space (Sassen, 2001, pp. 282–303). 
Sassen’s analysis of the conditions of Tokyo’s inner-city identifies the influence of the 
Japanese version of Western-style gangsters or Mafia – the “yaksuka” in the 
maintenance of Tokyo’s blighted districts, within which they manage labor pools of 
informal, largely immigrant workers (ibid). While OCG’s in Mumbai have largely been 
wiped out or sent into hiding following the serial bombings of 19939 which set off a 
brutal police-crackdown in the city, the function they served in Mumbai’s real estate 
development in the early years of liberalization continues to be critical although not 
unfulfilled (Ketkar, 2003). The modern-day real estate developer, as I demonstrate, 
                                                        
9 The 1993 bombings were a series of thirteen bomb explosions that took place in Mumbai on 12 March 
1993. The attacks, which resulted in over 300 fatalities, were reported to be coordinated by Dawood 
Ibrahim, leader of the Mumbai-based international organised crime syndicate, D-Company.  




brokers between the illicit and formal mechanisms of real estate production to 
provide land, services, information, and security (against socio-political risks) in 
exchange for money and patronage among global financial investors. Their 
participation in the land market, however, sustains precarious and non-transparent 
arrangements of land exchange, which as economic historian Avner Grief has pointed 
out, restricts the scalability and reproducibility of market relations (Greif, 2000, 
p. 253). Nevertheless, Mumbai’s real estate sector continued to expand at 
unprecedented rates through the 2000s, under the influence of new sources of 
finance capital made available after FDI restrictions were relaxed.  
The lifting of restrictions on foreign direct investments into real estate development 
marks the second watershed moment in India’s transition towards liberalization. The 
following section delves into the background and details of the FDI policy, and its 
impact in terms of real estate production and revenue flows. Empirical findings on 
the distribution of finance capital among development firms, which I present 
subsequently, reveals that developers who are able to operate at the seams of legality, 
financially dominate Mumbai’s real estate industry, while a large number of 
developers fall outside the influence of institutional finance.  Moreover, developers 
that are financially most credible gained little traction from the new sources of 
finance capital available to them since liberalization. My findings, therefore, cast 
doubt on the idea that the liberalization of the land market in India was successful, 
unambiguous, and sustained. Instead, what I present is a picture of an incomplete, 
patchwork scenario that is prone to the kind of paradoxes that one witnesses in 
Mumbai today: where buildings are unfinished, housing demand unmet, and FDI 
investors hesitant to make further investments. 
4.  FDI IN INDIAN REAL ESTATE 
Though liberalization bolstered private participation in Indian real estate through a 
new approach to housing policy (See: Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, India, 
1998), and programs like the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Reform Mission, 
India’s real estate sector was one of the last sectors to be subject to Foreign Direct 




Investment. Indian authorities have, however, taken monumental steps to make real 
estate markets internationally accessible since 2002. To begin with, the government 
legalized foreign direct investment in township construction in 2002. It further 
liberalized the policy in 2005, reducing the minimum size requirements for 
townships and enabling foreign investment in other types of construction and 
development projects. In addition, the Securities and Exchange Board of India began 
allowing venture capital funds to invest in real estate in 2004, which led to a spike in 
the number of domestic real estate investment funds in India (Trammell Crow 
Meghraj, 2007, as cited in Searle, 2014). Furthermore, the SEZ (special economic 
zone) policy launched in 2005, helped to make large tracts of land available for real 
estate projects by providing considerable incentives to both developers and industry. 
After these measures were introduced, a host of international firms announced plans 
to invest in Indian real estate development, because as Searle puts it, investors were 
hoping to turn the double risk of working in an emerging market and developing real 
estate, into handsome profits (Searle, 2016, p. 135). Investors included foreign 
developers, property investment companies, and real estate investment trusts, banks, 
private equity firms, and hedge funds, as well as mall development and hotel 
companies (ibid). Firms from Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Middle East, and 
Canada were among the first to take advantage of India’s newly liberalized real estate 
sector. 
Between 2000 and 2019, a total of 436,471 million USD entered India in the form of 
FDI, according to data released by the Department for Promotion of Industry and 
Internal Trade, India. The top source countries of these FDI investments are Mauritius 
(32%), Singapore (20%), and Japan (7%). In fact, nine of the ten largest foreign 
business organizations investing in India are based in Mauritius (DIPP, 2019). This is 
because Mauritius is one of the eighty-eight countries to have signed a double-tax 
avoidance agreement with India, and Mauritius (just like Singapore and Cyprus) 
offers investors a significant tax relief owing to their relatively low tax of 3% on 
capital gains (DIPP, 2019). It is therefore common for foreign investors to route their 
investments into India through shell companies based in Mauritius or Singapore, in 




order to save on tax, making it difficult for financial regulators as well as researchers 
to trace the actual source of foreign funds flowing into the country. Nevertheless, 
what one does know is that a cumulative investment of 25,122 million USD (or 5.75% 
of total FDI) was made towards “construction development”10 in India, ever since 
restrictions were lifted in 2002 (ibid). While the Indian government does not 
segregate FDI data according to sector and city, it is reported that about 33% of all 
investments till date were channeled into Mumbai, making it the country’s top 
recipient of FDI. One could, therefore, assume that roughly 7,500 million USD (total × 
0.0575 × 0.33) of foreign capital was invested into Mumbai’s construction sector over 
the past fifteen odd years11.  
The above estimate is hardly notable given that the total investment into developing 
new real estate in Mumbai over these years was 171 billion USD. In other words, just 
over 4% of spending on real estate development in Mumbai in the years following the 
liberalisation of the sector can be attributed to FDI. However, more than the volume 
of FDI that served the real estate sector, it is the yearly trend of FDI flows that is 
deserving of greater attention. While FDI flows into construction development in 
India predictably saw a sharp rise soon after it was allowed, these investments dried 
up very quickly, in a matter of five to seven years (DIPP, 2019, p. 4). When studied in 
relation to overall FDI, the FDI flows into the construction sector show a sudden jump 
in the years between 2005 and 2010, followed by an equally sudden fall in the years 
after 2011. Therefore, while FDI in construction appears to have risen sharply in 2006 
(by 550% since the previous year), and is often cited by scholars to invoke 
astonishment among readers, it is the fall in 2015 (of -85% since previous year), 
which when looked at relative to overall FDI flows in the country, is worthy of just as 
much, or greater astonishment (see Figure 6, below).  Besides, both the 
diminutiveness of FDI, as well as the eccentric trajectory of its flows into Indian real 
                                                        
10 Construction development includes construction of townships, housing, and built-up infrastructure, 
but not ownership or land or development companies. 
11 The assumption is all the more plausible because Mumbai accounts for roughly one third of real 
estate supply by value in India, followed by Delhi-NCR and Bangalore.  




estate development is all the more evident when studied in relation to overall 
investment into real estate production. Figure 7 shows that while real estate supply 
in the country continued to grow in volume and value, FDI in construction did not 
keep pace, and on the contrary, diminished almost completely at a time when 
production in the sector was at its peak. 
  
Figure 6: FDI Trends across India (Compiled by Author; Data: DIPP, 2019) 
 
Figure 7: FDI Comparison for Mumbai (Compiled by Author; Data: DIPP, 2019) 
While FDI flows into India’s construction industry may well be limited, compared to 
the scale of real estate production in the country, the liberalization of the sector 




certainly marked a point after which growth in real estate production has been 
unprecedented and undeterred. The relaxation of restrictions on land development 
and opening up of the economy to allow FDI has had a visible impact on the built 
environment in Mumbai, if not the rest of urban India. Mumbai has, for example, seen 
an increase of 457% in the number of developers operating in the city, over the past 
fifteen years. The rise in developers has, in turn, led to similar growth in the number 
of projects developed (+439%) and the number of housing units produced (+519%) 
over the same time period (Figure 8). This development frenzy has, however, had 
little impact on the city’s housing crisis, as the house price to income-ratio 12  in 
Mumbai remains one of the highest in the world (see Table 3, below), which means 
that majority of Mumbai’s residents cannot afford the new housing units that have 
been produced in recent years. 
 
Figure 8: Mumbai Real Estate Growth (Compiled by Author; Data: Liases Foras, 2019) 
                                                        
12 Price-to-income ratio is the ratio between the price of a median home to that of the median annual 
household income in a particular area (Source: Numbeo (2019). 
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21.21 145.09 0.69 
45 Munich, Germany 16.90 100.35 1.00 
The liberalization of the Indian real estate sector, therefore, failed to deliver what it 
had actually set out to achieve, while still leaving behind a physically mammoth legacy 
in the form of hundreds of thousands of unaffordable housing units (Parkin, 2019). 
The mismatch between FDI flows and real estate production is, therefore, all the more 
important to understand and examine, since much more housing will be required to 
be produced in Mumbai and across the country in years to come. Besides, the growing 
number of insolvencies among developers' due to their inability to meet debt 
obligations amid the funding crisis, is onerous to the productivity of India’s 
construction industry, which as urbanist Richard Florida warns, is a huge problem 
both for housing costs and for employment, since the construction industry is one of 
the most important sources of higher-paying low-skill jobs in any country (Florida, 
2017).  
Below, I delve into the field of real estate developers in Mumbai, in order to examine 
how this field is organized in relation to real estate funding, and the extent of risk 
erratic FDI flows poses to the functioning of the industry.  




5.  DEVELOPER GROUPINGS  
 Purpose  
Since the terms of real estate financing in India are both stringent and expensive, 
developers in Mumbai are segregated into groups based on their association with 
finance capital. While (lack of) access to funding is an evident reason for inequality 
among developers, the high cost of finance in India means those developers who are 
able to self-finance or raise funds through informal sources, also refrain from the 
trappings of institutional debt. From my interviews, I found that both developers and 
financiers perceive and talk of a hierarchical category that defines developers 
(“established firm,” “small player,” “creditworthy,” “fly-by-night operator,” etc.). The 
intention behind a methodical sorting of developers into groups is thus two-fold: first, 
to study the scope and extent of formal finance within Mumbai’s developer 
population, and identify that group that is most financialised; and second, to find out 
how the field of real estate developers is organized in terms of funding sources and 
volume.  
 Conception of Categories 
My exposure to the world of real estate development in Mumbai had a significant 
influence on how I went about categorizing developers into groups. Since I had 
already spent several months interviewing and interacting with various market 
actors by the time I began this exercise, my starting point for the sorting of developers 
was the perceptions of difference between developers by my participants. Therefore, 
my initial attempt at categorizing developers was based on how market actors 
themselves perceived the distinctions between different developers. I later refine 
these groupings by applying empirical filters, which I describe further on in the 
section. The five groups that I captured from the accounts of my participants are as 
follows: 
Group 1: Developers belonging to this group are typically untouched by institutional 
financing, and therefore carry out their operations without incurring any formal debt. 




The group includes developers who have little-to-no experience, are engaged in 
small-scale developments and have access to land that, in most cases, they did not 
have to purchase. Developers who fall in this group seem to be either small-scale 
landowners or land aggregators who turn developers. Their model of operation 
involves very little upfront investment into land acquisition (mostly limited to 
covering approvals cost and the temporary relocation of existing residents, if any), 
and a heavy dependence on pre-sales for covering construction costs. While the group 
is hardly taken seriously by other, more established developers, their significance as 
a key player in real estate production is slowly drawing the attention of micro-lenders 
in India. At PropConsulting, requests for market intel on “XS players” have been 
gaining popularity.  I was told there is a whole new segment waiting to be tapped into. 
Despite their lack of building experience and low financial credibility, financiers and 
consultants alike saw Group 1 developers as potential consumers of financial and 
consulting services. According to Manoj (Director at PropConsulting), most 
developers in Mumbai start off as members of Group 1. 
Group 2: This group, too, has low dependence on institutional finance. But their scale 
of operation is not necessarily small. Their mode of operation is similar to that of 
Group 1’s, in that, they rely greatly on customer-finance (i.e., pre-sales) to cover 
construction costs. However, unlike Group 1, this group has access to other sources 
of finance, which they use to procure larger parcels of land. These alternate sources 
of finance include borrowing from community13, friends and family, moneylenders14, 
and politicians. Developers belonging to Group 2 typically borrow from formal 
financial institutions only to cover short-term gaps in development finance, for 
                                                        
13 An extreme case of community borrowing is the redevelopment of Bhindi Bazaar, a congested inner 
city neighbourhood in South Mumbai. The redevelopment is estimated to cost around £4 billion, and 
is supposedly financed entirely through donations by the Bohri Muslim community. Members of staff 
of SBUT (the trust that is overseeing the redevelopment) claim that SBUT has not incurred any debt 
(formal or informal) for the execution of the ambitious project.  
14 Moneylenders are typically wealthy local businessmen with cash to spare and looking to invest in 
real estate development. Direct financing provided by moneylenders is usually 
untaxed/undocumented money, colloquially known as black money.  




instance, to adjust cash flows in case of slow sales. While the reason for the group’s 
low dependence on institutional finance is partly restricted access, many of them 
view formal financing as inflexible, expensive, and impractical. Bankers claim that the 
extent of formal borrowing among such developers is generally no more than ten 
percent of the total project cost. The group is also highly fragmented in terms of 
organization type, firm background, and status. Nevertheless, real estate experts and 
other elite developers perceive this group as non-professionals. When asked to 
elaborate on the group’s role in the real estate industry, Manoj tells me: “These people 
are goondas (thugs), who only know to use their muscle power to forcefully get hold 
of land…. You can’t call them developers because they don’t have the management 
skills required to carry out complicated developments”. Manoj’s comment, implicitly 
refers to the continued involvement of OCGs in Mumbai’s real estate industry. 
Group 3: Developers belonging to this group are young (established after 
liberalization), sauve (familiar with global business etiquette), entrepreneurial 
(mostly specializing in complicated redevelopment projects), and big borrowers 
(have the highest debt burden compared to other groups). These developers have had 
a meteoric growth, made possible only because of institutional borrowing. Manoj 
describes them as “revolutionary developers” who shot to fame in a very short time, 
surpassing the production records of old generation developers. He, however, feels 
that this group is most susceptible to burnout, precisely because of their unrealistic 
growth, and the production/ return expectations riding on them. According to 
bankers, this group borrows as much as 70% of the project cost in the form of debt. 
Group 3 developers have a distinct identity with respect to age, entrepreneurial spirit, 
and debt burden, which binds them closely as a group. I also found them to be the 
most active members of professional associations and developer-focused events. In 
fact, it was at these events that I established contact with many of my developer 
participants, of which Group 3 developers were highest in number. My affinity to 
Group 3 developers was partly conscious since I was aware of their importance as 
real estate developers in the post-liberalization era. It, however, helped that many of 




these developers were easy to access for researchers like me, presumably because it 
strengthened their self-perception of being outward-looking.   
Group 4: Members of this group have a long-standing reputation of being credible 
developers, and are relatively well organized in their operations. What sets them 
apart from other known development firms is their age. Group 4 developers are old-
schoolers who were dominant players long before liberalization and have continued 
to remain relevant (through sustained production) till date. According to Manoj, this 
group was able to sustain the changes that accompanied liberalization, without 
getting wiped out by competition or suffering a burnout. He labels them as 
“evolutionary developers.” Other industry experts offered me a different perspective. 
As per this perspective, Group 4 developers accumulated great amounts of wealth, 
mostly in the form of land banks, in the late 80s and 90s, and have merely been 
capitalizing on that wealth to stay relevant ever since. Although bankers consider the 
group credit-worthy because of their supposed financial prudence and social repute, 
reports of fraud and wilful default by developers belonging to this group are not 
uncommon. The group consists of only a handful of developers who are known to 
everyone engaged with the real estate industry in Mumbai, as well as property buyers. 
These developers are, however, not diversified corporate entities and continue to be 
run as family businesses despite their age and size, which limits their life expectancy 
to the family’s lineage, or rather, the cohesiveness of family members. 
Group 5: Developers belonging to this group are sophisticated in their corporate 
governance, have diversified interests ranging from pharmaceuticals, to IT, to 
automobile, and have the easiest access to bank finance. They are seen as bankable 
and trustworthy by financiers and homebuyers alike and have the best credit rating 
among all developers. These firms are also listed on the Indian stock market 
(BSE/NSE), and their stocks are traded actively, which implies transparency in their 
financial dealings and accounting practices. The size, stature, and varied interests of 
these firms, however, hinders them from making too many (risky) land acquisitions 
at once. Real estate consultants claim that these firms belonging to this group do not 




identify as developers per se, and instead position themselves as a versatile 
conglomerate that incidentally also participates in real estate development. The 
chairman of Godrej Properties, a Group 5 developer, acknowledged during a real 
estate conclave that the firm ventured into real estate development only because they 
had surplus land (CNBC Awaaz, 2017). In recent years, however, several Group 5 
developers, including Godrej, have been buying out stressed projects, or entire 
portfolios of stressed developers. While this practice, if continued, may increase the 
group’s prominence in the real estate industry, experts believe that the approach is 
only relevant in times of market downturn, and is tightly bounded by risk measures 
stipulated by board members. 
 Sorting Methodology  
With the above categories in mind, I looked for empirical filters that would help with 
the systematic sorting of all 2,247 developers operating in Mumbai. The intention was 
to match the qualitative features of each group with appropriate empirical values. The 
selection of group filters was, however, guided/ limited by the data available to me, 
and the way in which the data was already 
organized. I sourced all data for this chapter from 
Liases Foras, a real estate research and data firm 
based in Mumbai. Liases Foras provided me with 
data on real estate developers from 2008 onwards, 
which meant that I had limited information on the 
performance of developers prior to 2008. Under 
these constraints, the filters used to sort each group 
are as follows (Figure 9, Table 4). 
Figure 9: Sequence of sorting process 
Since the filters are not of the same type for every group, and since certain filters are 
stronger than others, a sorting order had to be followed. Therefore, groups that could 
be identified with greater certainty (such as Group 4, 5, and 1) were given preference 




over groups whose filters are somewhat arbitrary (such as Group 2 and 3). The 
sorting process followed the following sequence.  
Table 4: Filters used to sort developer groups 
Group Filter Reasoning/ Assumption 
1 
Overall supply volume of 
≤250000 sq ft 
Number of projects built 
till date ≤1 
A volume of 250,000 classifies as ‘small’ in LF’s database 
Indicates a lack of building experience 
2 
Overall supply volume of 
≤10 million sq ft 
Number of ongoing 
projects ≤3 
Location of projects ≤ 1 
micro market 
A volume of 10 mn classifies as ‘large’ in LF’s database 
Developers with limited access to institutional funding 
would not be able to spread themselves beyond 3 projects 
at a time 
Developers who rely greatly on their social/ political 
connections (i.e., having mostly embedded ties) would 
build in just one neighborhood 
3 
Overall supply volume of 
≥1 million sq ft 
Number of ongoing 
projects >3 
Location of projects >1 
micro market15 
A volume of 1 mn classifies as ‘medium’ in LF’s database 
Institutional funding must allow developers to increase 
their spread beyond 3 projects 
Developers with weak ties to financial actors must be able 
to operate in multiple neighborhoods 
4 N.A. 
Since data prior to 2008 is unavailable, ‘sustained 
production over time’ could not be measured, and hence 
this group of developers had to be handpicked in 
consultation with experts 
5 
Group A listing on the 
stock market; Diversified 
business interest 
Group A indicates frequently traded stocks, as per the 
Bombay Stock Exchange 
 Findings 
The sorting of developers using the above method resulted in 383 unclaimed 
developers, that is, developers that do not fall in any group. These 383 developers 
                                                        
15 Micro markets in real estate are subdivisions between neighborhoods, or localized areas inside an 
overall housing market with their own defining characteristics. 




have overlapping features of groups 2 and 3 but do not completely satisfy the 
conditions of either group. However, since the mean deviation across the three filters 
used to define both groups is very close to 0.5, these 383 developers have been 
distributed evenly between Group 2 and 3. The resulting distribution of population, 
supply volume, and supply value among the five groups (as of January 2019) is as 
follows:  
Population distribution: 
Of the 2,247 developers studied, 1,100 or 49% fall into Group 1, i.e., developers with 
little to no experience, and with almost no reliance on debt-based finance, whether 
formal or informal. The second-largest group in terms of population is Group 2, with 
a size of approximately 860 developers (or 38% of total). Group 3, which comprises 
of those developers who are most financialised (by which I mean most indebted to 
institutional finance), has a population of approximately 280 developers (accounting 
for 12% of total). Finally, Groups 4 and 5, i.e., the developer elites, constitute a very 
small portion (less than 1%) of the total population, with nine developers in each 
group.  
Supply distribution by volume: 
As of January 2019, a total of 735 million square feet of residential real estate was 
available/ under production in the market. Of this total volume, about 330 million 
square feet, or 45% of the total was contributed by developers belonging to Group 3, 
making this group the single largest supplier of real estate by volume. Group 2, comes 
second, with a contribution of approximately 174 square feet (or 24%), which 
highlights the significance of informal funding in Mumbai’s real estate production. 
Groups 5, 1, and 4 follow behind with supply contributions of 117, 68, and 47 million 
square feet, respectively, corresponding to 16%, 9%, and 6% of the total supply.  
Supply distribution by value: 
The value of total supply follows a similar distribution among the five groups, as 
supply volume. Of the total INR 846,270 crore (89.5 billion GBP) that Mumbai’s real 
estate stock was valued at, as of January 2019, nearly half of the market’s share 




belonged to Group 3. The second-largest market share (of 21%) belongs to Group 2, 
followed by Groups 5 (12%), 4 (8%), and 1 (7%). The sorting of developers by supply 
value, therefore, reveals that market share is not concentrated among a handful of 
elite developers, as traditional market theories expect, and developers that are 
perceived to be most credit-worthy do not dominate the market. 
  
Figure 10: Developer Population, Supply Volume, and Supply Value (Compiled by Author; Data: Liases 
Foras, 2018) 
From these findings, once can see that Group 3, which comprises a new generation of 
entrepreneurial, risk-loving developers, has emerged as the most significant group in 
Mumbai’s real estate industry. Sorting of developers also revealed that the influence 
of formal financial institutions within Mumbai’s real estate industry is not as 
widespread as scholars of financialization imagine. Institutional financing is 
primarily restricted to three (of five) groups that contribute to a total supply volume 
of 63%. Nevertheless, the effect that formal finance and presumably FDI, has had on 
the growth of Group 3 is remarkable and worthy of investigation. In the next chapters, 
through my examination of various land development practices, I attempt to get at 
the reasons why Group 3 rose to prominence, and relatedly, the effect this has had on 




 CONSENT ACQUISITION 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Piramal Mahalaxmi is an ongoing residential development in South-Central Mumbai. 
The new development will replace a slum settlement named Dhobi Ghat that 
originally housed over 20,000 people (Ravindran, 2018). A little more than half of the 
settlement’s population will be rehoused in the same location, in two towers of forty 
floors each, and in the remaining area, three more apartment towers of sixty-four 
floors will be constructed for sale in the open market (MahaRERA, 2019; Piramal 
Realty, 2018). Each of these apartments is currently priced upwards of INR 40 million 
or £400,000. Piramal Realty, the developer behind this project is part of the Piramal 
Group, a large Indian business conglomerate founded in 1984, with diversified 
interests in healthcare, glass manufacturing, and finance. Piramal Realty is backed by 
Piramal Capital, whose partners include the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board 
(CPPIB), Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec (CDPQ), and Dutch financial 
services major APG Group (Barman, 2014). With its access to large pools of global 
finance, Piramal Realty was able to buy out the smaller, local developers originally 
involved in Dhobi Ghat’s redevelopment to make way for an ambitious new project 
(N. Kamath, 2016; Ravindran, 2018).  
What seems like a top-down takeover of a Mumbai slum by global finance capital is, 
in reality, a messy story involving complicated negotiations occurring at the ground 
level. Piramal’s entry into the project, as mentioned, is fairly recent, and comes after 
at least three other developers had already worked at realizing the redevelopment. 
The developers that preceded Piramal in redeveloping Dhobi Ghat had paved the way 
for Piramal’s entry by doing the work of “consent acquisition.” This work, which 
involves seeking residents’ consent for redevelopment, is not only critical to the site’s 
physical transformation but is also financially so profitable that it potentially 
undermines Piramal’s profit expectations. This is because consent acquisition 
requires overcoming conflicts between various actors whose interests do not align 




quite so neatly. These conflicts, as I show, resemble coordination problems more so 
than zero-sum contestations, and therefore require developers to rely not only on 
formal institutions and informal norms but also ad hoc, patchy solutions, which can 
hamper the project’s execution in the long run. 
While a large, established, globally-connected firm such as Piramal can indeed have a 
notable impact on Dhobi Ghat’s transformation, the assumption that the firm can: a) 
acquire slum land easily (if not on their own, then by delegating the task to experts 
with required know-how), and b) manipulate development regulations to ensure that 
their profit expectations are met (despite any added costs of land acquisition), 
ignores the problems associated with land’s specificity, especially when land is 
inhabited by thousands of people. Hurdles to land’s commodification, even when not 
in the form of overt resistance, can derail development goals, irrespective of the 
developer involved. An unpacking of the redevelopment process at Dhobi Ghat 
reveals that while Piramal’s participation in the project was made possible because 
of their access to large pools of global finance and their social ties within local 
networks, the execution of the redevelopment depends on several factors including, 
and most importantly, the coordination of land exchange between residents and the 
developer. More importantly, the local mediators who play a crucial role in this 
coordination work, rather than filtering risk away (Halbert & Rouanet, 2014, p. 472), 
produce more hurdles thereby exacerbating financial risks for global investors.  
In this chapter, I examine the work of consent acquisition, or more specifically, how 
developers and residents overcome the coordination challenges associated with the 
land exchange in slum redevelopments in Mumbai. The chapter comprises of three 
empirical sections. In the first section, I layout the details of the case study, including 
profit distribution between the many actors involved. Here, I highlight just how much 
economic value is associated with land acquisition, and the reason why this is so. In 
the next section, I analyze the institutional frameworks that determine the 
coordination of land exchange between residents and developers. In particular, I 
study the gaps and inconsistencies in both formal rules and informal norms that 




augment rather than resolve conflicts between actors. Finally, I discuss my 
ethnographic findings of how consent is acquired in practice. In this final section, I 
demonstrate how developers not only adopt ad hoc means to solve coordination 
problems but also operate in episodic siloes in their quest to be successful at land 
commodification, at the cost of undermining the project’s eventual execution.  
2.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF SLUM REDEVELOPMENT IN MUMBAI 
While there have been a variety of partnerships used historically in Mumbai and 
elsewhere in urban India to construct housing, the so-called Mumbai model or Slum 
Rehabilitation Scheme, first launched in 1991 and revamped in 1995, was actually 
quite novel for its use of land and development incentives to construct low-income 
housing. Up to that point, the public sector did not have a strong record of housing 
construction for so-called “economically weaker sections” either. Some factory-
owner and public-private land trusts helped construct worker housing in the 
industrializing cities of Bombay and Calcutta in the early 20th century, but supply 
never kept pace with demand. Public sector institutions such as the Delhi 
Development Authority and the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development 
Authority developed incrementally over the 20th century, but particularly after the 
mid-1960s, and were charged with housing construction. However, they tended to 
focus on middle-income groups who could at least pay construction costs. Slums and 
informal settlements of various types emerged to fill the housing needs of industrial 
workers and migrant laborers, to which the government responded with benign (or 
supportive) neglect, interspersed with aggressive slum clearance schemes, through 
the early 1970s (Weinstein, 2014b, pp. 59–63).   
In the early 1990s, amid the 1991 elections, Bombay’s state government launched a 
populist housing program that promised free flats and in-situ tenure to the city’s 
millions of slum residents. The program, called the “Slum Rehabilitation Scheme,” 
came to be administered by a public agency, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority 
(hereafter referred to as SRA), but was financed entirely by private builders by 
granting them development rights on lands that housed informal settlements. 




Initially, the developers received one square foot of land to develop and sell at market 
rates, for each square foot of land they used to house the current slum residents. Since 
there was very little developer interest in the first few years of the program, the 
incentives were later increased to 1.33 square feet of market-rate property for every 
square foot of rehabilitated slum property. The initial idea was that a group of roughly 
100 families living in shacks or chawls would organize themselves into a housing 
society and reach out to an architect or builder to construct both their building and 
the market rate component. They would strike a deal and submit a joint contract to 
the SRA for approval. But in actuality, nearly all projects have been developer initiated 
(Sanyal & Mukhija, 2001, p. 2049). Typically, a builder working with an architect 
would approach the residents of a settlement located in an area they deemed 
desirable for the market-rate construction. Because their market-rate sale 
component would be located on the same site as the rehab housing, only slums 
located in prime market areas were initially targeted for the program (Nijman, 2008, 
p. 77). But as a protection against developers coercing residents to participate, the 
SRA required that 70% of the residents had to consent to the project before approval 
would be granted.  
Acquiring consent is a drawn-out process involving tedious negotiations between 
developers and slum residents. Since residents have varying concerns regarding 
compensations and do not constitute a homogenous group of actors, disagreements 
among them, including over which developer to support, is both common and 
inevitable (Sheela Patel & Arputham, 2007, p. 504). The struggle over consent 
acquisition is exacerbated by the fundamental problem of unclear titles and 
ambiguous property rights in slum settlements. Residents and developers have had 
to navigate opaque rules of land ownership and exchange, for consent to be acquired 
(Weinstein, 2014b, p. 118). The unequal distribution of risk between residents and 
developers further adds to this challenge. Since the redevelopment model requires 
residents to hand over their land to a developer for a loosely specified period of time, 
the impact of non-cooperation and development uncertainties is far more significant 
for residents than for developers. As a consequence, developers find it difficult to get 




residents to vacate their homes, even if a majority of them consented to the project. 
To facilitate consent negotiation and land clearance, the SRA also requires that 
residents form a committee that will make decisions on behalf of resident groups, and 
act as a mediator between developers and residents. As per this rule, twelve 
committee members shall represent every 100 households to negotiate terms of 
redevelopment. The idea is that individual concerns can be consolidated and 
negotiated as a collective, without undermining the scale and extent of diversity 
within slum settlements. However, committee members have instead assumed the 
role of middlemen, which makes consent negotiations all the more complicated.  
Consent acquisition is nevertheless the only means to acquire slum land for privatized 
redevelopment. Slums occupy 36.45 square kilometers, or 48.6 % of the total 
developable land area in Mumbai and are scattered across the entire landscape of the 
city, including the south and west regions where real estate is most expensive (P. K. 
Das, Singh, Dewan, & Agarwal, 2018; GOI Census 2011). In a city where land is a scarce 
resource, and uninhabited land is almost nonexistent, slum redevelopment (and 
urban residential redevelopment in general) provides developers the opportunity to 
stay in business. According to a public circular released by the Bombay High Court in 
2017, 83% of all real estate activity in Mumbai was redevelopment work. Besides, and 
as I show in this chapter, the negotiations over consent between developers and slum 
residents have significant costs associated with it, which ultimately impacts the 
production and sale of new real estate. Consent acquisition is, therefore, a critical 
value function of the land market in Mumbai. In the next section, I unpack the practice 
of consent acquisition, using the case of Dhobi Ghat slum in South-Central Mumbai. 
Dhobi Ghat is a case wherein consent was acquired “successfully” by the developer. 
By this, I mean that residents and developers were able to arrive at an agreement via 
non-violent negotiations, and the exchange of land was carried out rather peacefully.  




3.  THE CASE OF DHOBI GHAT 
 
Figure 11: Location map of Dhobi Ghat (Source: kepler.gl) 
 Context 
Dhobi Ghat, which translates to washing area in Hindi, is a 140-year-old outdoor 
laundry precinct located in Central Mumbai. The wash pen, originally built by the 
British, continues to be used for large-scale cleaning and dying of clothes. It serves 
the washing needs of clothing manufactures, the hospitality and medical industry, 
and thousands of individual households in the city. Dhobi Ghat is also a popular 
tourist spot, not just because of its historical significance, and the quaint practice of 
manual clothes washing, but also because it offers tourists a stereotypical picture of 
the urban contrast that Mumbai is most famous for. Set against the backdrop of a 
dense cluster of newly erected skyscrapers, Dhobi Ghat highlights the contrast 
between modern and traditional, wealth and poverty, and colonial and post-colonial.  
Originally, Dhobi Ghat was situated outside the main city, along with several textile 
factories that provided it business. However, due to the city’s northward expansion, 




the district of Mahalaxmi, which includes Dhobi Ghat and the many defunct textile 
mills, now lies at the geographic heart of Mumbai. Today, Mahalaxmi is not only one 
of the main commercial districts of Mumbai but is also a much sought-after 
neighborhood for living. Abutting the historic washing pen is a slum settlement, 
which houses the Dhobis or workers belonging to the Dhobi community, who mostly 
hail from the states of Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. This settlement exists on 
land that is highly valuable and, therefore, is of great interest to real estate developers. 
While the washing pen itself is protected for the time being under Mumbai’s heritage 
laws, the settlement is notified as a regular slum by the SRA and can be redeveloped 
privately, like any other slum in the city.  
The residents of Dhobi Ghat, however, appear more affluent compared to other slum 
residents in Mumbai, because Dhobi Ghat’s location offers access to better jobs and 
education. Aside from being economically better off, residents of Dhobi Ghat are also 
seemingly well versed with union politics, due to their proximity to former mill 
workers associated with The Great Bombay Textile Strike16 . Moreover, Dhobi Ghat 
belongs to the electoral constituency of the family of Arun Gawli, a gangster turned 
politician who ran his criminal operations out of the area until he was arrested in 
2012 for the murder of a Shiv Sena politician. Gawli is also charged (but not yet 
convicted) with the murder of Sunit Khatao, a factory owner who lost his life to the 
gang violence that followed the closing down/ sale of mill lands in Mumbai in 1994. 
Dhobi Ghat and Mahalaxmi continue to be a stronghold of the Gawli family, which 
includes Sachin Ahir (Gawli’s nephew), who, until 2014, was the Housing Minister of 
the state of Maharashtra. Therefore, at the time of negotiating the terms of 
redevelopment, residents of Dhobi Ghat had access17 to a very important political 
                                                        
16 The mill workers of Bombay, under trade union leader Dutta Samant, called the Great Bombay 
textile strike on 18 January 1982. The purpose of the strike was to obtain bonuses and an increase in 
wages. Nearly 250,000 workers and more than 50 textile mills went on strike in Bombay, at the time. 
17 Residents claim that Ahir and other members of the Gawli family frequently visited the slum, and 
were in touch with community leaders over the slum’s redevelopment. 




figure who essentially framed the formal and informal rules of slum redevelopment 
in Mumbai.  
 Suitability of the Case 
The foreseeable friction between market forces and slum politics is one of several 
reasons why I selected Dhobi Ghat as my case study to investigate the practice of 
consent acquisition. If slums in Mumbai were to be arranged in order of land value, 
Dhobi Ghat would be at the top of the list, since property prices in Mahalaxmi are one 
of the highest in Mumbai. On the other hand, residents of Dhobi Ghat appear to be 
self-aware in terms of their position vis-à-vis private developers and the State, and 
their perception of the exchange value of the land they occupy 18 . What is also 
interesting about the case is that Omkar, the developer leading the redevelopment 
(before Piramal stepped in), is regarded as the most successful developer for 
acquiring slum land in Mumbai (Samar Srivastava, 2012). I was, therefore, curious to 
find out how Omkar operated, and how they came to be to the master of slum 
redevelopment. The timing was also right as Omkar was in its final stage of land 
acquisition at Dhobi Ghat when I started my fieldwork. The tactics adopted by the 
firm were, therefore, fresh in the memory of Dhobi Ghat’s residents and Omkar’s 
employees.  
One more reason for choosing Dhobi Ghat as a case study was my locational proximity 
to the site. Since I lived not too far from Dhobi Ghat during my fieldwork, I was able 
to visit the site frequently, and whenever required. More importantly, I had access to 
two individuals who had connections to committee members of Dhobi Ghat19 . While 
                                                        
18 In my interviews, residents often referred to the price of high-end apartments in the neighbouring 
towers, and their perception of current property values was not inaccurate. Residents however did not 
speak about feeling entitled to apartments of similar size or value. Instead, they talked about how the 
developer would reap huge profits, if and when they surrendered the land for redevelopment – thereby 
indicating the worth of their consent. 
19 My gatekeepers into Dhobi Ghat were Jayan Patil and Sumit Saudagar (names changed). Jayant and 
I used to be colleagues at a micro mortgage company in 2014, where he was (and continues to be) a 
loan officer in charge of bring in new customers. Jayant has reviewed several customers from Dhobi 
Ghat for loans, and also has a cousin who is a resident and committee member in Dhobi Ghat. Sumit on 
the other hand, works at a hair salon that I have visited since 2005, and is also a youth member of the 




access to slum residents, in general, is easy, making contact and establishing trust 
with slum elites like committee members and community leaders is very difficult, 
even for a local Mumbaikar. While I did not have any direct connection with the 
developers involved in Dhobi Ghat’s redevelopment, establishing these connections 
once I got started with my research was relatively easy because I already had access 
to the social world of real estate developers in Mumbai, through my past professional 
experience as an architect in the city.  
 Site Details 
The settlement at Dhobi Ghat covers a total land area of 39,000 square meters or 9.63 
acres, according to planning permissions issued by the SRA in December 2016 (Annex  
C) However, representatives of the developer have mentioned to me that the total site 
area is around 12 acres (48,562 square meters).  It is therefore unclear what the exact 
plot boundary is, and whether the developer plans to acquire more land in the near 
future. Most news reports claim that the settlement originally housed around 4,000 
households or 20,000 residents in total (N. Kamath, 2016; Ravindran, 2018). This 
number includes renters and those households that are ineligible for new housing as 
per rules set by the SRA. The number of “eligible” households at Dhobi Ghat is 
reported as 2,215 in the development’s planning approvals (See Annex  B). Most 
residents also believed that the number of eligible households is around 2000. 
However, this number, too, does not match what representatives of the developer 
have told me, which is around 3,000. It is, therefore, possible that the planning 
approvals will be modified as the project progresses because building height and 
development limits are linked to eligibility count under Mumbai’s development 
regulations. 
Nevertheless, the SRA has currently approved a maximum built-up area of 146,165 
square meters, based on an eligibility count of 2215. Of this total area, approximately 
                                                        
Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS), a break-away right-wing political party from the Shiv-Sena. 
Sumit has close friends who live in Dhobi Ghat and who are also active members of the MNS. 
 




93,500 square meters is the effective carpet area that can be sold to consumers, and 
on which the advertised selling price applies (See Table 5 and Table 6, for 
calculations). As of June 2018, apartments in the project were priced at INR 505,861 
(£5,050) per square meter (see Figure 13), which makes the realizable sale value of 
the project around INR 46.3 billion (£463 million) (See Figure 10 for calculations). 
This projected valuation is valid only if the built-up area calculations, i.e., the planning 
permissions that were approved in 2016, remain unchanged (Annex  D). The project’s 
valuation also depends on future price behavior, which at the moment appears to be 
heading south (See Figure 12), but has been more or less flat in the last three years. 
According to one news report, however, Piramal has valued the project at INR 70 
billion (GBP 700 million) (The Asian Age, 2016). 
Table 5: Simplified Built-up Area Calculations (Compiled by Author, 2018; Data: SRA, 2018) 
Site area 39.000 m2 
Density of slum 850 / hectare 
Permissible FAR 4 
Maximum buildable area (according to Performa A) 146.165 
Rehab Built-up area (2215 units x 30 sqm) 66.45 
Maximum area available for commercial sale (without fungible) 79.715 
Total saleable area including (35%) fungible FAR 107.615 





Table 6: Simplified Sale Value Calculations (Compiled by Author, 2018; Data: SRA, 2018; Piramal Realty, 
2018) 
Total saleable area 107.615 m2 
Total carpet area 93.625 m2 
Carpet area rate advertised by Primal INR 505.861 
Project valuation (not accounting for price growth) INR 46.3 billion 
 
 
Figure 12: Price trends for Mahalaxmi (Liases Foras, 2018) 
 





Figure 13:  Promotional advertising by Piramal Realty (Author, 2018) 
 Developer Details 
News of Piramal’s involvement in Dhobi Ghat’s redevelopment first broke in August 
2015 when the firm announced an early-stage investment of INR 2 billion (£20 
million) in the form of equity capital into the project (Menon, 2018). Till then, the 
project was managed and funded by Omkar Realtors, a Mumbai-based developer 
known to be experts in slum redevelopment work. According to the public 
announcement, Piramal’s investment was to be used by Omkar for rehabilitating 
residents and seeking government approvals (Nandy, 2015). The next major 
announcement came in January 2018, when Piramal and Omkar signed a joint 
development agreement. According to this agreement, Piramal would invest another 
INR 26 billion (£260 million) into the project in exchange for a sixty percent revenue 
share of the free-sale component and take over full charge of design, development, 
construction, and sales (N. Kamath, 2018). The announcement was made soon after 
all residents of Dhobi Ghat had vacated the site, which marked the “successful” 
exchange of land between residents and Omkar. Omkar, therefore, earned INR 28 
billion (£280 million) + 40% of profit share for the work of consent acquisition.  




Omkar, however, was not the only developer involved in consent acquisition at Dhobi 
Ghat. According to residents and news reports, it was Lokhandwala (another 
prominent Mumbai-based developer), who initiated the redevelopment process in 
Dhobi Ghat as early as 2004 (Babar, 2018; N. Kamath, 2016). Lokhandwala is said to 
have been the first developer to propose redevelopment to residents and had 
officially signed an agreement with the SRA in March 2005 to bag the slum’s 
development rights (SRA, 2018). However, since Lokhandwala failed to make 
progress with the redevelopment for a decade, residents went to court against the 
developer, and the court subsequently ordered a ballot test among residents to decide 
the fate of the project. It was in this election, which was held in August 2014 that 
Omkar emerged as the more popular and officially elected developer among the 
residents of Dhobi Ghat (Babar, 2018; MahaRERA, 2018). The court also ordered 
Omkar to compensate Lokhandwala for losses incurred, as per section 13.2 of the 
Slum Redevelopment Act (Bombay High Court, 2014). While details of the deal remain 
unknown to the public, the title deed in the SRA’s records, mentions that 
Lokhandwala was paid “certain moneys” and “certain flats in Omkar 1973, and Omkar 
Meridia” (other residential developments by Omkar) as compensation (See Figure 
14). Anecdotal accounts of my participants (which included two committee members 
and an ex-employee of Lokhandwala) suggest that the total settlement amount paid 
to Lokhandwala could be around INR 3 billion (£30 million). 





Figure 14: Excerpt from the title deed. Monetary transactions between Omkar and Lokhandwala involved 
exchange of flats and money (MahaRERA, 2019) 
Residents allege that in addition to Lokhandwala, Omkar had to make a settlement 
with another (not-so-known) developer, Keemaya, who was briefly involved with 
consent acquisition in Dhobi Ghat between 2011 and 2013. While a senior executive 
of Omkar refuted this claim, the title deed also mentions that Keemaya was paid INR 
50 million (£500,000) by Omkar (See Figure 15). Other developers who are familiar 
with slum redevelopment work, however guess that Keemaya might have earned 
closer to INR 500 million (£5 million) from their involvement in consent acquisition 
at Dhobi Ghat. These claims are nevertheless mere speculations, and cannot be 
verified for accuracy. 
 





Figure 15: Excerpt from the title deed. Keemaya was paid INR 50 million (£500,000) by Omkar as 
compensation (MahaRERA, 2019) 
In summary, Dhobi Ghat’s redevelopment involved the participation of at least four 
developers with different levels of experience, background, and organization size 
(See Table 7). Three of these four developers contributed to the work of consent 
acquisition, which lasted thirteen years in total. The physical exchange of land (i.e., 
the evacuation of residents from the project site) took four years, and Omkar was the 
only developer involved in executing this task (Figure 16). The rest of this chapter 
focuses on the coordination between Omkar and residents of Dhobi Ghat, which made 
the exchange possible.  In particular, I look at the institutions that governed this 
exchange, the coordination problems and risks that residents and developers faced, 
and the practice that got the job done.  
 
 
Figure 16: Chronology of Dhobi Ghat's redevelopment (Author, 2018) 
 




Table 7: Developers involved in the Dhobi Ghat Redevelopment (Author, 2018) 
Developer Lokhandwala Kimaya Omkar Piramal 
Year established 1988 2007 2003 2012 













Region of operation Mumbai, Dubai Mumbai Mumbai Mumbai 
Number of employees 200 80 700 240 
Number of completed 
projects 
9 0 14 0 
Total real estate 
produced (in sq ft) 
10 million 0 20 million 0 
Number of on-going 
projects 
3 3 7 5 
Real estate 
commitment as of 2018 
(in sq ft) 
3.5 million 138,000 7.1 million 15 million 
Developer Group 2 2 3 5 









4.  INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 Cases of Dissent 
By the time I started my fieldwork in April 2017, the settlement at Dhobi Ghat had 
been nearly razed to the ground. What remained were a few shacks and the bamboo 
structures which the Dhobi’s use to dry their laundry (Figure 17).  





Figure 17: Baboo structures used for drying laundry at Dhobi Ghat (Author, 2017) 
A tall fence ran along the perimeter, with openings facing the street that led to the 
washing area.  Security guards hired by Omkar manned the main entry points to the 
site and inside stood two trailers, which functioned as Omkar’s site office. Iqbal, a 
resident of Dhobi Ghat, who had found alternate accommodation in a neighboring 
slum, continued to use the site for his laundry business. In what was more of a casual 
discussion than a structured interview, I inquired about the status of the 
redevelopment. Iqbal, who seemed to be in a rush but perhaps found it rude to not 
engage with me, updated me on what he knew20.   
Iqbal: Almost 90 percent of residents have moved out.  There are about 40-50 
households holding on at the moment.   
                                                        
20 I sensed that Iqbal’s hesitation was not just to do with loss of time, but also the fact that Omkar’s 
security men watched us interact as they guarded the site. Iqbal also initially mistook me for a 
journalist, before I explained to him who I was. 
 




Anitra: Why haven’t these people moved out yet? It’s been almost three years since 
Omkar won the GBR elections.  
Iqbal: Everyone has a different issue. Some people are waiting for their names to 
be added to the list, others are fighting for better compensations… These things 
take time.  
Anitra: How are they going to resolve the issue? 
Iqbal: They are all in talks with the committee to get their matter sorted.  
Anitra: How long do you think they will continue to hold on? How much longer do 
you think it’ll be until the site is fully cleared? 
Iqbal: They will all move out eventually… they have to- the BMC [Bombay 
Municipal Corporation] has already sent them eviction notices. But I can’t put a 
date on it.   
Iqbal then walked away to carry on with the work he had come there to do, while 
I looked for other residents to talk to. 
In the months that followed, my agenda was to identify the causes of conflict, which 
led to delays in land clearance, and the solutions that had been devised to overcome 
these conflicts. The residents who were yet to vacate the site were my starting point 
for this investigation. From their accounts, I was able to identify the most typical cases 
of dissent. 
One such case included the case of Rakesh- a resident whose name did not feature on 
the list of candidates eligible for resettlement housing. Rakesh claimed that despite 
being a resident of Dhobi Ghat since 1993, his name was not on the list because the 
BMC had missed locating his shack in their survey. Developers, however, claim that 
the list-making process is rather thorough and follows a double review process. The 
BMC does the first round of survey in which they mark and number each shack in a 
slum. This is then followed by a second, more detailed survey carried out by the 
developer in consultation with slum residents, wherein discrepancies in the BMC-
prepared list are ironed out. In the event that a shack is identified, but its owner is 
documented incorrectly, the BMC or the developer will accept proof of residency in 
the form of a utility bill dating back to the cut-off year specified by the SRA. Rakesh, 




however, claimed that he did not have any documents to prove his residency status 
as it got washed away in the 2005 deluge that left slum residents worst affected.  
The second (typical) case is that of Susheela- an elderly woman who was concerned 
that when the redevelopment is finished, she would only receive one flat, even though 
she had three grown sons, each of whom is married with kids. Susheela claimed that 
her original shack was much bigger in size than most other households in the 
settlement because it accommodated fourteen people. “How can fourteen of us fit in 
a flat of 300 square feet?” she cried out. When I questioned a representative of Omkar 
about this concern, I was told that two of Susheela’s sons were actually residents of 
other slums and that the sons had moved out of Dhobi Ghat years ago.  
Susheela’s concern was shared by Bhima, another resident who was also troubled by 
the number of flats his family would receive after redevelopment. Bhima claimed that 
his family owned two separate shacks that were connected internally, but the BMC 
registered it as just one unit. However, according to developers, each household is 
entitled to one flat only, and a household or tenement is defined as four walls and a 
roof, as per section 33(10) of the city’s development regulations (Mumbai DCR, 2018). 
Developers tell me that because residents are aware of this rule, many of them have 
built partition walls inside their original shacks, which not only makes it difficult for 
surveyors to map, but also leads to absurd claims. One developer, referring to the map 
of a slum settlement, pointed out how a resident had built what looked like a closet of 
16 square feet with no windows or doors, and called it an independent unit worthy of 
qualifying for a new flat. 
A fourth type of case involved a dispute between a brother and sister, whose father 
(who was the original owner of the shack) had died just after the list was prepared. 
Sheena, the sister complained that not only had it been a nightmare to register her 
father’s death with the BMC, but it was also unfair that her brother be the only one to 
get a new flat, and not her. She too claimed that their shack was actually two units, 
and that there was a wall that divided her part of the house from her brother’s part. 
Sheena swore that she would not budge until she got her fair share from the 




developer. When asked about this case, a representative of Omkar responded: “this is 
a family matter that has now become our problem… But it has nothing to do with the 
redevelopment”.  
Lastly, there was the case of Bharat, a resident who partially operated his laundry 
business from home, and whose livelihood would be affected with the redevelopment. 
Bharat, like many other residents of Dhobi Ghat used the little available open space 
attached to his shack to dry washed laundry.  Having to relocate, even if temporarily, 
meant that he would have to find an alternate space to hang his washing, which in a 
space starved city like Mumbai is not easy. Indian land acquisition laws and the SRA 
mandates land acquirers and developers to compensate landowners for any 
disruption caused to their livelihood. Bharat therefore wanted adequate 
compensation for the drying space he would loose because of the redevelopment. 
Bharat evaded the question when I asked how much compensation he was 
demanding from the developer, and when prodded simply said, “whatever is fair”.  
While the notion of fair compensation is understandably contested, demands over the 
open drying space supposedly went as high as INR 10 million (£100,000). This is 
because, residents who claimed ownership of, and thereby sought monetary 
compensation for, the open drying space were valuing the compensation based on 
market rate of land in the neighbourhood, as opposed to measuring loss in revenue 
caused by redevelopment work. The problem of valuation of the drying space was of 
concern to the developer too. One representative of Omkar was particularly 
perturbed by this problem. “Residents are being greedy”, he said, adding that, “If the 
issue is disruption to their business, then we have tried to address it in other ways. 
We’ve offered to install German-made industrial drying machines that are space 
efficient, and also made room for a temporary drying space in a portion of the site 
while construction goes on… So it isn’t about their business at all. It’s about extorting 
us for more money”.  
From these different cases of dissent, I learnt that conflict over consent acquisition 
mainly stems from the issue of compensation, or rather the distribution of 




compensation among residents. Compensations could range from nothing at all (for 
residents deemed ineligible) to anything as high as a developer’s maximum paying 
capacity (for residents with stronger bargaining powers). While formal rules 
pertaining to compensations do exist, the rules as I show below, seem to create 
conflicts while simultaneously intending to mitigate them, which is 
counterproductive to successful land exchange. 
 Formal Rules of Consent Acquisition 
Of all the rules concerning consent acquisition, the most significant are: rules that 
define eligibility; rules that determine compensations; and rules that permit forced 
evictions. As per SRA regulations, eligibility is decided based on a cut-off date, which 
applies to all residents. At present, the cut-off date is 1st January 2000, but this date 
is periodically brought forward, especially in the months leading up to major 
elections (Weinstein, 2014b, p. 65). The rule essentially states that if a household had 
built their shack prior to January 2000, then they are eligible for free resettlement 
housing. While this rule is more or less accepted and followed by developers and 
residents, drawing a hard line to segregate residents according to residency status is 
a challenge. The rule, for starters, assumes that the original owner of the shack (the 
definition of which itself is contentious), is also its current owner, which is often not 
true because slum properties are traded frequently outside of official slum 
(re)development regulations. Besides, to prove (or disprove) that a shack actually 
existed prior to January 2000 is impossible, because the SRA only began surveying 
slums in 2010 (Balachandran, 2016). This is why utility bills serves as a proxy to 
prove eligibility. However, not all residents have a record of bills dating back to the 
year 1999.  
The rules relating to compensations sets the lower limit for the compensation that a 
developer needs to provide residents as part of the slum redevelopment scheme. Just 
like the eligibility criteria, the minimum threshold for compensations is raised every 
now and again to appease voters living in slums. As of date, all eligible households 
need to be given a new flat (in the same location), sized at least thirty square meters. 




In addition, the developer needs to provide all eligible residents with transit 
accommodation in a nearby location, or equivalent rent money, for the entire 
duration of their displacement. In case of businesses affected due to the 
redevelopment, the developer must also provide compensation to the business owner 
in the form of new real estate space and/or pay for losses incurred due to the 
redevelopment work. The problem with these rules however is that: A) It ignores 
difference among residents- in terms of size and number of shacks owned by them, 
and their political capital. B) It does not specifically address the measures to counter 
risks of non-cooperation on part of the developer. Therefore, the continuous and 
regular supply of rent payments, and timely completion of the new building is not 
guaranteed. C) It does not clearly define what the compensation for affected 
businesses should be. Or rather, how “loss to livelihood” should be measured when 
the nature of work is informal. 
Finally, rules pertaining to evictions are critical to consent acquisition because they 
provide legitimacy to the rules relating to eligibility and compensations. The current 
rules state that residents can be forcefully evicted so long as A) at least seventy 
percent of residents are in favour of, and cooperating with the redevelopment, and B) 
the developer has been issued building approvals for the resettlement block. If both 
these conditions are true, then the developer can initiate the legal process of forced 
eviction. However, compared to the rules of eligibility and compensation, the rules of 
eviction are even more loosely defined. To begin with, the rule fails to delineate what 
“in favour of redevelopment” means. For instance, residents could be in favour of 
redevelopment in general, and could have given their official consent to a developer, 
but may still not be in favour of specific terms of the redevelopment. This is an 
important point to consider because when residents and developers get into a 
redevelopment contract, the full terms of the contract are unknown to either party 
until the land clearance process is underway. Therefore, it is possible that despite 
being in favour of the redevelopment, residents or the developer may at the time of 
land clearance, realise that the terms are not satisfactory to them.  The rules of 
eviction also do not synchronise with the grievance redressal tools available to slum 




residents (and minority groups) in the event of forced evictions, outside of the 
redevelopment context. Residents therefore do have the option of challenging 
eviction proceedings, by filing public interest litigation against the developer, even if 
the pre-conditions for legally evicting them hold true.  
These gaps in formal rules explain why projects often get suspended or abandoned in 
Mumbai, as residents, developers and the state end up in a political stalemate that 
undermines development efforts. However, the frustration of repeated failed 
attempts to redevelop slums has led to the creation of informal norms over time, 
which are meant to address the gaps and problems in formal rules, and which 
facilitate successful consent acquisition.  
I eventually pieced together details of how consent was acquired in Dhobi Ghat, by 
interviewing twelve residents (two of whom were committee members), six 
developers (one ex-employee of Lokhandwala, three employees of Omkar, and two 
employees of Piramal), one housing activist, one lawyer, and three real estate 
consultants who are familiar with the project. To check if the practice of consent 
acquisition observed in Dhobi Ghat is common across other slums in Mumbai, I 
interviewed five other developers who specialise in slum redevelopment work, and 
residents from two other slums in the same neighbourhood as Dhobi Ghat. 
 Informal Norms to Mitigate Conflict 
Through interviews and participant observation, I tried to identify what these 
informal norms are, and how they help overcome conflicts over eligibility, 
compensations and evictions. By norms, I mean a set of actions that are firstly 
replicable, and secondly followed by development actors not just in Dhobi Ghat, but 
in other slums too. I found the following norms to be most significant as mechanisms 
for conflict resolution:  
Letting committee members take over the tail end of the task of preparing the 
list of eligible residents. In Dhobi Ghat, I found that in addition to the BMC survey 
and developer-community consultation, committee members got to review the final 




list of eligible residents. Committee members were given discretionary powers by the 
developer to resolve conflicts over eligibility, and could suggest more names to be 
added to the list, if they considered a resident to be truly eligible for resettlement 
housing. The assumption here is that committee members would know if a resident 
has been living in the slum prior to the cut-off date, or what the original typology of a 
shack was before the BMC survey, i.e., whether a partition wall was added recently.  
Making possible the option to purchase eligibility.  According to residents who 
were yet to vacate their homes because of conflict over eligibility, there is an option 
to get on the list by paying a “fee” to committee members. In Dhobi Ghat, this fee (as 
per anecdotal accounts of residents) was INR 1,500,000 (£15,000). Ineligible 
residents, and possibly non-residents, could therefore receive a flat in the new 
development by paying an amount that is around 65% below market rate (in this 
case). However, most residents I talked to, found the fee to be unaffordable, and since 
the transaction would be impossible to document legally, accessing formal financing 
was not an option either.  
Accommodating changes, including name change , on the list. This norm, which is 
on its way to becoming an official rule according to developers, allows changes in the 
list (particularly changes in ownership) to be registered officially for a fee of INR 
40,000 (£400). At the time of research, residents of Dhobi Ghat could pay this fee to 
committee members who in turn paid BMC officials to modify the list prepared by 
them during the initial survey. This norm is aimed at recognising past property 
transactions in the slum and rectifying the errors made in matching owners with 
shacks listed on the BMC’s survey records.  
Waiting until majority residents have moved out before the legal process of 
eviction is initiated.  Although the official rule states that (non-cooperative) 
residents can be forcefully evicted if at least 70 percent residents are in favour of the 
redevelopment, the norm, according to developers, is to wait until the site is more or 
less clear. Therefore, developers say they do not begin eviction proceedings until at 
least 90 percent of residents have vacated the site, irrespective of how many residents 




officially consented to the redevelopment, or even if the development authority has 
issued them building approvals.  
These norms, while effective in addressing conflict, mostly pertain to issues of 
eligibility and eviction, and not the distribution of compensations. Only later did I 
realise that while residents of Dhobi Ghat appear to be somewhat self-aware in 
relation to the developer and the state, most residents are fairly oblivious of their 
position in relation to each other, when it comes to compensations. I found that even 
developers struggle to gauge the differential bargaining powers of residents.  The 
distribution of compensation therefore bears a close resemblance to the workings of 
a bazaar economy, where the search for information one lacks and the protection of 
information one has is the name of the game (Geertz, 1978, p. 29). However, unlike in 
a bazaar economy where bargaining and clientalisation are standard search 
procedures, there appears to be no normative approach to resolving disputes over 
compensations in slum redevelopment. This is because, the distribution of 
compensation is a complex and complicated coordination challenge that can only be 
resolved through procedural responses, as opposed to institutionalised action. 
5.  THE COORDINATION CHALLENGE 
 The Exchange Arena 
The distribution of compensation essentially entails an economic transaction 
between residents and developers. Coordination problem in economic exchanges is 
generally examined at the level of individuals or firms. In the case of slum 
redevelopments in Mumbai, however, the exchange arena comprises of thousands of 
residents looking to give their collective consent to one of at least two developers. 
The exchange requires almost all residents to willingly hand over land to a developer, 
in exchange for a new flat among other monetary compensations. Since there is 
generally more than one developer competing for residents’ consent, and residents 
are not obliged to give consent unless they are all satisfied with the compensation 




offered to them, the exchange must be voluntary21. For individuals to voluntarily 
enter into mutually beneficial exchange relationships they have to recognise them as 
such, and they have to be able to commit to fulfill their contractual obligations (Greif, 
2000). This fundamental problem of exchange is particularly difficult to overcome 
when rules and norms cannot account for the specificities of land. However, as I 
demonstrate below, coordination problem in the exchange of slum land is not linked 
to institutional structures alone, but also the problem of collective action and 
interests. Jens Beckert notes that economic exchanges within market structures can 
only occur if three inevitable coordination problems are resolved. Beckert defines 
these as the value problem, the problem of competition and the cooperation problem 
(Beckert, 2009, p. 245). I use this same analytical framing to analyse how conflicts 
over land exchange are resolved in slum redevelopment in Mumbai. 
 The Cooperation Problem 
The problem of cooperation arises from the risks that residents incur because of their 
incomplete knowledge of the developer’s intention. The exchange of consent and 
compensations is based on an open contract, the terms of which are not fully 
enforceable. Hence the risk of developers reneging on their contractual obligations is 
not only high, but also a real and frequently occurring problem. Moreover, the legal 
agreement that binds this exchange is often worded in English, a language that most 
slum residents cannot read. Residents are therefore inevitably wary of engaging in 
land exchange with developers. Solutions to the problem of cooperation have been 
discussed widely in the social sciences, mostly in the context of the notion of trust 
(Cook, 2001). Trust is indeed an important factor in consent acquisition, and I found 
                                                        
21 I acknowledge that in reality the exchange of slum land may not be voluntary for many residents, 
and coercion indeed exists in slum redevelopment in Mumbai. However, for the sake of analysing the 
exchange of slum land from a sociology of markets perspective, I focus on practices that are non-
coercive in nature. I would however reiterate that in Dhobi Ghat, land exchange was fairly peaceful. 
The number of reported cases of forced slum evictions in Mumbai has sharply declined in the last ten 
years, which is an indication that residents and developers are able to resolve disputes in a peaceful 
manner. 
 




stark evidence of this in the accounts of both residents and developers. The story of 
how Omkar came to be selected as developer in Dhobi Ghat, is in the eyes of residents 
as well as Omkar, a testimony to how much trust matters. Although Lokhandwala 
supposedly offered residents bigger flats than Omkar did, according to residents, 
Lokhandwala lost out because the firm had a poor track record when it came to timely 
delivery of projects. Besides, Lokhandwala is meant to have had a spat with some 
residents regarding their claim to ownership of the open drying space. During this 
spat, Lokhandwala is said to have responded rudely, asking residents: “Do you believe 
this space belongs to your father?” Residents claim that their trust in Lokhandwala 
was broken after that incident. Representatives of Omkar repeated the same story to 
me, when discussing the history of the project. In fact, Omkar maintains that their 
business model is successful because it is one based on trust, even in discussions with 
the media (Shrivastava & Prasso, 2014).  
Ethnographic documentation shows that much of the work that developers do in 
order to acquire slum land involves the social work of building trust and gaining 
confidence of residents. The practices that commonly constitute this work includes, 
showing patronage to community celebrations and festivals through donations, 
fostering relationships with residents who matter most (i.e. committee members) by 
attending their weddings, getting intimately involved in the lives of residents, etc. The 
intention behind many of these practices is also to mask the uneven power balance 
between developers and residents. In the words of Suresh Bhojwani, a Mumbai-based 
developer: 
You can’t offer them too little, but you can’t offer them too much either. If residents 
think you are throwing money at them to get their land, you’re in trouble. You 
should never make them feel like they can be bought, and even if you are 
technically buying their consent, you have to make it seem like you are doing this 
because you care about them.  
In Dhobi Ghat, Omkar supposedly organised screenings for residents, to show off 
their portfolio of work through marketing videos. Residents of Geeta Nagar (another 




slum settlement close to Dhobi Ghat), mentioned that one developer had even 
arranged a bus tour for them to visit the firm’s other completed projects in the city.  
While trust can overcome resident’s fear of defection, it cannot however, overcome 
the problem of coordinating group action. Once residents have given their consent to 
the redevelopment, there is no formal rule as yet, to compel them to vacate the site 
within a stipulated timeframe22. Therefore, residents are in no rush to move out, 
especially if other residents have not yet done so. According to developers, residents 
play the waiting game because no one is fully convinced about the project taking off. 
Land clearance, predictably becomes much easier once the first big group of residents 
have moved out, as it enhances resident’s conviction about the redevelopment. For 
this reason, developers provide incentives to early movers. I describing his “hero-like” 
experience with land clearance, Dilip Sathe, former project manager of a 
redevelopment project, noted: 
There was this one time when we were getting increasingly frustrated about how 
slowly things were progressing. Everyone was waiting for the other person to 
move out first. I needed to get a large group of families to move at once, so that the 
others could follow… I came up with a plan and called Viren [his boss] … told him 
that I had to do this now, or else we’d be waiting forever. That night I organised for 
a truck full of Biryani from Jaffer Bhai [a restaurant famous for its Biryani] and 
another truck full of cash. It was around midnight, which is when people are back 
home from work. I made an offer to residents: 50,000 [£500] in cash and biryani 
for the whole family, if they moved out immediately. We managed to convince 
almost 700 families. It was a good move and I’m glad Viren supported me.   
Another problem that impacts cooperation between developers and residents is the 
uneven dissemination of information in large slums. Residents in different parts of a 
slum may have access to very different information regarding the trustworthiness of 
a developer, or the benefits/ disadvantages of moving out early. Developers see this 
as varying levels of cooperativeness among resident groups, which is usually a 
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reflection of how supportive the leaders of different groups in the slum are, of the 
developer. In order not to loose time because of the uneven levels of cooperation, 
developers identify and divide the slum into geographic clusters based on levels of 
cooperativeness. According to one of Omkar’s project officers, in Dhobi Ghat, the site 
was cleared in tranches, beginning with the cluster that appeared most cooperative. 
Residents confirmed that different “societies” (a term used to identify groups 
represented by separate committee members) moved out of the slum at different 
time periods.  
 The Problem of Competition 
Competition poses the risk of uncertain profit expectations for the developer. It is 
therefore in the interest of developers to shield themselves favourably from 
competitors, in order to stay committed to the exchange. Although the structuration 
of competition leads to contested distributional results and is a precarious 
compromise reflecting the inequalities of the power of actors in a market field 
(Beckert, 2009, p. 258), it nevertheless resolves coordination problems. For private 
developers in Mumbai to be interested in taking on the risky and cumbersome task of 
slum redevelopment, there has to be a profit incentive that is higher than in a green 
field, or non slum redevelopment project.  The only way to ensure high profit rewards 
is by keeping cost of land acquisition low. To keep land costs low, the compensation 
offered to residents would have to be equal to, or minimally higher than, the SRA 
stipulated requirements, which is only possible if very few developers are in the race 
to acquire the slum’s redevelopment rights.  
Developers in Mumbai alleviate some of the uncertainties created by competition 
through reciprocal agreements that operate as soft law. Gaurav Sheth, a business 
development manager at a large real estate firm that specialises in slum 
redevelopment work, explained to me:  
If another big player like us is already involved [in a slum] we will not step foot 
there. Even if there are several small players it is best to stay away.... We could take 
down one or two small guys, but beyond that is too much hassle and not worth it.  




Gaurav’s concern reveals that competition in slum redevelopments poses problems 
other than just the risk of uncertain profit expectations. When multiple developers 
compete for residents’ consent, it creates divisions and rifts among residents that 
could undermine redevelopment efforts. Residents of Dhobi Ghat claim that at the 
time when Lokhandwala and Keemaya were both vying for the redevelopment 
contract, there were violent fights in the slum everyday between supporters of either 
developer. “Things started to get pretty bad. No one was killed luckily, but we had to 
constantly call the police to stop the fighting”, recollected one resident. According to 
the committee members I talked to, peace was eventually restored when Sachin Ahir 
(former Housing Minister and nephew of Arun Gawli) intervened to lay down some 
ground rules for developers.  
Once Omkar took over from Keemaya, a different strategy was put to use, to overcome 
this problem associated with competition. Residents claim that for over a year, until 
the GBR election was held, Omkar had stationed its men in the slum to keep an eye on 
residents. “They were here night and day, watching over us, to make sure that we 
didn’t talk ill about Omkar, or spread hearsay”, said one of them. “Omkar didn’t want 
us to switch sides, so they made sure that Lokhandwala did not influence us in any 
way”, claimed another resident. According to a representative of Omkar however, the 
firm had its staff reside on site, to build trust with residents and get to know their 
concerns, so that the redevelopment could be as smooth as possible.  
 The Value Problem 
The value problem refers to the uncertainty confronting buyers and sellers from the 
difficulties of assessing the value of commodities. In slum redevelopments, 
developers and residents struggle to ascertain the value of residents’ consent because 
the use-value of slum land and the disruption to everyday life and livelihoods that 
redevelopment causes, cannot be measured through objective processes of 
classification and commensuration. Moreover, since ownership of slum properties is 
not explicitly defined, residents’ claim to the (full) exchange value of slum land is a 
matter of contention too. The SRA has helped mitigate this problem by setting rules 




and valuation standards that are now more or less agreeable to both developers and 
residents, much to the despair of housing-rights activists. While talking with me about 
Dhobi Ghat, Aravind Bhat, a known figure among Mumbai’s housing activists, 
lamented: “Everyone is just wanting a little bit more than 30 square meters (of new 
apartment space). The demands (of residents) are not radical in any way”.   
While SRA guidelines are able to somewhat tackle valuation problems relating to 
housing, disputes over the valuation of businesses that operate out of slum 
settlements remain unaddressed. I found that some developers use a valuation 
technique that is commonly practiced by micro finance institutions for calculating 
annual revenue of informal businesses. The practice entails shadowing business 
owners over a period of several weeks, to determine their true earnings. Once this is 
done, a process of bargaining begins, wherein the developer and business-owner 
haggle for a compensation that is agreeable to both parties. Hashim Khorakiwala, a 
management consultant who was initially leading a massive neighbourhood 
redevelopment project in another part of the city, but later resigned for unknown 
reasons, narrated his experience of negotiating with a Kebab shop owner to me:  
The guy operated out of a tiny space at the corner of a building that we needed to 
tear down. His business was doing very well no doubt, so I knew he would not 
move easily.  Besides, he had good contacts with powerful people who’d been 
eating there for years. After studying him and his business for some time, I offered 
him 10 Crores [£1 million]. He refused right away, saying that he made 50,000 
[£500] a day and hence deserved more. Eventually, because we were losing a lot of 
time, we gave in and settled on an amount that I can’t disclose to you... I hear the 
guy lives in Dubai now. 
The value problem in slum redevelopments however, is not about valuation alone. 
Unlike in most economic exchanges wherein buyers and sellers agree on a value 
before the exchange, in slum redevelopments, the value of residents’ consent is 
determined through the course of the exchange, and becomes known to the developer 
only after the land is fully cleared. Therefore, while an initial exchange value (i.e. 
standard compensation) is agreed upon when a developer is selected for the job, the 
real exchange value (which includes additional compensations) is ascertained only at 




the end of the transaction. This increases the developer’s risk of uncertain profit 
expectations. Another problem relating to value, but not exactly to do with valuation, 
is the distribution of the exchange value among residents. Since compensations 
cannot be evenly divided, a developer faces the challenge of figuring out the most 
politically acceptable pattern of distribution. This challenge adds to the risk of non-
cooperation, since a bad decision on the developer’s part can jeopardise the 
foundation of trust on which the exchange rests.  
Developers with experience in slum redevelopment work claim that one can, to some 
extent, hedge against the risk of cost overruns by accounting for additional 
compensations at the beginning. Sandeep Kumar, a Mumbai-based consultant who 
specialises in assessing financial feasibility of slum redevelopment projects, 
explained to me that cost of land in slum redevelopment constitutes three main 
expenses: 1) “official” land cost (an amount that is to be paid to the registered 
landowner, which in the case of Dhobi Ghat is the Bombay Municipal Corporation)23; 
2) rent payments (given to residents for the entire duration of their displacement); 
3) and miscellaneous settlements (which includes all additional compensations and 
payoffs, but not including government bribes, or the new flats that residents are 
entitled to). “These three costs are roughly divided in a 2:1:1 ratio, but it really 
depends on how judicious a developer is with the spending” says Sandeep. According 
to Sandeep, the main beneficiaries of the extra spending are business owners, 
committee members, and a group that developers refer to as “slum dadas”, which 
broadly translates to slum bullies or troublemakers who supposedly obstruct 
redevelopment.  
While developers are able to comprehend, and maybe even plan for the risks that the 
value problem poses, I did not find any evidence of a specific strategy that is used to 
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overcome the problem. However, I found that the following practices adopted by 
developers and residents in Dhobi Ghat, seemed to have helped:   
Selective use of secrecy and transparency 
While investigating the conflicts over compensations, I observed that residents were 
very open about their concerns regarding the redevelopment, even if the concerns 
were not always “legitimate” as per the SRA rules. Residents talked freely, not just 
with me, but with other members of the community as well, about not getting what 
they wanted: being left out from the list; the confusion over number of tenements 
they owned; the treatment they received from the developer, etc. Residents were 
aware of their neighbour’s concerns and shared a sense of solidarity, especially with 
those who were still holding on. However, on the contrary, residents were tightlipped 
when it came to individual deals struck, and the most common response when asked 
about the final compensation was: “I got what everyone else got”, or “I got whatever 
is right”.  
Developers too, preferred to keep information about compensations non-transparent, 
because by doing so, they are able to manage costs by shortchanging some residents 
to make up for higher spending on certain other residents. However, when I 
questioned multiple employees of Omkar about how compensations were distributed, 
I was told by all of them that residents received the same compensation, which is: a 
flat of 30 square meter, and rent money for two years. It is an open secret though, 
within Mumbai’s real estate circles that compensations, in case of redevelopment 
projects or jointly held properties (large landowning family for instance), are never 
equal. According to some of my participants, developers usually tie residents to an 
informal non-disclosure agreement, in order to maintain the opacity around 
compensations.   
Maintenance of cognitive dissonance through semantic or language choices 
Unlike representatives of the developer, residents of Dhobi Ghat acknowledged that 
some people, particularly committee members, received more compensation than 
others. When questioned about how they knew that committee members received 




more compensation, one resident jokingly responded: “If a man who has travelled by 
cycle all his life upgrades to a BMW overnight, can’t you guess where the money came 
from?” Another such case, which was discussed openly, is of a resident who 
supposedly bought and moved into a two-bedroom apartment in Parel- an upper 
middle class neighbourhood in central Mumbai.  
However, instead of recognising these cases as the unequal distribution of 
compensation, residents described it as “salaries” paid to committee members for 
assisting the developer with land clearance work. Representatives of Omkar too, used 
the word salary frequently while talking to me about the integral role of committee 
members in the land clearance process. “We pay them a salary according to their 
performance. So we give them targets of convincing 20, 30, 40... households every 
month” said one of the representatives. Similarly, residents perceived the 
compensations received by those who bargained hard by resisting the pressure to 
move out, as a “reward” for their perseverance, time, and effort. While referring to 
Susheela’s case, Raju, a fellow resident of Dhobi Ghat remarked:  
When the rest of us were away at work, carrying on with our lives as usual, 
Susheela stayed back to fight off the developer. She spent time and energy doing 
that, so she should get whatever she is asking for.  
Loose coupling of land clearance and land development 
While semantics and secrecy are useful tools to navigate the challenge of dividing 
exchange value among residents, an unorganised and non-transparent system of 
spending inevitably adds to the risk of cost and time overruns. However, I found that 
this risk gets overlooked, rather than mitigated, because both residents and the 
developer operate in episodic siloes. Therefore, so far as the task of land clearance is 
the main focus, completion of the project becomes a distant, almost secondary goal.  
The residents of Dhobi Ghat negotiated, as a collective, for an upfront payment of two 
years’ worth of rent money from Omkar. Once this money was received (along with 
other compensatory payments), residents scattered away- some back to their villages, 
others used the money to buy an apartment in the outskirts of Mumbai, and the rest 




found accommodation in other slums in the city. The resettlement block, which was 
originally meant to be complete by 2017, is facing a 2-year delay (as of June 2018). 
Residents seem unsure about when their new flats will be ready, but are concerned 
that their second installment of rent payment is delayed.  However, there is nothing 
they can do now, except wait. 
At the developer’s end, I found that the team that was in charge of consent acquisition 
has been disbanded, except for four people who are retained to handle residents’ 
grievances. “The others have been allocated new projects, or found work elsewhere”, 
one of the retained members of staff tells me, adding that their role now is to manage 
rent payments. While Omkar offers full-time positions to those who work on land 
acquisition, SD. Corp (Omkar’s primary competitor) prefers to hire contract workers 
for the job. According to Sunil Bajaj a senior executive at SD. Corp: “We hire 
consultants, or project managers as they are called, to clear (slum) land because it 
ensures greater efficiency.... The decision making is faster that way”. Sunil went on to 
tell me that even though they had experts helping them out, most good project 
managers retire early. “It is a very stressful job. Attending to resident’s phone calls all 
the time, and dealing with their politics”, Sunil acknowledged. The key to keeping 
project managers happy is to give them relative autonomy, says Sunil. While I was not 
able to study how project managers at Dhobi Ghat coordinated with the accounting 
team, in regard to budget and time frame, I was told that team meetings were held 
every two weeks during the land clearance phase to discuss new developments. When 
I asked about the status of the project and why rent payment has been delayed, a staff 
member responded:  
It could take another year for the resettlement block to be built.... Rent payments 
are late because the company is having some liquidity problems…. The market is 
down at the moment, and our other project Omkar 1973 is not having good sales.  
As of April 2020, the resettlement block at Dhobi Ghat continues to face delays in 
completion, according to the website of the SRA. I was unable to reach out to my 
participants about the disbursement of rent payments, and can only guess that 
residents are stranded in this situation indefinetly.  




6.  DISCUSSION 
An unpacking of how coordination challenges were overcome in Dhobi Ghat, indicates 
that while institutions, social structures, and cultural ideologies facilitate the 
exchange of slum land, the practices adopted by developers and residents are 
ultimately ad hoc responses to complicated problems. The case shows that 
stakeholders certainly acknowledge the rules and regulations set by the SRA, but the 
institutionalization of slum redevelopment brings with it a whole new set of 
challenges related to the specificities of land, which makes land exchange all the more 
difficult, irrespective of the developer leading the project. While stakeholders seem 
to follow informal norms to address the difficulties of coordinating land exchange in 
Dhobi Ghat, these norms in several instances, only indicate to actors what (not) to do, 
rather than how to solve the problem. Cultural understandings of compensation and 
trust are useful in mitigating risks related to non-cooperation and conflicts over value 
in Dhobi Ghat. However, these shared understandings do not quite resolve the 
problems of collective action and distribution of exchange value. It is for this reason 
that consent acquisition commands much profit, and prestige, among land market 
actors. 
Dhobi Ghat’s redevelopment also reveals that land acquisition is often the end goal, 
even for established developers like Omkar, which is hailed as the expert in slum 
redevelopment work in Mumbai. Besides, the case shows that there is greater 
observable competition in land acquisition than in land development in Mumbai, 
which supports my proposition, that land commodification is the name of the game 
for Mumbai’s developers. While there were three developers: Omkar, Keemaya and 
Lokhandwala vying for residents’ consent, there appears to have been just one 
developer interested in developing the project. This is partly because of the 
significant profit attached to consent acquisition, but more importantly because these 
profits can be earned before land is developed. Therefore, developers do not have to 
wait until the project’s completion to reap the rewards (be they economic or social 
prestige) of successful transformation of slum land into commodity form. Put 
differently, consent/land acquisition provides real estate developers the opportunity 




to both display their “heroic skills” of coordinating land exchange, and also 
circumvent the relatively distant risks of land development. 
While Omkar may have figured out ways to acquire slum land with minimum conflict, 
their strategies are neither replicable, nor foolproof. In fact, the delay in Dhobi Ghat’s 
redevelopment, including the time taken to “clear” the site, is an indication that 
Omkar too stumbled at the task, despite the hefty monetary compensation promised 
to them. While Piramal too is poised to earn sizable income from their participation 
in the project, their profit ultimately depends on: the project’s exchange value over 
the next ten years (until all flats are sold); their cost of financing/ holding power; and 
the development approvals granted to them by planning authorities. However, the 
precarious and shortsighted arrangements on which the coordination of land 
exchange in Dhobi Ghat rests, poses additional, unknown challenges for everyone 
involved. These uncertainties, I argue, eventually hinders the project’s completion, if 
not for the new contestations they create, then due to the inability of investors like 




 PROJECT VALUATION 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
What I learned from my investigation into land acquisition is that real estate 
developers, i.e., the primary buyers and sellers of land, are not professionals who 
follow objective standards of work; and that land, i.e., the primary unit of exchange in 
real estate markets, is not easily tradable. Besides, as the Dhobi Ghat project 
demonstrates, the costs of land development (both direct and transactional) are 
unclear till the very end, and therefore difficult to decipher at the outset. The 
(e)valuation of development projects must, therefore, be riddled with constraints 
emerging not from the institutional conditions of professional practice, or normative 
behavior, but rather the idiosyncrasies of land and the ad hoc practices of developers. 
Scholars who study land and property evaluations have nevertheless tended to focus 
on customary rules or conventions of the field (Weber, 2002), technologies of 
evaluation (Doganova, 2011), and the role of non-humans and instruments of 
evaluation (Searle, 2014). The inadvertent assumption that evaluation practices are 
standardized, and evaluators well integrated within a professional world, I argue, 
limits the scope for identifying the influence of land’s many specificities on evaluation 
practices. For this reason, in my analysis of project evaluation, I shift the focus to 
developers by looking at the criteria of evaluation (Lamont, 2012) – not of land but of 
developers, along with the self-concept of evaluators (Hennion, 2004, 2007). This 
entails examining how the criteria for a “capable developer” are constructed, how 
developers participate in the signaling of this virtue, and how developers’ capability 
(to acquire and develop land) is quantified and legitimized by market actors. 
In this chapter, I investigate how land development projects are evaluated and what 
role real estate developers play in shaping land value through evaluation practices. 
Given the uncertainties in real estate development, particularly in a context such as 
Mumbai wherein project delays due to land acquisition and government approvals 
are commonplace, it is intriguing that developers commit to real estate development 




– an endeavor that not only requires significant upfront investment in land but is also 
oriented far into the future. A popular postulation among economic sociologists is 
that “future imaginaries” or “fictional expectations” serve as the principal tools for 
coping with uncertainties, and when these imaginaries are embodied in narratives 
and models, they become determinate enough to structure economic action (Beckert, 
2016b; Beckert & Bronk, 2018; MacKenzie, 2008). In the case of Mumbai developers, 
I find that economic decisions are guided not by imaginations of future price behavior 
but by temporally closer concerns related to the complications of land acquisition and 
government approvals. Embodied in narratives of developmental hurdles, and the 
requirement of an entrepreneurial developer to overcome these hurdles, 
uncertainties of the present, I argue, serve as the orienting schema that guides action 
in Mumbai’s land market. As a result, practices of evaluation become determined by: 
1) the social meaning of a developer in a given context; and 2) the social meaning of 
acquiring and developing land for developers in that context. Following the work of 
Marion Fourcade, who demonstrated that different meanings associated with money 
and nature lead to very different evaluations of compensation for ecological disasters, 
I propose that different meanings associated with developers and development work 
can lead to different evaluations of land and real estate projects (Fourcade, 2011). 
The chapter comprises of four empirical sections, which explore the constraints and 
conditions that frame evaluation practices in Mumbai’s land market, with particular 
focus on how developers perceive and distinguish themselves from each other. The 
first section lays out the regulatory context and historical background of land 
evaluation in Mumbai, to demonstrate that developers are compelled to follow each 
other – through shared conventions of land value when evaluating real estate projects. 
In the second section, I examine the different domains of competition along which 
developers aim to establish their niche advantage in order to become distinguishable 
(but not necessarily enhance life expectancy), under conditions of exogenously 
enforced uniformity. Developers, it appears, distinguish themselves through project 
count (i.e., the number of projects in their portfolio), as opposed to the price of their 
products or the pace of their product sales. Developers, therefore, enhance their 




project count at a steady and also similar pace, even though growth in project count 
has no observable impact on their economic performance. On the contrary, rapid 
growth in project count, can, as I discuss in subsequent chapters, hamper the life 
expectancy of development firms. In the last two sections, I present my ethnographic 
findings, which reveal that real estate developers in Mumbai are geared towards 
acquiring land (irrespective of the economic benefits of doing so), because of the 
social meanings and prestige associated with acquiring and developing land in the 
Indian context. I end the chapter by proposing that evaluation practices in Mumbai’s 
land market are guided by the social expectations riding on developers to deliver on 
the future imagination of commodified land and the prestige that comes with being 
successful at it.  
2.  REGULATIONS  
Unlike the other practices of land development that are shaped by innumerable 
regulations, land valuation is largely unregulated. Developers are therefore free from 
regulatory constraints when carrying out project evaluations, i.e., deciding the price 
of land and built property. However, since stamp duty and registration fees account 
for a significant source of revenue for the government24, states have an incentive to 
ensure that transactions are not under-valued. It is for this reason that in 1981, the 
Bombay Stamp Rule was introduced to ensure effective revenue collection, and 
involved estimating and publishing the Annual Statement of Rates, also known as the 
ready-reckoner rates, or guidance rates. Ready reckoner rates (hereon referred to as 
RRR) were introduced as a mechanism to curb under-reporting in property 
transactions, following an investigation in 1971 by the Direct Taxes Enquiry 
Committee, a committee set up specifically to look into the problem of tax evasion 
that was a pressing concern in the country at the time. The investigation indicated 
severe undervaluation of properties and highlighted its role in the generation of black 
money, besides considerable losses to the exchequer. A pilot study of 1,052 property 
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transactions in Bangalore subsequently discovered that 70% of the cases had under-
reported prices by more than 50% (Venkataraman, 2015, p. 26). Curbing the 
undervaluation of property transactions, therefore, became a priority for the Indian 
government as a means of augmenting revenue. This led to the evolution and 
expansion of the RRR to other cities besides Mumbai (ibid). 
By 1991, when the Indian economy liberalized, many more cities had introduced the 
concept of RRR under the legal mandate of their respective Stamp Acts or some 
similar legislation. The Department of Registration and Stamps in each city had 
developed a mechanism for calculating market value guidelines wherein the rate per 
unit area of land was estimated/ assessed for all areas falling under a specific 
jurisdiction, which was then made available to the public as a guidance rate. Since 
stamp duty on property transactions is calculated on an ad valorem basis, the RRR 
was expected to set the floor value for stamp duty liability. Stamp duty would hence 
be calculated on the actual transaction value or on the RRR, whichever is higher. The 
idea was that since RRRs were set to reflect market rates, it would reduce black 
money in real estate transactions and increase state revenues. However, the change 
in policy did not result in any significant increase in stamp duty collections, since the 
penalty for undervaluation was modest compared to the tax saved on income earned. 
In a stronger effort to curb undervaluation of property transactions, in Mumbai, both 
the buyer and seller came to be charged, in addition to the standard transaction fees, 
a tax of 30% on the difference amount (between the reported sale and RRR). The 
revenue department also mandated that the RRR be updated every year so as to 
reflect market rates more accurately. However, in recent times, both developers and 
property buyers have publicly contested these revisions for being capricious 
(Nambiar, 2017). 
While state revenue departments do not disclose the rationale or methodology 
behind RR rate setting, Madalasa Venkatraman, senior faculty at the Indian Institute 
of Management Bangalore, has discussed in a paper, both the methods and limitations 
of how RRRs are calculated in India (Venkataraman, 2015). According to 




Venkatraman, RR rates are calculated using two data sources: past transactions that 
have been registered at close to market value, and informed broker estimates or on-
ground market surveys. While the paper is notable in that it reflects on the 
government’s assessment of land valuation in India, it describes and presents RRR 
calculations as a technical exercise devoid of political objectives. Her key findings 
were: 
In situations where data from the two sources is not comprehensive enough to 
estimate property values for a particular block, a general increment pegged to the 
observed market-wide increase is applied to existing circle rates.... In order to 
account for the difference among properties in close proximity, an amenity-based 
pricing system is used, wherein premiums and discounts based on specific 
attributes of the land/ property are applied in the form of multiples 
(Venkataraman, 2015, p. 27). 
Venkataraman’s only critique is that while incorporating a fairness-measure is 
necessary, and an internationally accepted practice, the methodology to calculate 
premium and discount multiples in the Indian context is, “non-scientific” and 
“arbitrary.” However, she later reveals that since a high base rate would discourage 
compliance, and to err on the side of caution, revenue departments, in reality, apply 
an across-the-board discount to arrive at the final RR rates. She concludes with the 
warning that despite efforts to reduce the gap between RRR and market rate over the 
last thirty years, RR rates in India continue to be conservative reflections of market 
rates, leading to serious losses to the exchequer.  
For a less bookish insight into how RRRs are calculated and what it means for 
developers, I met with Rajesh Shah, my classmate from architecture school, who now 
works as a liaison architect (aka broker) between developers and government 
officials. As it was our seventh meeting since I began research on this Ph.D., Rajesh 
needed little orientation to my project or assurance of my trustworthiness. I, 
therefore, jumped straight to the question that was on my mind. “I want to talk about 
ready reckoner rates and the politics of it,” I said to him. “You want to set the rate for 
any neighborhood?... I can do that if you tell me to… it’s possible,” he responded half-
jokingly. Excerpts from the conversation that followed, below: 




Rajesh: The state revenue department handles RRR and its revisions. Property tax 
is their bread and butter. So, every year, before the budget is announced, a bunch 
of officials sit down and decide what they want their earnings through property 
transactions to be. Then they look at the previous year’s registration records and 
decide which neighborhoods require a hike in order to achieve the pre-decided 
revenue target. 
Anitra: Can the rates be manipulated? I mean, as you mentioned earlier, can 
developers control the RR rates? 
Rajesh: Developers could pull strings to keep the rate constant for a year until 
they’ve paid for all the approvals for an on-going project25, but then eventually, the 
RR will go up the following year. So, if the RR is 80% lower than the market rate in 
a certain location, you can be sure it will quickly adjust itself. 
Anitra: Would you say that RR rates affect developers… are developers really 
perturbed by its revisions? 
Rajesh: RRs are quick to catch up with price hikes. If a fancy developer launches a 
fancy project at higher than average prices, then the RR for that neighborhood will 
see an upward adjustment, and then eventually everyone becomes bounded to the 
new rates. However, the opposite is not true. RRs never adjust against price 
drops… There can be a time correction, but not rate correction in case of market 
downturn.... The controversy you hear of [referring to the contestation of RR 
revisions] is because only recently did the developer body find out that downward 
RR rate correction is legally not possible. The Bombay Stamp Act only permits an 
“increment” to existing rates. Developers are lobbying to change this term to 
“revision” so as to allow for both increase and decrease in RR rates.... The people 
who drafted the law probably never anticipated deflation in tax revenue! 
Rajesh’s version of how RRRs are set makes for a more interesting and yet plausible 
explanation compared to Venkataraman’s. Irrespective of which version is closer to 
being true, though, it is evident that the agenda driving RRR calculation is revenue 
collection and not the achievement of scientific accuracy in the tracking of property 
                                                        
25 While RRRs appear to be conservative and innocuous, they influence project valuations, since much 
of the approvals costs are linked to RRR. For instance, floor area ratios (FSI), and transferable 
development rights (TDR), i.e. all the vertical space in a real estate project, bears a charge that is linked 
to the RRR. Project costs are therefore greatly impacted by sudden or inconsistent adjustments to RRRs, 
since development rights account for as much as 50% of land cost in Mumbai. 




prices26. A comparison of the two rates across a fifteen-year period, I found out, shows 
that RR and market rates are related in the limits of 40-60%, and a three-year moving 
average of their ratio 27  confirms that ready reckoner rates are synchronic with 
market rates (Figure 18). This indicates a consistent error in the non-alignment of the 
two rates, which means that Venkatraman is not wrong in pointing out, what appears 
to be, a deliberate act by the state to keep the floor rate for tax on property 
transactions low. Urban Planner Sudeshna Mitra (forthcoming) points out that lower 
RRRs increase the scope for government officials to charge developers “premiums” in 
the form of bribes. The focus on the methodology of calculating RR rates is, therefore, 
an effective way to highlight not only the loss of revenue to the state28 but also, and 
more importantly, the role of the state in the construction of land value. However, a 
focus on methodology alone overlooks the relevance of RRRs in land market signaling. 
Simply studying how the state computes and decides revisions to the RRRs fails to 
capture the response of developers to each revision, and vice versa. 
                                                        
26 Parallel government agencies such as the Reserve Bank of India and National Housing Bank, already 
have in place, a system for measuring property price behaviour that adopts a methodology similar to 
what is proposed by Venkatraman as a means to counter differences in RR and market rates.  
27 A moving average simplifies data by smoothing it out and creating one flowing line, making it easier 
to observe trends in the data. 
28 Rachel Weber’s (2018) work on property evaluation demonstrates how the city of Chicago loses 
millions of dollars in taxes every year because of manipulation of property values by real estate 
developers. Weber calls this “accumulation through taxation” by real estate developers. 





Figure 18: Comparison of Ready Reckoner and Market rates for Malad, a district in North Mumbai, over 
15 years (Compiled by the author; Data: Department of Registration and Stamps, Maharashtra, 2019). 
RRRs perform a critical function in establishing the shared conventions of land value, 
which is necessary to coordinate expectations among market actors (Young, 1996), 
and in providing a feedback loop for developers to refer to while making decisions. 
Producers in a market are known to watch each other when deciding what to do 
because, under conditions of imperfect information, there is no way of knowing about 
the quality of products, or their valuations. In his seminal work, Harrison White notes 
that firms can observe only volumes and payments, and they act on the basis of these 
observations, thereby reproducing the observations (White, 1981, pp. 520–521). 
RRRs are, therefore, the physical manifestation of market observations that compel 
developers to take into cognizance the actions of their competitors at the time of 
project evaluation29. Moreover, since RRRs ensure the base costs that developers 
work off of are more or less the same, the variance in conceptions of project values is 
reduced. Finally, as Rajesh mentioned, RRRs have traditionally always only increased 
with time, which provides an important assurance to market actors about the future 
price of the property; that at worst, property prices will never fall below RRRs. 
                                                        
29 Developers may be referring to market rates rather than RRRs when evaluating their next decision. 
However, the consistent relation between the two rates makes it difficult to eliminate the possibility 
that RRRs too serve as a reference tool for decision-making. 
 




Therefore, even though RRRs appear to be inconsequential compared to market rate, 
and hence barely acknowledged as a critical factor in project evaluations, the impact 
of RRRs on evaluation practices is significant: if not in explicitly determining project 
evaluations, then in creating the necessary conditions for developers to observe and 
follow each other.  
In the next section, I look at the relevance of market signaling on land evaluation. In 
particular, I explore how developers distinguish themselves based on their 
observations of the actions of other developers. I do so by examining how developers 
distribute their resources and prioritize their interests to establish a competitive 
advantage within multiple domains of competition.   
3.  DOMAINS OF COMPETITION 
 Niche Positions 
The concept of niche plays a central role in the sociological perspective on 
competition. Niches provide an orienting lens for sociological work on competition 
because it exemplifies a fundamental disciplinary premise: the recognition of a 
duality between actor and position, and an expectation that position is the primary 
determinant of opportunity and constraint. Scholars of organization studies have 
proposed that organizations compete on multiple dimensions and hence occupy 
niches in multiple domains (Park & Podolny, 2000; Podolny, Stuart, & Hannan, 1996). 
Furthermore, under certain conditions, competition within a particular domain 
becomes more relevant to organizational life chances. Therefore, the outcome of 
competition within one domain shapes a set of organizational competencies or 
resources that bound the possibilities for expansion in other domains. While domains 
of competition may be useful for predicting the life expectancy of organizations, they 
also define the evaluation strategies adopted by organizations belonging to different 
niches. If organizations are focused on expanding or retaining their competitive 
advantage in a certain domain, then it will reflect in their evaluation decisions to 
prioritize one type of uncertainty over others. Therefore, depending on an 




organization’s niche position, the evaluation of an investment opportunity would 
vary. Using the semiconductor industry in the US as a case study, Podolny et al. 
identified there to be three domains of competition in producer markets: competition 
for customers, financing, and technological innovation (Podolny et al., 1996, p. 663). 
In the case of the real estate industry, the primary domains of competition are similar, 
but instead of technology inventions, developers compete for land (i.e., raw material). 
The aim of this section is, therefore, to identify which domain of competition is of 
greater significance for developers in Mumbai, and therefore which uncertainties are 
given more weight over others during project evaluations.  
While Podolny et al.’s intention for defining niche and niche positions were to explain 
the relative success of firms, their methodology is also useful for studying the 
constraints that guide evaluation practices. In their research, the significance of each 
domain of competition is measured by calculating standard deviations of relevant 
factors such as technology patents, firm collaborations, and product sales. I use a 
similar methodology to study how, and to what extent, real estate developers 
distinguish themselves from each other when competing for customers, finance, and 
land. I found launch price, sales velocity, and ongoing-projects to be factors that 
directly or indirectly reflect competition for consumers, finance, and land in the real 
estate market, and hence I measure standard deviations across these three factors. 
The launch price is the publicly advertised price of a property when a developer 
launches a new project. While this may not be the actual price at which the property 
is transacted, launch prices are a good indicator of how developers view themselves 
in relation to other developers (and consumers) when pricing their products. Sales 
Velocity, on the other hand, is a measure of how quickly developers are able to sell off 
their stock (of apartments). Sales velocity is, therefore, an indicator of how 
consumers differentiate between developers when buying property. Finally, ongoing-
projects is the number of projects a developer has ongoing at any point, which is a 
crude measure of the scale of operation of a developer, as well as their 
resourcefulness in sourcing finance capital.  




 Mapping Distinctions 
In order to measure standard deviation across price, sales velocity, and on-going 
projects among a group of developers, the other variables, such as time and location, 
need to be kept constant. Since it is impossible to study projects or developer activity 
in a single location, the closest alternative is to identify a locational cluster with: 1) a 
fairly high representation of developer types, and 2) a fairly low price differentiation 
across properties (per unit area) within the cluster. I identified one such locational 
cluster in East Mumbai, comprising of the adjoining neighborhoods of: Ghatkopar, 
Vikhroli, and Kandivali (Figure 19). Since the price and sales velocity of real estate 
does not change significantly in a one-year period, data is collated in yearly cycles. 
However, to avoid bias towards a particular phase in the evolution of Mumbai’s real 
estate market, I examine deviances in five different years (2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 
and 2017). Data for this study was procured from Liases Foras India (consent letter 
reviewed by Ph.D. supervisor); hence minor errors in LF’s dataset are reproduced in 
this research as well. Most noteworthy of these errors are: delay in noting of launch 
price30, and misreporting of sales velocity in the first few quarters31. To mitigate these 
errors, I only considered fourth-quarter data in case of launch price, and the average 
performance of the first four quarters is taken into account, in case of sales velocity. 
                                                        
30 Liases Foras, An Indian Data Agency, collects data on property prices primarily through a method 
they call “mystery shopping”, which entails physically visiting the project or telephoning the sales team, 
by posing as customers. This exercise is repeated every quarter for all projects under review. New 
projects however are often late (by a quarter or two) in entering the review system, especially when 
there isn’t much advertising about its launch, or if the project is in a distant location from other projects 
being monitored.  
31 Sales data is collected through the same method as above, wherein surveyors posed as customers 
enquire about the availability of flats in every project. The limitation of such a method however is that 
there is no way of verifying if representatives of the developer are providing false information about 
their unsold inventory (as a marketing ploy). Surveyors claim that the data becomes clearer with every 
subsequent visit to the project site, and by the end of the fourth quarter the sales trend is much clearer.  





Figure 19: Locations analyzed for standard deviation across price, sales and projects (Compiled by 
Author; Map: kepler.gl) 
Other discrepancies in the methodology include, as mentioned above, the attribution 
of the price difference to developer reputation as opposed to locational features; 
ignoring project size/scale in the calculation of sales velocity32; as well as ignoring 
the size of each project in the counting of a developer’s ongoing projects. While the 
discrepancy related to price difference has been left unaddressed (since the selection 
of neighborhood cluster already attempts to minimize locational price variation), 
data on sales velocity has been normalized to account for the vastly different sizes in 
projects. Discrepancies in project count on the other hand, while possible to correct, 
                                                        
32 Larger projects have a slower sales velocity compared to small projects, because customers of small 
developments are generally known to the developer (friends, family, acquaintances) and hence the 
time taken to search for customers is much shorter. 




is not essential, since the intention of this exercise is not to measure the absolute size 
of a developer’s land bank, but rather their resourcefulness in acquiring new lands. 
As a result, standard deviations, in reality, would be lower than the findings presented 
below in case of price, and to some extent sales velocity (since projects located in 
better areas would also sell faster, irrespective of developer reputation), and higher 
in case of project count (as larger land parcels are more difficult to acquire).  
 Findings  
My analysis revealed that launch price across all five years has the lowest coefficient 
of variation (average of 0.21) as compared to sales velocity and project count (Figure 
20). Put differently, the price of the built property (per unit area) seems to be the least 
distinguishing factor among developers in Mumbai. Besides, there appears to be no 
consistency in which type of developer commands a higher or lower price for their 
product. This is because factors such as project location, its scale, the holding capacity 
of a developer, and product features (amenities, material specifications, etc.) are 
important determinants of price in case of real estate. 
 
Figure 20: Comparison of the builder groups’ coefficients of variations (Compiled by Author; Data: Liases 
Foras, 2019). 
The coefficients of variations of sales velocity across the five years are higher 
(average of 0.66) than the launch price but lower than the project count. Again, there 
is no consistency in the pace of sales of different developers (i.e., reputed developers 
do not necessarily sell their stock faster than lesser-known developers). On the 




contrary, developers of low repute clocked in the highest sales velocity in most years. 
According to real estate analysts, this is because small developers tend to focus on the 
redevelopment of old residential building clusters, wherein additionally built flats are 
sold to family members or friends of existing residents. Hence many redevelopment 
projects of this type are sold-out almost instantly after being launched.  
The highest coefficients of variation among all are of ongoing project count (average 
of five years = 0.83). What this means is, the most distinguishing feature of a Mumbai 
developer is the number of projects they have ongoing at any point. However, it is 
worth noting that there is no correlation between project count and launch price or 
sales velocity (Figure 21). In other words, having a high number of ongoing projects 
does not impact a developer’s economic performance. This is maybe because, when 
developers venture outside their neighborhood of dominance, they lose some of their 
network advantages, and with increased supply, they would also have to seek 
customers beyond known social ties. I, therefore, propose that developers distinguish 
themselves by project count not to increase their life expectancy, but rather because 
there is social prestige associated with a high project count. 
 





Figure 21: Comparison of Sales Velocity, Launch Price, and Project Count (Compiled by Author; Data: 
Liases Foras, 2019) 
 Competition for Land 
To further investigate the nature of competition that distinguishes between 
developers with an unequal number of on-going projects, I looked at the past project 
records of the same developers whose performance I analyzed above. The intention 
is to determine whether the deviance in developers’ on-going project count relates to 
their different points of entry into the market, or rather a difference in each 
developer’s ambition/ ability to scale up. I, therefore, examine the pace of growth of 
each developer, in terms of project count, by ignoring the staggered starts of their 
operations. Since the idea is to test how quickly developers increase their project 
count, I filtered out developers with less than five projects. Doing so reduced the 
sample size to a total of sixteen developers (from the original pool of 64 developers). 
Among the selected sixteen developers, the lowest project count (till date) is that of 
Shivam Parivar Developers (year 0: 4 projects; year 1: 7 projects), and the highest 
project count is of Lodha Developers (year 0: 1 project; year 15: 61 projects).  





Figure 22: Project growth rate of 16 developers shows a linear growth of about 1.62 launches per year 
(Compiled by Author; Data: Liases Foras, 2019) 
These findings reveal, firstly, that all developers follow a linear growth progression 
(Pearson coefficient for the linear correlations is 0.97 ± 0.03, Figure 22). This means 
that developers continue to launch new projects at a steady pace as time progresses 
– irrespective of their firm size or changes in market conditions. In other words, there 
is no observation of exponential growth or sudden decline in any developer’s project 
count (in Chapter VII: , I argue that this is because developers almost always divert 
the funds of a newly launched project to the acquisition of their next project). 
Secondly, all developers, except two (from a total of sixteen), have a very similar 
growth gradient. The mean gradient among the majority developers is 1.62 launches 
per year (with a standard deviation of 0.32). This means that most developers with a 
project count greater than 5, follow each other in their pace of new launches, to launch 
1-2 new projects every year, even though land acquisition and approvals have no 




standard timelines. The two exceptions to this trend are Lodha33 and Neumec, with 
gradients of 4.5 and 4.6, respectively (Table 8). 
Table 8: Mean Gradient (project launches per year) and the Standard Deviation of 15 developers 






ALL 1.98 1.02 0.97 
ALL but Lodha and Neumec 1.61 0.32 0.97 
Lodha and Neumec 4.55 0.05 0.97 
In conclusion, developers in Mumbai distinguish themselves from each other not 
through the pricing of their product, or speed of sales, but by the number of projects 
in their portfolio (ongoing or completed). Among the developers who stand out 
because of their high project count, there is an observable pattern and similarity in 
the pace of portfolio expansion, barring a few exceptions. Developers seem to follow 
each other to launch a certain number of projects every year, even though doing so 
has no positive impact on their economic performance. In the next section, I analyze 
whether this tendency has an influence on evaluation practices, and if so, how then 
do developers overcome the uncertainties that accompany firm growth through 
increased land acquisitions?  
4.  CONSTRAINTS ON VALUATION DECISIONS 
When I began my nine-month internship at PropConsulting, as part of my Ph.D. 
fieldwork, I expected to document the performativity of valuation models and the role 
of experts in such performances. PropConsulting, I was told several times, is a “non-
brokerage” valuation consultancy. For Manoj Gupta, the director of the firm, this was 
the distinguishing feature between PropConsulting and its competitors. Manoj 
insisted that the company’s website and other promotional material highlight the fact 
                                                        
33 Industry insiders attribute Lodha’s peculiar pace and scale of development to a range of factors 
including their politcal connections (Mangal Prabhat Lodha, the founder of the firm, is a serving 
legislator and president of the ruling BJP’s Mumbai unit); and the professional background of their 
directors (the two Lodha sons) in the financial services sector.  




that PropConsulting does not engage in the brokering of land deals. “Unlike JLL, 
Cushman, and Knightfrank, our valuations are completely unbiased because we don't 
earn commissions from land deals,” Manoj explained when I asked about the 
significance of non-brokerage. Can valuations be objective? I asked provocatively. 
“Absolutely,” Manoj responded, adding that:   
Valuation is a science…, and our unique modeling system integrates factors such 
as distance, economic density, surroundings, and product quality to provide an 
accurate and fair value of any property. 
Do developers really want to know the “fair value” of their projects, I asked, this time 
with genuine curiosity. Manoj heaved a sigh of frustration. “I lose a lot of business 
because developers think of me as a naysayer and pessimist. I am the lone voice that’s 
pointing out the irrationality of land pricing in India”, Manoj remarked. While I found 
Manoj’s description of “valuation as a science” and “land price as irrational” intriguing 
and in line with popular ethnographies on the performativity of economics 
(MacKenzie, 2008; Zaloom, 2010), his remarks on the lack of deference developers 
have towards valuation professionals stood out more.  
Upon investigating PropConsulting’s client record, I found that, on average, 50 
developers hired the company’s services every year for valuation advice. To put this 
in perspective, the number of developers that launch new projects every year in 
Mumbai is roughly 250, and PropConsulting is one of only five real estate consulting 
firms that provide professional valuation services to developers in the city. Tanvi 
Mishra, the business head at PropConsulting, tells me that their consulting portfolio 
has grown 3x over the past five years, which includes services such as evaluating 
project feasibility, determining the right product mix (proportion of 2-bed and 3-bed 
units, for example) and phasing of launches. Many of these services, however, pertain 
to decisions that are made post-investment in land. In the period between 2013-2018, 
less than ten percent of all consulting jobs that PropConsulting received were cases 
of pre-investment advice. According to Tanvi, most developers rely on thumb rules 
rather than data science when making decisions. Development firms generally have 
in-house valuation teams that assess potential projects through less-sophisticated 




evaluation methods, she says. “So developers don’t rely on professional valuation 
consultants for making important investment decisions?”, I asked, wanting to confirm 
what I had just learned. “Valuation reports are mandatory for acquiring finance, and 
we are considered a reliable external valuator by most banks and fund houses in 
India,” Tanvi responded nonchalantly, not realizing that her comment undermined 
the relevance of the firm’s expertise in valuation modeling in favor of performative 
value. 
Developers in Mumbai seemed to turn to experts for validation of pre-formed 
opinions about the future, rather than to narrow down the endless possibilities that 
accompany future-oriented investments. Developers of all sizes appeared 
unconvinced about the benefits of hiring external consultants for valuation advice. 
When questioned about the reluctance to seek expert opinion on project valuations, 
Arjun Kapoor, chairman of a reputable public-listed real estate firm, responded: “Why 
should I go to a consultant when I have an in-house team that knows the business 
inside out?... I would take their data (referring to reports published by property 
consultants) to get an overview of the market, but at the end of the day, I trust my 
own team with valuation decisions”. Valuation consultants, however, are predictably 
skeptical of the valuations conceived by developers. “Their ill-informed valuations 
are causing havoc to the property market, and ironically to themselves,” retorted 
Manoj, referring to Arjun’s comment. Manoj also claims that projects are often valued 
much higher than data-backed prognosis. One such case is the deal struck between 
Omkar and Piramal over Dhobi Ghat’s redevelopment, in 2018. The sale of 
development rights, details of which I have elaborated previously, was carried out at 
INR 3000 crores. As per the calculations presented in Chapter 3, the transaction was 
priced at INR 20,000 per sqft (on saleable area). However, when the deal was 
announced, the price of the property in the neighborhood ranged between INR 
12,000 and 15,000. In fact, given the high supply of new property in Mahalaxmi, my 
colleagues at PropConsulting claim that the project should have been priced no more 
than INR 11,000 per square feet, i.e., two times lower.  




Why do developers not take the recommendations of valuation experts seriously? 
According to Manoj, developers think they can never go wrong because, historically, 
land prices in Mumbai have always appreciated. However, he noted that simply 
observing growth in land prices is misleading. Citing the example of Delhi-based 
developer DLF, who’s market activities are frequently reported in local media, Manoj 
explains that the high costs of borrowing for land acquisition, makes seemingly 
profitable investments unprofitable. For instance, in 2005, DLF purchased 17.5 acres 
of land in Central Mumbai’s Lower Parel district, for INR 700 crores, through the 
National Textile Corporation’s auction of defunct mills. DLF, therefore, paid INR 9,200 
per square feet for the land parcel, though the average rate of saleable land area at 
the time was INR 4,700 (i.e., paying more than double the prevailing rate). DLF 
subsequently ran into financial trouble and ended up selling the undeveloped land to 
Mumbai-based developer Lodha in 2012. Lodha, it is reported, paid DLF INR2700 
crores for the land, i.e., four times more than the auction price. DLF’s investment of 
700 crores, therefore, fetched a gross profit of 2000 crores, or rather a CAGR of 21 %, 
within a span of seven years. While the hike in land price is indeed phenomenal, 
Manoj pointed out a catch in this story: “People think DLF made a killing.... However, 
DLF must have borrowed 700 crores at a minimum of 21% (interest rate). So, if you 
calculate IRR based on a seven-year borrowing, the NPV is close to zero.... If DLF had 
just put that money in a fixed deposit account, they would have probably earned 
more”. Manoj’s comments suggest that stories of profits, which circulate among 
market actors, are often simplified to the point that they become disconnected from 
the contingencies under which profitability is determined. According to Manoj, it is 
this belief among developers – prices will only rise, and investments in land, no 
matter the price, is always profitable, which constrains their ability to make 
economically sound decisions.  
The idea that market actors are irrationally optimistic about future outcomes is a 
popular assertion among behavioral economists (Shiller, 2016) and cognitive 
psychologists (Dow Schüll & Zaloom, 2011). Jens Beckert, however, notes that while 
such observations are used as the central argument for rejecting orthodox economic 




theory, the rebuttal falls short of providing a convincing starting-point for a 
sociological contribution to the understanding of economic phenomena (Beckert, 
1996, p. 804). Instead, Beckert urges sociologists to show that economic theory 
cannot maintain the maximizing assumption convincingly in the face of situational 
structures that are characterized by uncertainty (Beckert, 1996, p. 805). Beckert, 
therefore, proposes that deviations from the prescriptions of economic theory must 
not be explained with reference to an actor’s motives, but rather from situational 
structures. In his recent works, Beckert postulates that “future imaginaries” or 
“fictional expectations” serve as the principal tools for coping with uncertainties, and 
when imaginaries are embodied in narratives and (mathematical) models, they 
become determinate enough to structure economic action (Beckert & Bronk, 2018, 
p. 222). However, in the case of Mumbai developers, it is evident that their reliance 
on valuation models is low, and the futures imagined by them does not align with the 
predictions of valuation experts. I, therefore, propose that economic choices in 
Mumbai’s land market are guided not by imaginations of future price behavior, but 
by temporally closer concerns related to the complications of land commodification. 
Embodied in narratives of developmental hurdles, and the requirement of an 
entrepreneurial, albeit opportunistic, developer to overcome these hurdles, 
uncertainties of the present serve as the orienting schema that guides action in 
Mumbai’s land market. 
During the many real estate-focused conferences I attended between 2015-2019, I 
found that developers often engaged in lengthy discussions about the idiosyncratic 
process of seeking development approvals. Implementation of a single-window-
clearance system for approvals, and digitization of the approval process in order to 
eliminate bureaucratic or political interference, was debated at almost every 
conference, while talks of developing effective predictive models of price behavior 
were rare. At one such roundtable meetings organized by Lawpoint India (minutes of 
which are published on their website), Mr. Ninaranjan Hiranandani, MD Hiranandani 
Developers, expressed his concerns about the current state of the real estate industry: 
“Lack of clarity over administrative machinery for approvals, bureaucratic 




procedures, jurisdictional difficulties have in turn delayed pace and volume of 
construction,” he noted, and followed with the suggestion that, similar to SEZ, the 
housing sector too must be assigned a special status so that developers have the 
incentive to build with minimum regulatory hurdles. Citing the example of green 
projects, he added:  
The authorities have created a dual regulatory environment where, despite the fact 
that a person has obtained approvals under the rigorous Green Building Norms, he 
has to still obtain regular environmental approvals. If approvals under Green 
Building Norms are obtained, the government should exempt such projects from 
obtaining regular environmental approvals as Green Building Norms are way more 
stringent (Lawpoint India, 2019). 
Financiers, on the other hand, mainly expressed concerns over project delays caused 
by title encumbrances. Investors complained that even a small glitch in the title deed 
of a property, derails a project by years, leading to serious financial losses. Concerns 
over property titles are so rife that few financial firms have even deliberated 
insurance products to provide security against title risks (Malcolm, 2020)34. Mr. Sunil 
Rohkale, Director of ASK Capital – a firm that specializes in real estate development 
finance, mentioned at the same roundtable meeting:  
One of the most daunting issues in the entire structure is to with the title of 
property. Given that there are multiple authorities who exercise jurisdiction over 
different aspects of land matter, there is no clear link between them. Land records 
are not reflective of the persons who enjoy ownership rights over it. As a result, in 
case of ancestral properties, developers purchase it from one of the coparceners, 
and later some other coparcener challenges the title of the property. In many 
instances, this has happened after the completion of projects, and the courts have 
declared the entire project as illegal and unauthorized (Lawpoint India, 2019). 
Ethnographic accounts, therefore, indicate that land market actors in India are most 
perturbed by transaction costs relating to land acquisition and government approvals, 
more so than uncertainty pertaining to demand-supply dynamics.  
                                                        
34 The insurance market for land and property titles has witnessed a poor response in India thus far, 
because insurance products are expensive, and can only provide marginal protection to buyers. 




The prioritization of transaction costs over property sales in professional discourses 
does not mean that future imaginaries are inconsequential in Mumbai’s land market. 
Rather, the future that primarily occupies the imagination of market actors is one in 
which land is free of social, political, and bureaucratic encumbrances, as opposed to 
one where property prices are higher. The role of a developer is, therefore, pivotal to 
the land market because predictions and thereby participation in the market is based 
on the ability of a developer to deliver this primary imagined future. Market actors, 
therefore, bet not on the accuracy of predictive models, but instead on the accuracy 
of a developer’s self-assessment (Will the developer be able to acquire land, get 
approvals, construct the building, within the time/ cost frame he has set for himself?). 
Developers are critical to the land market also because they operationalize the 
imagination of commoditized land, through narratives of the “developmental hero.”  
Indian developers describe themselves as deliverers of progress – one whose job it is 
to turn Mumbai into Singapore (Anand, 2006). Developers frequently tell stories of 
their persistence, entrepreneurship, and willingness to get their hands dirty to 
achieve India’s developmental goal. In a piece titled How Omkar Cracked the Messy 
Business of Slum Redevelopment, Forbes Magazine notes about Babulal Verma, MD 
Omkar Realtors:  
When he bought rights to redevelop the chawl in Parel, he worked unlike any other 
developer.  “I have visited each house a dozen times and eaten with all the 
residents at least once,” he says. If there was a problem, I’d make sure it was solved 
as soon as possible. My number one aim was to complete the project on time. 
Government processes were another key area where he realised that developers 
need to spend a disproportionate amount of time. So, after spending time at the 
chawl, he made sure he visited Mantralaya, the state government headquarters, 
everyday. “I would accost people to show me their plans to understand how they 
got certain permissions,” he says.... On weekends, he would study court judgements 
and look for legal remedies to his problems (Samar Srivastava, 2012). 
Many other developers, like Omkar, describe their work as acts of heroism in a 
context where development would otherwise be impossible (R. Kamath, 2016a; 
Mendes, 2020). Mobilizing finance, negotiating with slum residents, overcoming 




bureaucratic red tape: all the standard activities of an Indian developer, serve as 
props to the hero narrative, which concertizes the imagination of land as a commodity.  
The hero narrative is seemingly powerful enough to entice developers to venture into 
land deals with extreme uncertainty. In an interview with Navin Hasija, a Delhi-based 
developer behind an ambitious slum redevelopment project that has been delayed by 
several years, I asked why he had taken on a project that looked financially precarious 
at the outset. Hasija conceded that the project wasn’t going to earn his company much 
profit after all the delays, but then justified his decision as a service to the country. 
“People will ultimately recognize my efforts towards the transformation that is much 
needed in this city,” he said, adding that this recognition makes the investment 
worthwhile. It is only later that I learned that developers find devious ways to turn 
even unprofitable ventures profitable and that the hero narrative isn’t actually a case 
of favoring “social value” over “economic value.” Hasija, however, is not wrong in 
expecting a pay-off from the public’s perception of him being a developmental hero. 
Financiers, I observed, relied heavily on the perceived capability of developers to “get 
things done” when deciding whether or not to fund a development project. This 
perception is determined in part by a developer’s performance track record, and in 
part by the strength of their hero narrative. “If a developer is effective in overcoming 
hurdles, whatever they may be… having the right political connections… the foresight 
to prevent roadblocks basically, I will put my money on him”, claimed Vasudev 
Krishnan, chairman of a non-banking finance company. Therefore, while the present 
exchange value of a project and its future cash-flow projections may indeed be 
important factors in determining investment decisions, the perceived bravado of a 
developer also plays a significant role in influencing these decisions35. 
In summary, market actors in Mumbai’s land market appear to prioritize the future 
imagination of commodified land over price rise. As a result, the narrative of the 
                                                        
35  For the proposition to be more definitive however, a controlled experiment would need to be 
carried out, to assess how financiers make decisions when lending towards real estate development, 
and the degree to which financiers favour developer reputation over asset value securing the deal, and 
the project’s projected financial revenues. 




developer being a developmental hero is powerful, not only because it is aimed at 
realizing the imagination of land free of social ties, but also since it serves as a 
consolatory prop in case of failed investments, and at the very least, bolsters 
developers’ macho persona. This explains the tendency of developers to continually 
acquire new lands, irrespective of the future that lies before them.  
5.  (E)VALUATION IN PRACTICE 
Developers in Mumbai were attempting to crack what looked to be extremely 
challenging feats of land development in their quest to launch more projects. Their 
sense of bravado, heightened by the significance of the hero narrative, appeared to be 
clouding their judgments in project evaluations. Runwal, a renowned local developer, 
had acquired 25 acres of land from Crompton Greaves, an Indian consumer electrical 
goods manufacturer, through an “outright acquisition” (Babar, 2014). The land 
exchange required Runwal to buy out CG’s entire manufacturing unit, along with all 
its liabilities. The process of commodifying land, therefore, entailed letting go of all 
the workers after negotiating with the labor union. In addition, Runwal would have 
to get permissions from the Labour Ministry in Delhi and then approvals to convert 
industrial land to residential land from state town-planning departments; a task 
known to be cumbersome and protracted. In several other cases, developers were 
trying to pull off similar feats of risky land acquisitions involving local gangsters 
(Joseph, Vyas, & Mengle, 2016), or hundreds of thousands of slum residents (Babar, 
2012). These deals are all the more challenging because Indian developers most often 
use finance capital that is time-bound to pay for land and launch projects (i.e., sell 
apartments with a proposed delivery date) before clarity on land acquisition and 
project approvals timelines are achieved. How do developers evaluate the worth of a 
project under such uncertain conditions? 
It is difficult to study how developers carry out project evaluations because, unlike 
other practices of land development, project evaluation does not involve interaction 
between actors, which can be observed or even verified by alternate sources. I would 
have had to, therefore, typically intern at a few different development firms to study 




how projects are evaluated in practice. However, since the research timeline did not 
allow for such a study, I instead focus on other observable actions of developers that, 
although may not be directly related to practices of evaluation, provide useful insight 
into them. In particular, I look at, first: what kind of risks developers set out for 
themselves (i.e., how they convert the uncertainty of land development into 
measurable risks with tangible consequences, by say, promising an assured return on 
investments or setting a date for delivery), and the measures they take to exacerbate 
or ameliorate these risks. Second, I look at how developers quantify or account for 
risks. Here, I observe the tactics adopted by them to conceptualize risks and project 
outcomes (are developers drawing on experiences and events that have already 
transpired or are they chalking out future scenarios that are unrelated to the past?). 
Third, I look at what developers do when outcomes are not as expected, especially 
when outcomes are negative (do developers see through their commitments by 
absorbing losses? Or, cut their losses by exiting projects at an opportune time? Or, 
find ways to not bear losses at all?). Answers to these questions were sought mostly 
through interviews with developers and property consultants, newspaper reports, 
and promotional material produced by developers, such as websites and brochures.  
With the surge in project launches, a new factor for distinction seems to be emerging 
among developers in Mumbai: their success rate in the timely completion of projects. 
Most financiers, I talked to, claimed that a good developer is one who is able to stick 
to the schedule. Property consultants also agreed that financiers should lend only to 
those developers who can complete projects on time. “The capacity and intent to 
execute projects in a timely manner are the qualities that will set good developers 
apart from the rest of the pack,” says real estate analyst Anuj Puri (Nandy, 2018). So 
critical is the virtue of timely delivery that developers even advertise it on 
promotional materials these days (Figure 23). On their website, Hiranandani, one of 
Mumbai’s oldest developers, writes: "Sincerity and commitment with consistent 
efforts, is the recipe to achieve success and great heights. This quote very aptly sums 
up our Magic Mantra” (Hiranandani, 2019). Hiranandani is indeed hailed as an 
accomplished developer in Mumbai, by consumers, financiers, and government 




officials alike, even though the firm is notorious for flouting rules and defrauding 
investors, simply because they have been successful in executing several ambitious 
real estate projects in Mumbai (Modak, 2018).  By making explicit their supposed 
resolve to deliver projects as promised, real estate developers are signaling which 
traits are most important to qualify as a developer worthy of recognition and reward. 
A good developer is, therefore, one that finds different modes of accommodating 
reality, depending on the orientation of the situation and by defying social norms if 
required to deliver a project on time. However, the commitment of timely delivery, 
while not always legally binding, nevertheless requires the prediction of a timeline in 
the face of future uncertainties. 
 
Figure 23: Promotional Material by Paradigm Reality highlights “commitment” as a virtue (Paradigm 
Realty, 2019) 
Committing to a timeline for project delivery is a gamble, irrespective of whether the 
means adopted to get there are ethical, when land is yet to be acquired and approvals 
are still pending.  Property consultants note that the prediction of the project 
schedule is only possible once construction commences, that is, when the 
uncertainties relating to land acquisition and approvals are over with. I found that a 
general template for estimating project completion was followed by most banks after 
this stage, based on the past performance of developers (Table 9). However, very few 




projects in India are acquired at what is referred to in real estate lingo as the mature 
phase. Mohit Khanna, the business head of a corporate development firm, notes there 
are three phases in real estate development with scope for developer participation: 
pre-approvals; ready for construction; and post-construction. Most developers, he 
says, prefer to acquire projects/land at the very first stage because returns here are 
highest, and barriers to entry lowest. When asked about the evaluation methods 
adopted by developers entering a project at this stage, Mohit is quick to note that 
future prediction is a futile exercise since the possibilities are innumerable. “One 
would have to come up with tens of scenarios based on economic growth, government 
regulations, infrastructure development, etc. … and then multiply that with all the 
possible uses for land, residential, commercial, etc.” he pointed out.  According to 
Mohit, one can only make assumptions based on “comparables” (prevailing property 
rates and pace of sales) and internal efficiencies (how long it would take the 
developer to receive approvals/ clear land) when taking the plunge. Predicting the 
behavior of other actors, what Mohit refers to as studying “comparables,” is a 
common form of evaluation in market systems (Akerlof, 1978). However, predicting 
one’s own capability seems to be just as critical in evaluation practices in Mumbai’s 
land market, if a bet on a project’s timeline is to be made. 




Table 9: Timeline indicator used by banks to predict completion of projects after construction commences 
(State Bank of India, 2018) 
Project Size (sft in lacs) Completion in months 
0-0.5 18 months from launch 
0.5-1 30 months from launch 
1-2 36 months from launch 
2-4 48 months from launch 
4-6 60 months from launch 
6-8 72 months from launch 
>8 80 months from launch 
 
Every developer I interviewed, whether large or small, said they studied comparables 
in the catchment area, before buying land. What this means is, they scrutinize the 
neighborhood in which they plan to purchase land, which could entail anything as 
basic as talking to local real estate agents or store owners, to something more bookish 
like poring over glossy market reports prepared by property consultants. The 
intention is the same, however: to gauge price behavior and sales in the vicinity 
(based on what other developers are doing, as opposed to gauging what the future 
demand could be), and then decide if the price of a land parcel is “right.” Developers 
tell me that this is an effective way of evaluating projects, and has been in practice 
since the beginning of privatized real estate development in India. Manoj (Director at 
PropConsulting), however, scoffs at the method for being “non-scientific,” and 
encouraging of “herd mentality.” Manoj tells me that the method cannot predict, and 
as a result, developers fail to take cognizance of the impending slowdown of sales due 
to oversupply and high prices. Therefore, the longer it takes to develop a project, the 
weaker is the effectiveness of comparative analysis, he warns. It is for this reason that 
the calculation of developer’s efficiency is integral to evaluation practices. Developers 




claim that they refer to the past when making this calculation too, but are generally 
optimistic that their efficiency will improve with subsequent projects. “We like to 
think that we can build better relations in the coming years, become more adept at 
negotiating with landowners, and so on, and therefore can turn around projects 
faster,” confessed one developer. While developers did not seem to deliberate on 
future demand-supply, because they felt that the future could not be predicted, their 
methods of evaluation which primarily relies on the information of the past, is also 
unhelpful, since the future cannot be determined from past events. Developers, 
therefore, may be adopting the evaluation methods they do, either out of habit or a 
compulsion to follow other developers. 
Developers did not acknowledge that their methods of evaluation have limited 
predictive capability, and could seriously undermine a project’s fate, as Manoj 
mentioned because the consequences of incorrect predictions were not grave until 
Mumbai’s real estate market took a hit from slow sales. Until recently, errors in 
judgment and inefficiency on the part of the developer were pardoned, if not 
rewarded, as property prices rose faster than the cost of delays. One of several 
relevant examples is the case of Evershine Nagar, a new township development in 
North Mumbai, which witnessed delays of almost six years due to the inability of the 
developer to acquire necessary approvals from the forestry department. Homebuyers 
who were most affected by the delay, however, did not take legal action, according to 
those familiar with the case, because in those ten years, the sale value of their delayed 
property grew four times. Besides, the lack of regulations to ensure timely delivery of 
projects meant that developers had room to make adjustments to their 
miscalculations on the go. Lodha Developers, for instance, made news in 2009 when 
they canceled a housing development project in Thane, an outer suburb of Mumbai, 
under the pretext of inability to seek necessary approvals. While Lodha was prompt 
in returning homebuyers’ deposits with interest to avoid bad press, it became evident 
a year later, when they re-launched the project, that approvals delay was just an 
excuse to re-evaluate the project. Flats that were originally sold at INR 3000 per 
square feet, a year later, were resold, potentially to the same buyers, at INR 6,000 per 




square foot that is at the double the price as before (gathered from personal 
interviews). As a result, future prediction of a developer’s efficiency did not require 
much contemplation after all since not only did the future change in favor of 
developers but because the lack of regulations in Mumbai’s real estate industry, 
allowed developers to go back to past decisions to correct it to match the known 
future.  
When new forms of finance capital became available to Indian developers, the 
flexibility of loosely defined project valuations was curbed. With structured debt 
backing development projects, the terms of investment had to be made clear at the 
outset. Developers and financiers had to necessarily agree on a future, in order to 
move forward on a deal. As a result, property prices in Mumbai saw a sharp increase 
after the liberalisation of the sector. Financiers claim that during this time, developers 
escalated project valuations by as much as fifty percent of “fair market value,” not 
because they envisioned prices to go up congruously, but because they wanted to get 
hold of as much financial capital as possible, presumably to buy more land.  Valuation 
consultants concur that increased availability of finance capital led developers to 
become “greedy for money.” Recollecting his experience with valuation advice, Manoj 
notes that developers frequently nudged him to validate inflated valuations as 
suggested by them. “Developers specifically tell you what they want the project’s 
valuation to be, and if you don’t oblige, they make sure the report doesn’t reach the 
financiers,” Manoj revealed. Using the example of a project he is familiar with, Manoj 
explained to me how property prices, along with land and construction costs were 
inflated to benefit developers in the short term, an act which ironically reduced the 
project’s profitability in the long run, owing to slow sales (Table 10).  Developers, 
however, presented a different story to me. Rustom Khambatta of Khambatta 
Developers, who recently raised over 1 billion GBP from a Private Equity firm, and is 
now reportedly struggling to service the financial obligation (Babar, 2017a), claimed 
that it was “men with flashy degrees” who misled him with their impressive 
presentations and coerced him into betting ambitiously on the future. “These guys 




had targets to meet, and bonuses tied to those targets... [T]hey were more keen than 
us to lend big”, he noted, during an interview with me. 
Table 10: Changes to net present value (NPV) of a project due to inflation in project costs (Liases Foras, 
2017) 























































































Fair Market 7,000 3% 1,894 1,325 13 17 50% 66% 42 42 39% 
Promised to 
P/E 
10,000 3% 2,642 2,050 20 27 50% 70% 64 42 37% 
Performance 10,000 1% 2,642 2,050 20 1 16% 23% 55 106 12% 
 
Mohit, who worked closely with Rustom for nine years before taking on his current 
position, felt personally attacked when I recounted my interaction with his ex-boss. 
“I have a degree from Harvard, and Rustom can mock me if he wants, but no one 
misleads him; let me tell you that,” he retorted. According to Mohit, developers know 
their business better than any financier wanting to lure them with money. Mohit, 
however, admitted that financiers, too, were reckless with their investments and 
lending, and many a time even corrupt (accepting kickbacks in the form of apartments 
from developers). While the accounts of different actors may be misaligned, a 
common theme is evident, especially from Mohit’s perspective. Opportunism and self-
interest appear to be a dominant factor in guiding valuation practices in Mumbai’s 
land market. However, under conditions of financial stress, developers seemed to be 
acting in contradictory ways, by not cutting their losses in time.  
When real estate sales in Mumbai began to slow down in 2017, developers were faced 
with the option of either off-loading their stock at discounted prices to other 
developers or investors with deep pockets, or letting their debt burden mount. 
Property analysts claim that very few developers were prudent enough to take the 




former route and instead ended up in a far worse situation. According to Mohit, this 
is because there are other kinds of values associated with land, which hinder 
developers from trading land purely as an economic commodity. He notes: 
In my twenty years of experience, I have observed that developers who keep their 
raw material [land] for longer than seven to eight years sink faster than the rest 
during bad times. I think this is because they become attached to the project and 
are more likely to make mistakes.... Land is something you get emotional about.... I 
don’t know whether this is uniquely Indian, but it is very hard for a developer to 
cut back on their land bank.... Land is not something that you can just buy so easily. 
Besides, there’s not much else a developer can do except develop land! 
Mohit’s comments, among other observations presented in this chapter, support the 
proposition that developers in Mumbai are socially oriented to (continually) 
purchasing land, as opposed to achieving economic prudence in their decisions. 
Evaluation practices may, therefore, be governed by the social meanings and prestige 
associated with the acquisition and development of land, even though project 
evaluation serves as a tool for developers to explore and exploit various means of 
accruing profit without delivering on the promise to develop land.  
6.  DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, I analyzed the practice of land evaluation by focusing on how socially 
constructed criteria for a “capable developer” produce land value. Empirical findings 
presented in the chapter show that developers distinguish themselves and get 
distinguished for their ability to acquire and develop land. Developers, therefore, 
distinguish themselves, in a context where shared conventions of land value are 
exogenously established through a base rate for taxation by project count, followed 
by the speed of sales and the pricing of products. In their quest to acquire and launch 
more projects, developers appear to overcome uncertainties of the future by 
prioritizing uncertainties related to transaction costs over the uncertainty of future 
demand-supply mismatch. Economic choices in Mumbai’s land market, therefore, 
appear to be guided not by imaginations of future price behavior, but by temporally 
closer concerns related to the transaction costs of land development.  




The future that primarily occupies the imagination of market actors is, therefore, one 
in which land is free of social, political, and bureaucratic encumbrances, as opposed 
to one where property prices are higher. Furthermore, the imagination of 
commodified land is operationalized through narratives of the “developmental hero.” 
Developers describe their work as acts of heroism, without which development 
would be impossible. This, I argue, concertizes the imagination of land as a 
commodity. Finally, my observations of developer actions reveal that developers are 
not inclined to reducing risks when acquiring new projects, partly because the 
informality in Mumbai’s real estate industry allows them opportunities to eke out 
profits through questionable means. However, developers undermine opportunities 
to ameliorate losses by not reducing their pace of acquisitions or their land bank size, 
which indicates that developers are constrained by the social meanings and prestige 
associated with the acquisition and development of land in the Indian context.  
Broader conclusions can be drawn about the role of developers in shaping the land 
market, and of the organization of the market, from the study of land valuation. The 
tendency of experienced developers to adhere to an industry defined pace of project 
acquisition/launch, irrespective of market conditions, indicates that developers may 
not be inclined towards becoming adept at the business of real estate development, 
but rather just inclined towards accumulating land and increasing their land bank 
size. This indicates that developers may not be part of a professional field, wherein 
norms of good practice are defined and maintained by dominant firms. Second, the 
practice of land valuation appears to be, on the one hand, embedded in social 
meanings of land/land development, and on the other hand, contingent on the 
strategic advantage that a particular land deal offers a developer. Since both 
influencing factors differ across developers and projects, land valuation cannot be an 
institutionalized practice, and would necessarily require developers to make ad hoc 
decisions based on situational exigencies. As a result, land valuation practices become 
tools for developers to explore and exploit various means of accruing profit, without 
any serious intention of developing land, which not only causes the market to 




 BUILDING APPROVALS 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Since developers in Mumbai are socially inclined to increase their land bank size, 
despite development uncertainties, acquisition of projects are carried out at 
questionable valuations, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. In order to justify 
inflated valuations, and to match profit expectations, developers impinge on building 
regulations, which sustains contestations over the rules of land development. 
Scholars, who study social movements and other change agents that bring 
contentiousness to markets, have pointed out that when societal pressures trigger 
changes to market rules, firms in the hope to instill market stability, influence the 
process, leading to political contestations between firms and state (and society) on 
the one hand, and among firms on the other. The survival of a market, therefore, 
depends on the ability of firms to fight off competition, and also influence 
interventions in response to public cries against the social strains produced by that 
market. The political process, which generates rules in Mumbai’s land market, 
however, hardly reflects the organized interests of developers looking to establish 
market stability. Rather, I found that developers in Mumbai strive to overcome the 
many uncertainties linked to building approvals, by relegating long term survival of 
firms to the back and focusing instead on project-specific concerns.  
With numerous actors, beyond just consumers, suppliers, and producers of land/real 
estate engaged in the shaping and reshaping of innumerable rules that govern urban 
land development, the approvals process is riddled with all kinds of uncertainties. 
Gaining approvals for building construction and land development entails, on the one 
hand, interpreting development regulations that are continually shifting, and 
navigating an equally uncertain bureaucratic system that capriciously processes 
approval applications on the other. Just like in land acquisition, multiple interests 
press on the authorization of building permits, since approvals are not only 
consequential to social life in a city (a disturbing example being the inhumane density 




of slum redevelopment blocks in Mumbai), but also a reflection of the efficiency and 
transparency within the state machinery. In a context where housing conditions and 
service infrastructure become increasingly strained with growth in urbanization, 
building approvals cannot neatly fit with the interests of growth machine proponents 
(Logan & Molotch, 2007), because not only would it spark social unrest, as warned by 
Polanyi, but also because the goal post of urban development is never fixed.   
In this chapter, I discuss how under urgent pressures of urban transformation, the 
rules governing actions in Mumbai’s land market are faced with many disruptions 
from forces external to inter-firm dynamics, including but not limited to civil society. 
Development firms, as a result, are confronted by a social world where firm survival 
is dependent not just on their long-term position in the market structure, but also on 
responses to immediate developmental challenges. Contestations between firms, as a 
result, get relegated to the back, and the concept of stability takes on a new meaning 
for market actors, wherein the focus is not to obstruct price-competition or prevent 
firm deaths, but rather to strengthen the collective function of developers in the 
future imaginaries of urban development (Beckert, 2016b). Even though developers’ 
own accounts often point to the existence of a status order, i.e., the concentration of 
competitive advantage among certain actors, I demonstrate in this chapter that their 
actions are influenced, not by a want for stable hierarchical order, but rather, by the 
cognitive framing of an ever-successful (hero) developer. I, therefore, propose that 
developers in Mumbai seek control of their unstable worlds, by honing in on their 
collective identities as a “developmental hero,” as opposed to taking for granted a 
given set of “local knowledge” (Geertz, 1992, pp. 73–75). To support my proposition, 
I establish once again that in order to cope with their unstable worlds, developers 
refer not to a tool kit of strategies that can be used over and over again to justify an 
action. Instead, they rather adopt ad hoc strategies that, on the one hand, solve 
complicated problems, and on the other hand, strengthen the hero narrative.  
The chapter comprises of three empirical sections, which explore the constraints and 
conditions under which developers negotiate construction approvals in Mumbai, 




focusing especially on how developers perceive their social world and their position 
within it. In the first section, I lay out the conditions that characterize the world of 
real estate developers in Mumbai, in order to get at their conception of instability. 
Then, in the second section, I analyze whether or not a hierarchical ordering in terms 
of competitive advantage exists among developers, by examining approval 
documents of fifty-two projects across the city. In particular, I look for patterns in the 
variance in approval times and development rights among these projects. Finally, in 
the last section, I discuss my ethnographic findings on what developers do when 
negotiating construction approvals, in order to identify the cognitive frames that help 
them decide which actions to choose from, as interactions in the approvals process 
proceed. 
2.  A SHIFTING REGULATORY LANDSCAPE 
The unprecedented growth in Mumbai’s population has prompted impulsive 
interventions by development planning authorities (S. B. Patel, 2013, p. 68). Between 
1991 and 2011 (year of the last census count), the population of the Mumbai 
metropolitan region grew by 8.6 million residents, or the entire population of Austria. 
The challenge for planners has, therefore, been immense. They not only had to 
accommodate the high population count of 22 million but also to attend to the 
peculiar distribution of population density. Outer suburbs that were until recently 
beyond the scope of Mumbai’s planning limits have overtaken the city core in density. 
Such a pace and pattern of urban growth is unlike any other urban region in the world, 
and one certainly requiring constant tweaks and fixes that may or may not be rolled 
out seamlessly. Building height limitations and construction rules have, as a result, 
been subject to frequent changes, carried out through an annual exercise of the 
revision of Mumbai’s Development Control Regulations (DCR), in order to match the 
needs of the city’s population.  
Despite the many revisions to development and planning regulations, building 
construction in Mumbai is hardly an organized activity, with “haphazard siting of land 
uses” and “inadequate access to government utilities such as electricity, water supply, 




roads and sewage treatment mechanisms” (Pethe, Nallathiga, Gandhi, & Tandel, 2014, 
p. 128). Development projects at the outskirts, and in poorer, dense neighborhoods, 
especially, witness lower controls or benign oversight over building heights and 
concessions in open space norms. Ananya Roy terms this as an urban crisis that is 
“marked by the lack of adequate infrastructure and growth management, coupled 
with sharp social divisions” (A. Roy, 2009, p. 76). She further points that ambiguity in 
land-use, and the deregulation of “unauthorized” structures, allows the state 
considerable power to alter land use, deploy eminent domain, and acquire land. While 
Roy’s comment is intended to highlight the problematic role of the state in India’s 
urban governance, the urban crisis of inadequate civic and built infrastructure is, to 
some extent, also linked to the complexity that surrounds land’s commodification. 
Development challenges in Mumbai, as several local planners have noted, has no easy 
fix, because of the many layers of ownership, histories, and claims attached to the land, 
besides the topographical constraints that exacerbate land scarcity. Regulatory 
interventions in such a context, no matter how frequent, is a challenge, its 
enforcement even more so.  
Cases of circumvention of building regulations in Mumbai are commonplace and go 
unnoticed many a time. However, ever so often, consequences are lethal, thereby 
calling the regulatory system into question. In July 2019, fourteen people were killed 
when an “illegally constructed” section of a building collapsed in Dongri, a dense 
inner-city neighborhood in Mumbai. In several other such tragic cases, the death toll 
has been far greater. Building collapses among other causes of fatalities related to 
negligent building and development practices, while rarely spurs protests against 
civic authorities and private developers, nevertheless attract enough public attention 
to warrant a response from policymakers. However, rather than strengthening 
regulatory institutions, incidents like these lead to knee-jerk, if not adverse, reactions 
by authorities. Following the Dongri building collapse, Chief Minister Devendra 
Fadnavis assured to “bring new rules for the speedy redevelopment of the old and 
dilapidated buildings” (Firstpost, 2019). Vinod Ghosalkar, chairman of the repair 
board of Maharashtra Housing and Development Authority, in response, announced 




that MHADA's priority would be to redevelop old buildings “on a war footing.” 
Ghoslakar, however, went on to suggest that previously issued 
renovation/redevelopment permits would be made void under this new plan. In a 
press statement he noted: 
Before demolishing the rickety building, we need to follow a certain procedure, 
and the first step is canceling the no-objection certificate [NOC] given to the 
building's owner for its redevelopment... and we have started this procedure (ibid). 
The MHADA official was quick to announce changes because concerns and agitation 
over the operations of real estate developers, in particular, their evasion and/or 
manipulation of protective measures, are generally targeted towards the state, as 
opposed to the market. The idea that housing can only be delivered by the private 
sector is, however, hardly challenged in the Indian context; partly because of the scale 
of the housing shortage, which many believe is beyond state capacity (Sivam & 
Karuppannan, 2002, pp. 71–72), and partly because of the narratives of corruption 
that help shape people’s expectations of what states can and will do, and how 
bureaucrats will respond to the needs of citizens (Gupta, 2005, p. 6). Yet, the state’s 
intervention in defining the rules of land development and thereby the functioning of 
the land market is regarded apropos, since privatized land development cannot 
operate without collective sets of rules governing interaction (Campbell & Lindberg, 
1990; Evans, 1992). Regulation of land development in India, however, entails the 
participation of not few but multiple agencies and sets of rules across different levels 
and agencies of governance, which according to industry insiders, has a destabilizing 
effect on the land market. Sunil Rohkale, MD ASK Group, a financial investment and 
advisory firm and active supporter of automation of bureaucratic processes, noted 
the following about real estate in India, in a news post: 
The industry at present has to deal with not less than 40 complex No Objection 
Certificates before obtaining construction permits from local bodies, state 
governments and the central government.... Creating a single window online 
clearance platform where all approvals across departments can be managed in a 
coordinated manner is the need of the hour (Rohkale, 2017). 




Receiving building approvals is a complex process as Rohkale points out, not merely 
because of the steps involved, but also because the officers in charge of permits are in 
transferable positions, which means they are transferred to another position at least 
every three years, and often sooner. The logic behind such frequent transfers is that 
it would prevent government officials from becoming corrupt and entrenching 
themselves in the structures of local power. But the reverse side is that most officials 
feel accountable not to the local population, but only to their superiors and to the 
particular bureaucracy in which they are employed (Gupta, 2005, p. 10)36. Frequently, 
the pressures on officials to be corrupt cause them to behave in ways contrary to the 
ostensible objectives of their departments. In a much older but not so obsolete paper 
that questions the effectiveness of public service organizations in India, development 
scholar Robert Wade (1985), argues that the Indian state’s struggle to promote 
development is, to an important degree, related to the corruption-transfer 
mechanism and its effects on bureaucratic initiatives. Wade writes: 
Transfers took up a lot of the time of people at all levels of the bureaucracy. How 
to obtain a transfer, or to block one to an undesirable location or office, was a 
matter of great importance, and regularly resulted in the filing of court cases, the 
involvement of politicians at all levels, and the expenditure of large sums of money 
in the form of bribes, etc. (Wade, 1985 as cited in Gupta, 2005, p. 9). 
The transfer system among government officials in charge of building permits in 
Mumbai remains much the same, with key posts being reshuffled every 2-3 years, 
according to liaison architects who specialize in the approvals process. Most 
architects I interviewed believed that frequent transfers were necessary in order to 
curb corruption and cronyism, and hence better for development, even if it led to 
delays in project execution.  
Bureaucratic inefficiency has, therefore, lately received much political attention in 
India, not just within the sector of real estate, but commerce in general. This is 
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fulfilling, disinterested professional occupying a location in an organizational structure solely due to 
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because, the proliferation of Global Performance Indicators (GPIs), especially those 
that rate and rank countries against one another, has been instrumental in shaping 
decisions of states in emerging economies (R. Doshi, Kelley, & Simmons, 2019, p. 613). 
The World Bank, which has marshaled the Ease of Doing Business (EDB) index, has 
amassed surprising influence over global regulatory policies, as states respond to 
being publicly ranked and make reforms strategically to improve their ranking (ibid). 
The World Bank’s Doing Business reports have, however, been criticized for assuming 
that the business environment in developing countries is defined and determined by 
the exact implementation of rules by the state and by firms, an assumption 
demonstrated to be false by a number of studies, especially in contexts where state 
capability is low (Kar, Pritchett, Roy, & Sen, 2019, p. 9). Nevertheless, the Indian 
government has strived to improve the country’s EDB ranking with Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi committing to replace “red tape with red carpet” at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos in 2018 (Sidhartha, 2018). In 2019, India was among the 
biggest improvers in the EDB ranking, moving up from 100 to 77, among 190 
countries. India’s climb in the 2019 rankings is reportedly attributed to two doing 
business indicators (out of 11)— securing construction permits and trading across the 
borders (A. R. Mishra, 2019).   
The World Bank found that in Mumbai and Delhi, the two Indian cities studied, the 
number of days taken to give out construction permits had drastically reduced from 
144 days in 2018 to 95 days in 201937. Besides, the costs of permits had shrunk from 
23% of the building value to just 5%. According to the report, the single-window 
clearance for securing building permits in Delhi and a new online system in Mumbai 
brought about this quantum change. While liaison architects note that the approvals 
process is indeed faster and simpler today than two years ago, they also point out that 
digitization and its promise of transparency have brought with it a whole new set of 
                                                        
37 Note on WB’s methodology: The study used only a particular case of a “shed” to draw comparisons. 
In reality, a fully functional building would take longer to develop. Besides, survey participants were 
told that if India’s ranking moves up, India would receive more FDI, thereby undermining non-biased 
feedback from participants.  




challenges. On the one hand, development contestations have been exacerbated, since 
the entire process flow, including plans submitted by developers and approval 
recommendations by each signing authority, is now available online for public 
viewing. On the other hand, regulatory oversight has further been diluted as officials 
are compelled to clear cases under shorter timeframes, with little deliberation, by 
often relying on the advice of junior, non-transferrable staff of the bureaucracy.  
In summary, the regulation of land development and building construction in Mumbai 
sways between knee-jerk crackdowns due to sharp public outcry over the crisis, or 
benign neglect due to lack of the state’s capacity to resolve developmental challenges. 
In this context, much attention and public pressure are directed towards state 
inefficiency as opposed to the exploitative practices of real estate developers. 
However, in making states the focus of land development failures, the approvals 
process takes on multiple agendas ranging from state building to quantification of 
development efforts, to appeasement of civil society and aid agencies.  As a 
consequence, the regulatory landscape becomes all the more fragmented and shaky, 
thereby sustaining the climate of uncertainty around development approvals, which 
I argue is a fertile ground for the “developer as hero” narrative to flourish.  
In the next sections, I discuss how the fight for transparency and access to information 
in an uncertain regulatory landscape produces new roles for actors apart from 
developers and shapes social relations in ways that are consequential to approval 
outcomes.  Here, I demonstrate how the instability of bureaucratic arrangements 
causes network ties to become dependent on social proximities more so than network 
positions. And how, as a result, role positions and the (re)production of institutional 
order become impossible to establish.  
3.  THE FIGHT FOR TRANSPARENCY 
Contrary to the popular imagination that Mumbai’s real estate market is murky and 
non-transparent, developers and their ancillaries have, in principle, access to 
abundant information regarding construction approvals granted to other developers. 




Since the implementation of the Right to Information (RTI) Act in 2005, which 
mandates timely response to citizen requests for government information, and 
subsequently, the introduction of Citizen Search, an online-search portal on the 
website of the Bombay Municipal Corporation that allows the general public to access 
details of every building project in the city including approval certificates and 
construction drawings, developers are no longer in the dark about what their 
competitors are planning or doing.  
India’s Right to Information Act (RTIA), which was adopted by the Indian Parliament 
in May 2005, is similar to the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Like the United 
States’ FOIA, the RTIA gives Indian citizens a right to obtain information held by 
public authorities. However, the RTIA is broader in scope. While the U.S. law applies 
only to the national government, the RTIA applies to all of India’s state and local 
governments as well. Advocates of the RTIA argue that the law can help purge 
inefficiency and corruption from government, control bureaucratic power, and 
increase the political influence of marginalized citizens. A Bangalore-based think-
tank, Public Affairs Centre, describes the adoption of the RTIA as a watershed moment 
in the history of public governance in independent India, which has the potential to 
change the nature of governance in India (cited in:Roberts & Roberts, 2010, p. 926). 
In the fifteen years since its inception, there have been over 26 million RTI 
applications filed across the country (CIC, 2019, p. 11). While this may seem like an 
immense number of requests, both in volume and breadth (targetting all levels of 
India’s vast public sector), RTI advocates claim the number is too low, and reflects the 
limited awareness of the RTIA, and a host of other factors that hinder citizens from 
making requests under the law (Chauhan, 2018). This is because RTI, in its present 
form, has no provision for the safety of its users. While there are suggestions to bring 
users under the Whistleblower Protection Act, at present, the act recognizes a citizen 
as a whistleblower only if he or she makes a complaint to the Central Vigilance 
Commission about a case of corruption by a public servant. RTI applicants are, 
therefore, often intimidated, threatened or even physically attacked when they go to 




submit an RTI application, or as a consequence of their submitting such an application 
(Roberts & Roberts, 2010, p. 928). Reports on the effectiveness of RTI, document 
abundant cases of threats and harassment and note that the cost of asking for 
information can be very high, and sometimes brutal (PRIA, 2008, as cited in Roberts 
& Roberts, 2010, p. 930). 
As per the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI)’s “Hall of Shame” record, 
eighty-six RTI claimants have been murdered, and 445 have been assaulted in various 
parts of the country, ever since the RTI Act was implemented in 2005. In a report 
published by CHRI in February 2019, Maharashtra, of which Mumbai is the capital, 
tops the list of states with the most attacks on RTI applicants (CHRI, 2019). These 
include 17 cases of murder, 2 cases of death by suicide, at least 36 cases of assault, 
and 41 cases of harassment. While CHRI’s online-database does not categorize 
violence against RTI activists based on industry or sector, most of the urban cases 
reported appear to have links with the construction industry. In the state of 
Maharashtra, I found that out of the seventeen murder cases reported, seven deaths 
(41% of total) were directly linked to building irregularities in and around the cities 
of Mumbai and Pune, and four deaths (23% of total) were linked to investigations into 
land-use/sale, and illegal sand mining. The most recent murder reported in the state 
was that of 32-year old Vinayak Shirsath, an RTI activist from Pune, who is said to 
have filed several RTI applications pertaining to alleged illegal construction in the city. 
With this case, the pattern of unabated murders, assaults, threats, and harassment of 
citizens using the Right to Information Act to unearth wrongdoing in the construction 
industry continues. And although the process of promoting and implementing 
transparency mechanisms in the real estate sector in urban India comes at huge costs 
to life, through my fieldwork, I found that in less confrontational cases, it fosters new 
relationships of brokerage between activists and those who seek their assistance as 
expert mediators with the state. 
According to developers, while well-intentioned, the RTI act has given rise to an 
“extortion industry” helmed by RTI activists who supposedly operate in collusion 




with government officials. “Only ten out of every hundred so-called RTI activist is a 
genuine activist,” claims Girish Menon, an employee of a leading development firm 
with over thirty years of experience. Among other similar accusations, another 
developer talked about someone they knew who had given an RTI activist six flats as 
a pay-off for keeping mum about their misdoings. Ironically, I found that many 
developers themselves were RTI claimants. Some developers even confessed to 
having dedicated teams to seek out information on other developers, as well as 
address RTI inquiries made against them. Besides, being in the know, I found, was 
viewed as a valuable attribute among developers. Phrases like having an “informant” 
within the municipal office, or “squeezing information out” of an officer, were used 
commonly by participants, which I argue, heightens developers’ sense of machoness, 
while also increasing the perception of transparency among them. 
I got a sense of how this transparent yet dark process of RTI functioned when I sought 
information on an on-going real estate project that is helmed by one of Mumbai’s most 
prominent developers (referred to as The Firm, below).  Though the filing of an RTI 
application is fairly straightforward in principle, I decided to seek help from my friend 
from architecture school, Rajesh Shah, who has been working as a liaison architect 
for ten years and is well versed with the bureaucracy of building permits in Mumbai. 
A liaison architect is a legal expert who mediates between a developer and various 
government agencies to ensure a project’s compliance with construction bye-laws. 
Rajesh tells me that since he is known to the officials of the SRA (the government 
agency administering the project), he could get them to expedite the process, and 
provide me with relevant information. “By law, officers are only bound to provide a 
response, but not the response you are looking for… Besides, they could simply 
redirect you to a different department. They know how to tire people if they really do 
not wish to disclose information”, he warned me. Following his advice, I handed over 
my application form to Rajesh to submit to the “right person.” A week later, I got a call 
from Rajesh informing me of my application status. Below is an excerpt of our phone 
conversation: 




Devesh: Does Saurav Aggarwal (Director) or anyone else from The Firm know you?  
Anitra: I’ve met Saurav once for an interview. I suppose he still remembers me. 
Why? 
Devesh: Ah ok. The guys at SRA have informed their contact persons at The Firm 
about your RTI application. So it’s good if they know you already, and especially 
that you’re a student.  
Anitra: So, SRA officers contacted the developer whose project I want to investigate 
to seek orders from them about how to act on my RTI query?! 
Devesh: I mean not officially, but The Firm has their people within SRA, who inform 
them of every RTI request made against them.  
Anitra: Alright. What’s next? What should I do? 
Devesh: Nothing. If they know you’re not trouble, then everything should be OK.  
About three weeks later, and within the timeframe for response of RTI quieries, I 
received a CD from the SRA with all the information I had requested, including 
development plans and architectural drawings; the chain of approval requests and 
permissions granted over the course of the project’s development; along with legal 
documents pertaining to land exchange and redevelopment agreement struck with 
slum residents.  
While Rajesh’s allegations about the the collusion between SRA officials and 
developers may be exaggerated to show himself in heroic light, there are other 
insights that I can discuss with greater certainty. To begin with, the role of the liaison 
architect as mediator highlights how information flows within Mumbai’s real estate 
industry: triggered by, as well as, carried through by multiple actors besides just RTI 
activists.  Though there is no official record of the number of liaison architects 
operating in the city, Devesh tells me that there “hundreds” of other architects like 
him who carry out liaising work in Mumbai and whose work entails close interaction 
with government officials and developers.  Like RTI activists, liaison architects, too, 
are interested in and privy to irregular practices of land development, since it helps 
them make decisions on behalf of their clients. However, unlike RTI activists, liaison 
architects are viewed as non-threatening, which makes the fight for transparency in 




Mumbai’s land market simultaneously confrontational and impassive. Besides, the 
labyrinth of actors comprising government officials, developers, and liaison 
architects, appears to be arranged not hierarchically, but rather in a heterarchical 
pattern built on social-temporal proximities.  
The approvals system is, therefore, simultaneously transparent and murky on the one 
hand, and tight-knit and transactional on the other. As a result, market actors are 
neither able to gauge the landscape of rules clearly, nor reproduce role-positions 
quite so easily. In the next section, I examine how developers, under such conditions, 
perceive their social world and their position within it, when deciding how to 
negotiate building approvals. My findings reveal that developers tend to hone in on 
their collective identity as “developmental heroes” to overcome the many 
contradictions in their social worlds.  
4.  CONCEPTION OF CONTROL 
Conceptions of control, or local knowledge, as described by anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz, refer to the shared understandings that structure perceptions of how a market 
works, and that allows actors to interpret their world and act to control situations 
(Geertz, 1992, pp. 167–169). Put differently, conceptions of control reflect market-
specific agreements between actors in firms on principles of internal organization, 
tactics for competition or cooperation, and the hierarchy or status ordering of firms 
in a given market (Fligstein, 1996, p. 658). The goal of a conception of control, 
according to Fligstein, is to erect social understandings whereby firms can avoid 
direct price competition and can solve their internal political problems.  In the case 
of real estate developers in Mumbai however, conflicts over hierarchy within a firm, 
i.e., the problem of keeping a firm together as a political coalition (March, 1962), is 
eliminated because all firms, except nine of the corporate firms that I have 
categorized as Group 5, are promoter-driven, wherein firm leadership is 




unchallenged38. As a result, decision-making within real estate firms in Mumbai is 
mostly autocratic and hence also susceptible to economically irrational decisions, 
guided by, for instance, the pride over one’s land bank size, as I discussed in Chapter 
4. The rest of this section, therefore, focuses on the former concern pointed out by 
Fligstein in regard to conceptions of control, i.e., inter-firm competition. To do so, I 
examine how developers perceive their social world and their position within it 
compared to other developers, specifically in relation to (ease of seeking) 
construction approvals.  
Since market actors live in murky worlds where it is never clear which actions will 
have which consequences, the goal of action is to ensure the survival of the firm, 
through the creation of stable worlds. Actors are therefore prepared to take what they 
get and work towards a more stable situation. Fligstein calls these “tool kit tactics,” 
which, after some period of time, become recognized by market actors who then 
begin to imitate them (Fligstein, 1996, p. 660). For my developer participants, 
however, firm survival and the idea of stability seems to be a function of factors 
external to inter-firm relationships.  “Developers are not looking to take each other 
down,” Mohit Bhatia, the business head of a corporate development firm that clearly 
enjoys a higher status than other firms, tells me. “We are all united against the 
challenges posed against us,” he says, adding that, “When there is a common enemy 
(referring to the capricious rules of building construction, and the fluctuating supply 
of finance), then the differences are forgotten…. Just like how Pakistan is a common 
enemy that unites all Indians, Hindus, Muslims, Christians…”. While I found Mohit’s 
comment to be provocative, Mohit seemed to assert in a language that was more 
relatable for him, that developers in Mumbai sought control of their unstable worlds, 
by honing in on their collective identities. What Mohit was alluding to, is that, in his 
unstable world, conceptions of control refer not to a tool kit of strategies that can be 
used over and over again to justify an action, but rather the assurance of success 
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to the same family. A typical firm would therefore have the father as firm Chairman, uncle as Managing 
Director, son as Director, and so on.  




achieved by hook or crook, that developers in Mumbai seem to embody, i.e., the 
narrative that developers are “developmental heroes,” no matter the means they 
adopt to produce commodified land.  
 Several reasons contribute to the creation of such a conception of control among real 
estate developers in Mumbai. From the accounts of my interview participants, who 
included developers, liaison architects, and ex-officials of the Bombay Municipal 
Corporation, I was able to identify the following factors to have an impact on how 
developers perceive their social worlds: 
Low barriers to entry: With 2000-odd developers operating in Mumbai, it is evident 
that the barriers to entry for becoming a developer in the city are fairly low. Rajesh 
(my classmate from architecture school) tells me that the backgrounds of most of his 
clients are humble, and not remotely related to real estate. One of them, he recollects, 
was the owner of a small grocery shop in a slum. “The guy was able to garner enough 
support from the community to spearhead the slum’s redevelopment,” Rajesh noted, 
adding that “He knew nothing about being a developer, but was somehow able to 
acquire consent from residents, which gave him the opportunity to become one 
overnight.” The character that Rajesh describes is not uncommon to Mumbai’s real 
estate story, and yet probably uniquely a Mumbai story. As discussed in Chapters 4 
and later in Chapter 7, developers in Mumbai need little base capital to carry out 
operations because redevelopments do not require land to be purchased outright, 
and much of the financing for construction is earned through pre-sales. As a result, 
there are several success stories of developers who turned from “nobody to 
somebody,” capturing the minds of developers, which appears to instill a sense of 
meritocracy among them. When asked, what helps most when seeking construction 
approvals, developers of all types: small, big, old, new, told me that it was experience, 
social skills, and knowledge of construction bye-laws, that gave them an edge over 
others in the approvals process. In fact, established developers especially seemed to 
believe that small developers were often better at approvals because they had the 
time and patience to deal with babus, a local derogatory term for a work-shirking, 




bribe-seeking government employee. Therefore, contrary to their own signaling of 
the importance of political-connections in Mumbai’s real estate industry, developers 
seemed to attribute success, particularly in the domain of approvals, to merit. I later 
learned that developers, as well as liaison architects, perceived their work of building 
social relations with junior government officials as a meritorious endeavor because 
these relations were based on bonds built over time, as opposed to class or caste 
proximity.  
Easy access to government officials: Several developers mentioned to me that they 
often wined and dined with government officials. The chief liaison officer of Omkar 
developers, I was told, ate lunch with the commissioner of the Slum Redevelopment 
Authority regularly. I later learned that the two of them were colleagues at another 
government agency some years ago. The social separation of developers and 
government officials is neither distinct nor wide because it is quite common for 
retired officials to either set up their own private development firm or take up 
positions as approvals advisor for other firms. However, government officers and 
senior bureaucrats are, according to my participants, rather easy to access and dine 
with if you are a developer since the bonhomie builds over time with each visit to the 
approvals office. “There is no guarantee that the officers will clear an approval if you 
take them out for lunch, but they would never refuse a free lunch, or a nice watch, 
even!”, noted Kaushik Bhopte, another of my classmate from architecture school, who 
also works as a liaison architect. Developers, as a result, exude great self-confidence 
while discussing their experience with construction approvals. Unlike in real estate 
conferences and public events wherein developers highlight the arduousness of 
receiving timely approvals, in the confines of their own offices, developers seem to 
brag about how good they are at navigating the approvals process, and how pally they 
are with the officers in charge. Interestingly, I found that every developer I 
interviewed felt they were better than most others at seeking construction approvals. 
As a small experiment, I asked six developers to rate themselves on a scale of one to 
ten, to describe how efficient they were compared to others, at getting approvals. I 
also asked them to rate the approvals system for how straightforward and 




transparent they consider it to be. Each of my interviewees rated themselves higher 
than seven for self-efficiency, while their ratings of the approvals system varied from 
five to nine. Developers, therefore, seem to care a lot about how their efficiency in 
seeking approvals is perceived by others, and yet, references to political clout are 
made ever so often, as though that too, is a meritorious endeavor.  
Political involvement in real estate:  Developers in Mumbai have traditionally had 
close links with politicians and the mafia, due to the nature of real estate financing 
(Weinstein, 2008). Many developers are known to have built their businesses on the 
backbone of the illicit wealth of politicians or politically important persons (S. Sarkar 
& Tiwari, 2001). It is therefore not uncommon for real estate projects to have the 
“blessing of a politician,” a phrase I observed market actors frequently use to indicate 
that approvals would be easy, or building restrictions lenient for such projects. 
Whether developers with political ties benefit in the realm of approvals or not, the 
perception among the general public and also market actors is that they certainly do. 
One of many examples that point to this phenomenon is the case of HBS developers, 
promoted by Sandeep Shah – who industry insiders claim is a close aide of a 
prominent regional politician (who ironically, is being tried for corruption by the 
party at the center). With no prior experience or completed projects under their belt, 
HBS was able to bag contracts for three large redevelopment projects in the period 
between 2009 and 2011, possibly under the pretext of their political support, which 
at the time was held in high regard. Today, all three projects are unfinished and 
abandoned, with residents left indefinitely displaced, because the developer, they say, 
has run out of funds (personal interview). Several other developers, such as Hubtown, 
DB Realty, and Kohinoor Developers, that have known links to important politicians, 
have also filed for bankruptcy in the past two years. Therefore, while the close links 
between politicians and developers creates the aura of invincibility, developers are 
in reality, exposed to the risk of firm death caused by embedded political ties, which 
I argue, distorts conceptions of control based on rigid hierarchical ordering.  




The ambiguities of land ownership and land use in Mumbai, moreover, expose 
developers to the hybridities of formal and informal, structured and chaotic, kinetic 
and static, that scholars associate life in the city with. Land development necessarily 
requires developers to grapple with multiple conceptual and practical contradictions 
in their everyday activities, seeking building permits, being one of them. Therefore, 
even though developers clearly occupy positions within a status order, their 
responses, I postulate, are guided by the temporally closer, and socially consonant 
shared imagination of an ever-successful development hero: one who goes against all 
odds to commodify land.  
5.  HIERARCHY AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
That there exists a distinction between an actor and an actor's position in the social 
structure; and that rewards are largely a function of position, is one of the 
fundamental insights of the sociological perspective (Simmel & Wolff, 1950). The 
economic constraints and opportunities that confront a producer in a market are very 
much contingent upon the producer's position in the status order (Podolny, 1993, 
p. 830)39. For this reason, Neil Fligstein proposes that the social structures of markets 
should be viewed as attempts to mitigate the effects of competition with other firms 
(Fligstein, 1996, p. 657). Fligstein focuses on the distinction between firm sizes 
relative to their market (as opposed to perceived product quality), in order to study 
the political processes that, by way of establishing a stable conception of control, 
reproduce the position of advantaged groups.  This distinction among firms, however, 
is not as rigid in case of “countries just establishing modern capitalist markets,” 
according to Fligstein, since property rights, governance structures, and rules of 
exchange in such countries are not well specified (Fligstein, 1996, p. 661). 
Nevertheless, developers in Mumbai allude, albeit inconsistently, to the existence of 
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understanding of markets, could be attributed to a developers’ perceived ability to execute projects in 
a timely manner, as I have discussed in Chapter 5 (Valuation).  




inequalities stemming from their position in the social structure that comprises the 
market. The rest of this section, therefore, examines the applicability of the 
conventional theories discussed above onto Mumbai’s real estate industry, by 
measuring inequality pertaining to transaction costs incurred during the approvals 
process.   
In the conceptualization of markets as a status order, each producer's position is said 
to provide a unique cost and revenue profile for manufacturing a good of a given level 
of quality (Podolny, 1993, p. 829). In the real estate industry, developers seemingly 
benefit from differential costs relating to approval times and development rights 
(aside from financial borrowing), which impacts their cost of production. Developers 
with stronger ties to politicians and government officials would, therefore, be able to 
accrue higher profits as time delay due to approvals is potentially reduced, and the 
total buildable area in a project is potentially increased. Measurement of such a 
network advantage is, however, tricky because benefits gained from one’s social 
position cannot be distinguished easily from specificities of the land being developed. 
Approval times and extent of development are contingent on various factors such as 
existing land-use, topography, access to civic amenities, environmental norms, etc. 
and hence require decisions to be made on a case-by-case basis. While Mumbai’s 
development regulations, make clear the general guidelines to be followed by 
authorities when granting building permissions, developers and liaison architects 
claim that concessions are allowed by the municipal commissioner, to circumvent the 
bye-laws stipulated in the DCR. It is these concessions, and the time taken to seek 
these concessions, that developers compete for, and which should determine the 
status order among developers. Below, I look at each factor that determines approval 
success and compare them across fifty-two projects, led by forty-eight unique 
developers of varying status.  
 Approval Times      
Delays in execution can severely hamper the profitability of a real estate project, 
especially when the cost of borrowing is greater than growth in property prices, as 




has been the case in Mumbai for the past five years (R. Kamath, 2020). One would, 
therefore, assume that developers are looking to reduce approval times in order to 
meet their profit expectations. The overall time taken to seek all approvals until the 
completion of a project should, therefore, serve as a quantitative indicator of 
developer status.  However, through my interviews with liaison architects, and 
analysis of various approval documents accessible on government websites, I learned 
that it is common for developers to deliberately delay projects, depending on the 
speed of sale, project cash flows, and imminent policy changes. A developer could, 
therefore, intentionally allow a development permit to expire, or file an incomplete 
application in order to delay construction/ completion of a project. In such cases, the 
overall approvals timeline is a misleading indicator of a developer’s ability to seek 
faster approvals. For this reason, I focus on a single approval permit known as 
Intimation of Disapproval (here on referred to as IOD), which is an authorization to 
begin the construction process following several checks from local authorities (see 
sample IOD certificate attached as Annex  E). Unlike all other subsequent permissions 
that are contingent on the financial preparedness or intent of a developer to promptly 
execute a project, the IOD is simply an acknowledgment of a developer’s intention to 
build, therefore making it more suitable for comparison, than any other building 
permit. 





Figure 24: East Mumbai neighborhoods of Wadala, Chembur, Ghatkopar, Vikhroli, Kanjurmarg, and 
Mulund (Compiled by Author; Map: kepler.gl) 
I began the exercise of comparing IODs by identifying projects that were launched in 
and after 2017 across Eastern Mumbai, which has recently seen a greater number of 
project launches than other parts of the city, therefore providing me a larger sample 
pool to choose from (Figure 24). The area selected comprises of six neighborhoods: 
Wadala, Chembur, Ghatkopar, Vikhroli, Kanjurmarg, and Mulund, all of which fall 
under the same executive jurisdiction of the Bombay Municipal Corporation. The year 
2017 marks the enforcement of the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Act (RERA), 
which made it mandatory for all ongoing projects to make public its architectural 
drawings and development permissions. As a result, there is a lot more data available 
for projects that were either on-going or commenced construction after 2017. Since I 
intended to compare developers of different types (small, big, new, old, etc.), project 
sizes had to necessarily be of a broader range. However, a minimum project size of 
50,000 square feet was considered so that the variance between projects is not too 
large. In total, fifty-two projects satisfied these criteria. Of the fifty-two projects, 
seventeen are slum redevelopments (administered by the state-run Slum 
Redevelopment Authority), three are residential redevelopments (administered by 




state-run agency Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority), and the 
remaining thirty-two are either industrial redevelopments or non-redevelopment 
projects (administered by the local civic body Municipal Corporation of Greater 
Mumbai). The representation of developer groups (as outlined in Chapter 3) among 
the 52 selected projects is as follows (Figure 18). 
Table 11: Representation of developer groups among the 52 selected projects 
Group Name w/ description Number of projects Representation in the sample 
pool 
1 (First timers) 18 35% 
2 (Highly local) 16 31% 
3 (Millennial) 14 27% 
4 (Old-timers) 2 4% 
5 (Corporate) 2 4% 
Total 52 100% 
Findings: 
At first glance, the IOD timeframes of the 52 projects show significant variation, with 
some developers receiving their IODs in under a month, while some other developers 
have had to wait nearly 70 months for the same approval. When the projects are 
segregated according to development type (slum redevelopment and non-slum 
redevelopment), the range in IOD-times continues to be wide (1 to 62 months for non-
slum redevelopments; and 2 to 75 months for slum redevelopments). The average of 
all projects combined, is, however, much smaller, at around 12 months. This is 
because the extreme cases of 62 and 75 months are aberrations, and if those two 
projects are eliminated from the list, the average time for seeking an IOD is eight 
months (just two months longer than what most elite developers claim it takes them 
for their IODs). In fact, 41% of the projects received IODs in less than six months (see 
Figure 25), which indicates that quicker IOD times are not uncommon and especially 
not an advantage restricted to a handful of developers.  





Figure 25: Comparison of IODs. Majority developers received their IOD approval within six months 
(Compiled by Author; Data: MahaRERA, 2019). 
Group-wise segregation of the data shows that Group 2 and Group 3 clock in the 
fastest IOD times on average (7 months, if the two extreme cases are not considered), 
followed by Group 5, 4 and 1, with average IOD times of 8.5, 9.5, and 11 months 
respectively (Figure 26, below). Admittedly, the number of projects considered for 
Groups 4 and 5 is very low, and the findings may change should there be a higher 
representation from these groups in a sample. 





Figure 26: Average approval times between different developer groups (Compiled by Author; Data: 
MahaRERA, 2019) 
Statistical analysis of the data reveals no significant correlation between IOD time and 
developer group, or between IOD time and project size. Therefore, contrary to the 
claims made by developers and the common perception that developers enjoy 
differential turn around times for project approvals, the comparison of IOD times 
indicates that faster approvals may not be a distinguishing feature of elite developers 
alone and that approval times may be contingent on factors other than just developer 
status, such as specificities of the land to be developed, and nature of the development 
proposed. Alternately, I would postulate that developers do not strive to seek faster 
approvals, and hence may not find it necessary to tap into their networks to rush the 
IOD process.  
 Development Rights 
Since the cost of construction is relatively low in Mumbai (around 15-20% of total 
project cost, as compared to 50% in London) due to the availability of cheap labor, 
the profit outcome of a real estate project is generally commensurate with the extent 




of development permitted on a site40. Developers, therefore, strive to stretch their 
built area allowance despite close monitoring of built-area consumption, or what is 
locally termed as Floor Space Index (FSI), by competitors and activists alike41. While 
developers and architects claim that FSI distribution in Mumbai is more or less 
transparent, they acknowledge that not everyone knows how to unlock the full FSI 
potential of a land parcel. Therefore, much like the IOD timeframe, FSI can be 
considered to be a quantitative indicator of developer status. However, unlike in the 
case of IODs, where the start and end time is known/unchangeable, the FSI of a 
project is non-determinable until all potential phases of a project are complete. In 
other words, development plans can go through several alterations even after 
construction commences, and hence the only way to assess actual FSI is by studying 
completed projects. However, all the projects on the list compiled for this study are 
ongoing. Moreover, since it is not mandatory for projects older than 2017 to share 
project details with the public, accessing data for older projects is much more 
cumbersome (requiring RTI inquiries into each project). Nevertheless, a comparison 
based on tentative FSI of on-going projects is useful to rule out a correlation between 
developer group and development rights. Since the FSI for slum redevelopment 
projects is contingent on the density of the slum being redeveloped, I have considered 
only non-slum redevelopment projects, which are subject to blanket development 
guidelines, so that projects are more comparable. 
Findings: 
A comparison of the ratio of built area vs. site area (a proxy for FSI), among the thirty-
two non-slum redevelopment projects in the list, also generated a negative result like 
the IOD. There is no correlation between developer group and development rights 
                                                        
40 Except in certain poorer neighbourhoods where property prices are so low that building taller 
structures (and the associated approval cost) is not worth the investment. 
41 Floor Area Ratio, or Floor Space Index is the ratio of a building's total floor area to the size of the 
piece of land upon which it is built. In Mumbai, FSI is a contentious issue, with developers negotiating 
with authorities for higher allowances on one hand, and fighting off accusations of malfeasance by 
activists and civil society on the other hand.  




granted to a project. Since the data used for this analysis is not as robust as the data 
on IOD timeframes, descriptive conclusions such as average FSI, range of FSI between 
projects, etc. would be inaccurate. However, it is worthwhile to note that my analysis 
was unable to produce evidence of a systematic reproduction of competitive 
advantage among developers in regard to development rights. While these findings 
match the claims that gross violations in FSI norms are inconceivable under the 
current regulatory environment, it is also possible that government officials are wary 
of endorsing anything that could be seen as a circumvention of rules, officially. 
Rajashekhar Kamat, an ex-bureaucrat who, until 2004, worked in various agencies of 
the government such as the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority 
(MHADA), responded bluntly when I asked him about the scope for variation in FSI 
granted to developers. “FSI is math,” he said. “There is no ambiguity over how much 
FSI one can receive (for a given plot),” he added. However, later during the same 
discussion, Kamat admitted that the Bombay Municipal Corporation did not have 
sufficient resources to carry out repeated inspections of buildings on site. Kamat was 
alluding to me that there may be discrepancies between official records on paper and 
the finished product on the ground.  
That there is inequality in developers’ ease of seeking approvals is difficult to prove 
empirically. However, for the various reasons mentioned above, the lack of empirical 
justification, given the limited data, does not actually mean that such inequality does 
not exist. The empirical findings presented above, though, serve as an explanation for 
why it may be difficult for developers to conceive of status ordering in relation to 
development approvals. It also explains why developers contradict themselves by 
talking about their efficiency in seeking approvals and political clout on the one hand, 
and the non-existence of inequality in the approval system on the other. In the next 
section, I examine how developers navigate the approvals process in practice, and 
what conception of control they draw on when doing so.  




6.  NEGOTIATING APPROVALS: IN PRACTICE 
Throughout my research for this chapter, I received contradictory responses from 
developers regarding the advantages of their network positions. Developers claimed 
to be better than others, while simultaneously asserting that there is little variance in 
project FSI, if not in approval times. It was also puzzling to hear developers talk about 
the ease with which they “handle government officials” on the one hand, while 
asserting that the RTI portal serves as an effective tool to flag discrepancies in the 
approvals process, on the other hand. When I directly confronted developers about 
this, they either contradicted themselves further or sounded ambivalent. I argue that 
this contradiction exists because developers live through dual conceptual worlds: one 
in which there is a collective orientation towards strengthening of their identity as a 
developmental hero – by tending to temporally closer, external challenges, which I 
claim is their active world. And the other, which remains dormant for the most part, 
is that conception of control wherein actors are oriented towards obstructing 
competition and establishing long term stabilization of role positions. While I have 
maintained that developer action is mostly guided by the first conceptual orientation, 
an acknowledgment of hierarchical ordering is sometimes necessary to authorize the 
imagination of the developmental hero. For example, when talking at a conference, 
engaging with investors, or when faced with direct competition. As a result, 
developers tend to switch between the two conceptual worlds every now and then, 
to mostly signal their status position – not to combat competition, but rather to 
strengthen their identity. 
The rest of this section focuses on what developers do, in order to identify the 
cognitive frames that help them decide which actions to choose from, as interactions 
in the approvals process proceed. I begin by first studying how developers navigate 
the rules of building construction, by examining whom they hire for the job, in order 
to check for competitive strategies. Then, I study how changes to existing rules are 
negotiated, by looking at how developers organize themselves into developer 
associations, and the tactics they adopt to protect their individual and/or collective 
interests. Finally, I trace the responses of developers to the rules, by analyzing 




whether or not these rules are well established, and to what extent developer actions 
are constrained by them. 
 Hiring Experts 
Many of the developers I interviewed, claimed to be working with highly competent 
liaison architects who help them come up with ingenious ideas to maximize FSI, while 
“conforming to legal guidelines.” Mohit Bhatia tells me there are few liaison architects 
in the city who are notorious for bending the rules. One among them, I was told, had 
their license revoked recently because they got caught forging an approval on behalf 
of the environment ministry. There were several such stories that I came across, 
which signaled the knavery involved in the approvals process, alongside the risks that 
accompany it. While architects claim that the scope for manipulation of FSI and 
malfeasance, in general, had drastically reduced since 2012 when Mumbai’s 
development control regulations underwent major reforms, they nevertheless 
engaged in discussions about how some architects, under the auspices of their 
developer client, are more successful than others at exploiting loopholes in the 
system, and convincing officials to interpret rules in a certain way. The liaison 
architect, as I understand, is therefore not only integral to a developer’s day to day 
operations, and the bearer of their trade secrets, but is also effective in disseminating 
stories that help establish a developer’s status vis-à-vis their intrepidity.  
Several of my classmates from architecture school turned to liaison work (in most 
cases to join their fathers who already had an established practice).  Kaushik Bhopte 
was one among them. Although Kaushik’s clients comprise of prominent developers, 
including the current and past presidents of The Maharashtra Chamber of Housing 
Industry (MCHI), the oldest developer association in Mumbai, he tells me that his firm 
is relatively small, with few loyal clients that provide him the opportunity to earn 
money on the side as a “silent partner.” This practice, he claims, is common and often 
necessary to establish trust between liaison architects and developers. In contrast, 
Space Age, I was told, “ruled the approvals business.” From the website of the Bombay 
Municipal Corporation, I was able to gather Space Age’s list of projects along with 




client names. With around 200 on-going projects, led by eighty-five development 
firms, Space Age stands out for its scale of operations42. Their clients include almost 
all the major corporate developers (which I categorize as Group 5) who are meant to 
be direct competitors.  My participants tell me that corporate developers, more so 
than others, depend on their liaison architects for generating “black money,” and 
paying bribes to government officials. “These developers must completely trust their 
architect to negotiate the bribe amount (which can be as much as 15% of total project 
cost) and deliver the cash to the concerned officer because the developers themselves 
can’t be seen engaging in such activity as a public listed company”, noted one of my 
participants.  
As competing developers use the services of the same liaison architect, they 
inadvertently augment the exchange of knowledge between them. One particular case 
involving the clients of Space Age is especially telling in this regard.  Lodha and 
Lokhandwala, both developers of repute, found themselves competing for a view of 
the Arabian Sea, which commands a high premium in Mumbai real estate when the 
two developers acquired land parcels beside each other in the up-end district of 
Mahalaxm (Figure 27)
                                                        
42 On closer examination of these eighty-five developers, I found that many of the 
firms were actually sister concerns of a parent company. This makes it difficult to 
generate a unique list of clients, and therefore to sort them according to firm size/ 
group type, or derive patterns of social networks.  





developers were to build residential towers named Lokhandwala Minerva and Lodha 
Bellissimo, but only one of them (Minerva) could have an unobstructed view of the 
sea. Word among industry insiders is that Lokhandwala and Lodha, who share a 
liaison architect, knew of each other’s building proposals early enough to strike a deal 
that would protect Lodha from bearing losses. As per the accounts of at least five of 
my participants, Lokhandwala was paid generous compensation to delay the Minerva 
project until Lodha sold all flats in Bellissimo – at a rate that was based on the promise 
of a sea view. While these accounts may or may not be part of a fictional tale that 
glorifies the crimes of developers, it is evident from the approvals records of Minerva 
(Figure 28) that the project was put on hold between 2005 and 2009, which happens 
to coincide with Bellissimo’s launch in 2006 (Figure 29).    





Figure 27: Lokhandwala Minerva and Lodha Bellissimo competing for a view of the Arabian sea 
(Author, 2015) 
 
Figure 28: Excerpt from LOI certificate. Lokhandwala had originally submitted a Letter of Intent (LOI) 
for developing Minerva in 2005, but re-submitted a revised LOI in 2009 (MahaRERA, 2019) 






Figure 29: Lodha Bellissimo was launched in December 2005 (Housing.com) 
Therefore, while developers may seek exclusive expert insight into the approvals 
process to gain competitive advantage, their decisions seem to be constrained by 
several factors, including a general lack of trust in market actors, and in Lodha’s case, 
the spatial fixities of land. Moreover, there appears to be no real effort towards 
withholding information by developers, despite the allegations of an “extortion racket” 
being run by RTI claimants. If anything, knowledge exchange seems to be useful to 
forge cooperation among competing developers in Mumbai. 
 Push for Policy Change 
Developers are of the opinion that while the approvals process is rather 
straightforward for an experienced developer, erratic changes in policy is what 
affects them most. Mumbai developers are therefore organized into associations in 
order to “support or oppose legislation affecting the interests of the construction 
industry” (CREDAI MCHI, 2019). The Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry was 
thus formed in 1982 and remained the largest developer association in the city with 
1400 members. On their website, the MCHI notes that they pride themselves for 
“achieving the very best for all members and for the industry at large” (ibid). One of 
their recent achievements listed on the website is: convincing authorities to 
withdraw a circular that entitled the state to demolish any structure constructed 
beyond the height for which a construction certificate is granted. The MCHI’s agenda, 




therefore, appears to indeed protect the interests of all developers, including those 
who operate at the seams of illegality. In 2015 however, reports of fighting among 
developers over the association’s leadership emerged for the first time, with key 
members, including some of the founding members, quitting MCHI. In a local news 
report about the issue, one developer noted that the rift emerged because MCHI had 
turned into a “closed club with few members dominating the association’s agenda” 
(Bharucha, 2015). A close look at the leadership structure of MCHI, however, reveals 
that developers in Mumbai are not actually striving to seek authority over the framing 
of collective agendas and that conflicts between members may not be related to 
struggles over policy decisions.  
The representation of developers in MCHI’s managing committee is indeed limited to 
a small group of developers, as pointed out by the discontented member. However, 
the group’s leadership is non-reflective of the hierarchy among developers in regard 
to market share. Out of the ten developers that served as presidents of MCHI over the 
past twenty years, seventy percent belonged to Group 3, i.e., fairly new entrants into 
Mumbai’s real estate industry. The core managing committee, including vice 
presidents and joint secretaries, also comprises of mostly Group 3 developers. While 
corporate developers (Group 5) are completely absent from the committee, 
representation of Group 4 (the original dominant class of developers), also appears 
to be shrinking. In fact, even top Group 3 developers like Lodha and Omkar, who 
jointly take up 6% of market share, are absent from MCHI’s managing body. Core 
members, therefore, comprise of developers who are known within Mumbai’s real 
estate circles but are neither the largest nor the oldest producers of real estate in the 
city. Irfan Siddique, a partner at a small development firm and a passive member of 
MCHI, admitted that being a committee member of MCHI is much work, with little 
rewards. According to Irfan, developers like to compete for key positions in the 
association, because it gives them a chance to meet with the Chief Minister ever so 
often. Manoj Gupta (MD, PropConsulting), on the other hand, claims that MCHI is a 
good platform for distributing and receiving real estate awards, and provides 
developers recognition, but gives them little sway on policies.  




While affiliation with the MCHI may or may not translate to tangible advantages for a 
developer as far as approvals are concerned, I found that developers seem to benefit 
off of, as opposed to being disadvantaged by, each other’s intervention towards policy 
change. This is because most developers, as I have shown in previous chapters, are 
non-committal to project timeframes and can, therefore, re-negotiate project 
approvals halfway through construction when the rules change in favor of a certain 
developer. As a result, the first-mover advantage for a developer who effectively 
lobbies for change in rules is reduced. A recent modification to the building 
restrictions around Mumbai’s central jail serves as a good example to illustrate this 
point. The state of Maharashtra has traditionally restricted construction within a 182-
meter radius of all jails in the state. In Mumbai, however, since the jail, once located 
outside city limits, today lies at the city’s new geographic center, developers have 
been keen to revoke the restriction to facilitate (profitable) redevelopment of the 
many slums that exist along the jail’s periphery (Naik, 2019) 43 . The Dhobi Ghat 
redevelopment (discussed in Chapter 4), is one such project. A petition to reduce the 
distance, to which the ban applies, was finally accepted by the Bombay Municipal 
Corporation in 2018 when construction at Dhobi Ghat commenced (Mahamulkar, 
2018). With the revision of this rule, the developers of Dhobi Ghat were able to 
accommodate an additional building presently valued at INR 750cr (79 million GBP) 
in the development plan, which potentially increases the project’s profitability by at 
least 30%. However, along with Piramal, seven other developers, who have projects 
under various stages of execution in the vicinity of the jail, as per the projects listed 
on SRA’s website, become eligible for greater development rights as well. Incidentally, 
Shreepati Skies, the only project registered on the RERA website out of those seven, 
has moved its official completion date from December 2020 to December 2025, 
presumably to re-work their project plan in lieu of the recent regulatory changes 
(Figure 30). 
                                                        
43 Developers like Lokhandwala, have in the past failed at this effort, leading to the demolition of an 
entire building constructed by the developer in violation to the rule, as pointed out to me by residents 
of Dhobi Ghat.  





Figure 30: Project status of Shreepati Skies. Completion date extended to 2025 (MahaRERA, 2019) 
The above findings suggest that the strategy for policy change among developers may 
not be to establish anti-competition laws, but rather the exploitation of protective 
measures by all developers, which incentivizes violation of rules while subverting 
efforts to set in place a stable hierarchical order among developers. Such a practice is 
both reflective of and contributive to the hybridity of formal-informal or 
commodified-non-commodified that developers seem to be entrenched in.  
 Adhering to Rules 
Shakeel Ahmed Shaikh, an RTI activist from Mumbai, who has tirelessly conducted 
inquiries into illegal construction activity in the city, found that between January 
2016 and July 2019, the Bombay Municipal Corporation received 52,154 verified 
complaints about illegal constructions and encroachments in Mumbai. (Upadhyay, 
2019). He also gathered information that, in this period, the municipal authority had 
actively responded to just 4,166 (8%) of those complaints. Another inquiry along the 
same lines by housing activist Vinod Sampat revealed that over 50% of buildings in 
the city are without an Occupation Certificate, and hence not recognized on municipal 
records, nor by the fire department (Deshpande, 2018). Illegal construction activity, 
while not at all an anomaly in rich neighborhoods, is far more prevalent in poor, 
congested areas that receive benign neglect from the authorities. Responding to a 
recent building collapse in Dongri, one of Mumbai’s densest neighborhoods, politician 
Rais Shaikh, noted this about his constituency: 
Over the past two decades, the area has seen haphazard development and 
redevelopment of many old buildings. These buildings are built without the BMC’s 
permission under the pretext of carrying out structural repairs to the original 




building. It [the additional floors] adds weight to the original old structure and 
weakens it  
BMC officials also attributed the disaster to developers’ stealthy modus operandi.  
Many times, the developer over a weekend manages to construct several floors to 
a building, and by the time the BMC notices it [on the following Monday], tenants 
have moved in, making demolition very difficult for us 
A BMC official is reported to have said (Bharucha & Ali, 2019).  
Local residents, however, accuse the administration of turning a blind eye to illegal 
buildings. “It is the administration’s job to know if an illegal building is coming up in 
the area, and make sure to stop its construction,” complained one resident (ibid). 
Developers, on the other hand, claim that officials are well aware of every move of 
theirs. Vishal Kapadia, a developer who operates in a neighborhood where 
unauthorized construction is rampant, tells me that BMC officers seek payment for 
every square foot of illegal construction. “You can imagine how much money there is 
to be made,” he exclaimed. In a move that appears to make official this practice, the 
Maharashtra government has set the ball rolling for a new bill to regularise all illegal 
residential buildings in the state, that were built before December 2015 (Phadke, 
2017). As per the proposed policy, owners and occupiers of illegal buildings, as 
opposed to the developer, can now on payment of a penalty, get their buildings to be 
recognized by the municipal corporation. The notification is a part of the 
government's attempt towards “taking a realistic step to solve the problem of lakhs 
of unauthorised structures," an official of the urban development department 
announced in a press briefing (ET Realty, 2018). While citizens hail the policy to be 
pro-developer, developers argue against this claim by noting that homebuyers are 
equally responsible for the current state of affairs.  
When asked about the policy, Kapadia tells me rather bluntly that he has no sympathy 
for residents of illegal buildings who now find themselves in a precarious position. 
“Flat buyers know what they are getting into when the pricing is suspiciously low,” 
he says, adding that, “Even when developers reveal upfront to their customers that a 
building does not have certain permissions, customers are willing to take the risk.” Is 




that because they are too poor to afford anything better, I ask? “It is because everyone 
knows that in this country demolition of an occupied building is impossible…They’ll 
cut off the electricity and water supply, but the BMC legally cannot touch a building if 
it is occupied”, he responded44.  
While not all developers may be evading rules of building construction in Mumbai, 
they all nevertheless live in a social world where engaging in corrupt practices is 
common among developers, officials, and flat buyers alike. Developers who operate 
at a larger scale are, however, predictably more inclined to follow the rules because 
the costs associated with a probe, later on, are greater. Liaison architects tell me that 
not only do big projects attract more attention, but that pay-offs too are dependent 
on the economic status of a developer, or the exchange value of a project. It is for this 
reason that several luxury developments in the city such as Palais Royal and Kohinoor 
Square hit a roadblock after it was discovered that construction guidelines in these 
projects were grossly violated (Parkin, 2019). The incentive to follow the rules, 
therefore, applies only selectively to developers and is not constrained by 
professional goals. Besides, it is not intuitive for developers to always follow the rules 
because the rules of land development have not been repeated by all actors enough 
times for it to gain legitimacy. As a result, developers are continually confronted by 
inconsistencies in recognizing the social meaning of rules when carrying out their 
day-to-day activities of land development.  
7.  DISCUSSION 
Seeking approvals for land development and building construction in Mumbai 
requires developers to navigate a shaky regulatory landscape, wherein the rules of 
development are continually changing, and the bureaucratic encounters along the 
way are unpredictable. Both the rules of development and the process of seeking 
                                                        
44 In May 2019, the Supreme Court of India ordered the demoloition of five inhabited apartment 
buildings in an upscale neighbourhood in Cochin, Kerala, for violation of Coastal Regulation Zone rules. 
The four buildings that housed 343 waterfront apartments, were raised to the ground in January 2020. 
 




permissions are prone to much uncertainty because they are subject to a host of 
developmental and socio-political issues that have no easy solution. The sheer size 
and distribution of Mumbai’s population necessarily require frequent regulatory 
interventions, causing development rules to not only fluctuate but also be 
inconsistent. On the other hand, in neighborhoods where civic needs are bursting at 
the seams, building practices receive benign neglect, due to the sheer density of built 
formations, if not for any other reason. Developers and other market actors recognize 
these challenges to be intrinsic to the commodification of land, as a result of which, 
there is much talk about the lengthy and cumbersome approvals process in Indian 
real estate forums. According to developers and financiers alike, this is the reason 
why development projects in Mumbai derail ever so often.  
In the confines of their offices, and in settings where developers need to project 
themselves as capable of overcoming developmental hurdles, developers present a 
contradictory picture where having the required know-how and social ties makes the 
approvals process relatively easy. Similarly, developers suggest that there exists 
among them a status hierarchy in terms of ease of seeking approvals, while 
simultaneously asserting that the approvals system is both transparent and fair. I 
argue that these contradictions exist because developers, themselves, are confronted 
with, and subjects of, the many ambiguities and hybridities that accompany land and 
its development in the city. Even though developers acknowledge their market 
position relative to other developers, orientation towards their collective identities is 
more effective for (cognitively) overcoming the innumerable uncertainties related to 
development approvals, and land development more generally. Inter-firm 
competition is therefore perceived to be less of a threat compared to other 
destabilizing forces, such as hurdles posed by the shifting regulatory landscape, 
which generate project-specific problems that can seriously undermine developers’ 
profit expectations. In other words, developers refer to status orders only when a 
situation demands them to do so, but at all other times remain focused on overcoming 
regulatory uncertainties through ad hoc means that surpass systemic advantages.  




Uncertainty pertaining to development approvals not only distracts developers from 
the disparity in role positions vis-à-vis each other but also provides developers the 
opportunity to highlight their significance in the land market. The practices 
developers adopt when seeking building approvals reveal their tendency to: 
overcome mistrust by impinging on channels of information exchange; establish 
cooperation by subverting market competition; manage profit expectations by 
evading rules, and so on. These tactics are not only unsustainable in the long run, but 
they also foster an environment of murkiness, wherein external conflicts are plentiful, 
and that requires a “hero developer” to navigate. The uncertain regulatory landscape 
within which development approvals must be negotiated, therefore, serves as a fertile 
ground for strengthening the hero narrative, which, as I discuss in the next chapter, 
is of great consequence to the distribution and deployment of finance capital towards 




 FINANCING OF REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
I revisited Dhobi Ghat in December 2018 to inspect the slum’s redevelopment. It had 
been a year since the last remaining residents had moved out to make way for 
construction work. A year ago, representatives of Omkar – the developer responsible 
for the redevelopment – had told me that residents would be able to move into their 
new flats within two years. Up until December 2018, however, there had been little 
progress with the construction, and workers on site expected it would be another two 
years before the project is ready for occupation. Former residents of Dhobi Ghat who 
continued to live and work nearby were aware that the timeline promised to them 
would not be met. However, residents had more pressing concerns on their minds. 
Residents claimed that the rent payments owed to them by Omkar were delayed 
beyond eight months. When asked what the developer’s excuse was, the common 
response I got from residents was that funding for the project had not been flowing 
in. I found this to be odd, since the project is backed by credible funding partners, and 
the investment agreement (partial details of which have been made public), shows 
that enough funds were secured and locked-in for construction of the resettlement 
buildings and rent payments, in January 2018 (Construction Week Online, 2018). 
Meanwhile, industry insiders had been talking about Omkar’s bleak financial 
situation. Rajesh Shah, my friend from architecture school, who liaises between 
developers and the Slum Redevelopment Authority (SRA), claimed, “Omkar is no 
more.” When pressed further, Rajesh reveals that the firm is reeling under the 
pressure of tremendous debt. According to him, the firm has been effectively taken 
over by Piramal Realty – to whom Omkar owes close to £1 billion. Other industry 
experts, like Manoj Gupta, whose job involves monitoring the performance of 
developers, also seemed concerned about Omkar’s future. “It’s not a good sign,” Manoj 
responded when asked if the rumors were true. “Omkar is treading on thin ice at the 
moment… They are over-leveraged,” he said. While news of Omkar folding has not 




surfaced in media reports, Omkar’s delay in executing multiple projects besides Dhobi 
Ghat is concerning, since the firm is regarded as the “master of slum redevelopment 
in Mumbai,” and currently ranks sixth in the city in terms of supply value (Samar 
Srivastava, 2012). 
Omkar, once considered to be a distinguished developer and deemed as the expert of 
slum land acquisition, seemed to be in a precarious position. Propped up by new 
sources of finance capital that became available after the liberalization of the real 
estate sector, on the basis of their projected expertise in negotiating with slum 
residents, the firm now not only struggled to service their debt but also to hold on to 
the trust of slum residents. What went wrong for Omkar, and how did their situation 
change so quickly? On digging further, I discovered that institutional financing of real 
estate development in India simultaneously constricts developers and exposes them 
to loopholes to take advantage of (i.e., act opportunistically), which imperils the 
establishment of institutional order. Therefore, while liberalization of the real estate 
sector empowered certain developers through increased dependence on institutional 
finance, it did not result in institutionalized financing practices or the establishment 
of stable market hierarchies. Developers, who specialize in slum redevelopment work 
like Omkar, were especially prone to circumventing debt obligations in order to 
overcome the uncertainties that come with the acquisition of slum land, even though 
financing for risky projects like slum redevelopment is most exacting.  As a result, and 
as I discuss in this chapter, developers who shot to prominence under the new regime 
of real estate finance became weakly fixed to their position in the market structure, 
in the not-so-long run.  
This chapter focuses on the institutional conditions governing real estate financing, 
the inclination of developers to oblige with the conditions posed on them, and the 
practices adopted by developers to grapple with the realities of problematic 
commodification of land. The chapter comprises of three empirical sections. The first 
section examines and highlights the contentiousness and power struggles between 
developers and financiers, owing to their distinct and irreplaceable positions in the 




market structure. The second section demonstrates that the rules of land 
development are not easy to enforce, given land’s stickiness in the Mumbai context. 
The final section demonstrates how developers must rely on precarious financial 
arrangements and resort to devious practices in order to sustain the pace and 
promise of delivering commodified land.  
2.  REGULATING REAL ESTATE FINANCE IN INDIA 
The liberalization opened Mumbai’s real estate sector to new sources of finance 
capital from abroad and within the country and made financial investors important 
new actors. However, access to finance continues to be cumbersome for most 
developers in the city. This is because, and as I show in this chapter, the institutions 
that govern financial investments and lending towards real estate, simultaneously 
hinder and aid the deployment of finance capital for land development.  In fact, 
several regulations relating to development finance are in direct contradiction to the 
pro-growth/ open market agenda that liberalization is associated with. The reason 
being, regulations concerning development finance in India are, more often than not, 
geared towards the prevention of land commodification and mitigation of economic 
risks, rather than promoting the production of new real estate and housing. Below, I 
examine the most significant policies that govern real estate financing in India, before 
turning towards their impact on the organization of the urban land market. 
 Finance for Land Acquisition 
Of all the regulations that influence how developers finance their projects, land 
financing is most significant. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has always maintained 
that private developers shall not avail, in part or full, bank finance for the purchase of 
land for real estate development. In a policy that was first introduced in 1979, that is 
when socialism shaped the principal economic and social policies of the Indian 
government, the RBI acknowledged that commercial bank credit had not been 
flowing to private developers in significant measure. It also acknowledged that 
developers play an important role in the field of housing. Nevertheless, strict controls 




were imposed on developer lending, such as “not less than 16% per annum rate of 
interest… for a maximum period up to 18 months” (RBI, 1988).  
Besides, the RBI recommended that credit should be extended only to builders of 
repute and employing professionally qualified personnel (even though as I have 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, significant volume of real estate development in Mumbai, 
if not India, is carried out by developers with little experience and/or repute). In 
subsequent policies, The RBI emphasized its position in regard to land speculation. In 
a policy dated 1988, the regulatory body notes: 
It should be ensured through close monitoring that no part of such funds is used 
for any speculation in land. Care should also be taken to see that prices charged 
from the ultimate beneficiaries do not include any speculative element, that is, they 
should be based only on the documented price of land, the actual cost of 
construction and a reasonable profit margin (RBI, 1988, 4.III.(iv)).  
Subsequent circulars released after the liberalization of the real estate sector in 2005, 
define the restrictions of lending to private developers in clearer language. In one 
such recent circular dated July 2015, the RBI notes. 
In view of the need to increase the availability of land and house sites for increasing 
the housing stock in the country, banks may extend finance to public agencies and 
not private builders for acquisition and development of land.... Banks, however, are 
not permitted to extend fund based or non-fund based facilities to private builders 
for acquisition of land even when part of a housing project (RBI, 2015, 2(C)(i)). 
As of 2019, the above restrictions still hold despite repeated calls by developers, as 
well as, commercial bankers to relax the lending norms for land acquisition. 
Developers claim that the RBI’s policy is contradictory to the State and Central 
Government’s housing agenda, which requires increased participation by private 
developers. Developers also claim that the policy is oblivious to ground realities of 




development finance. Hussain Kadri, a Mumbai-based developer, who relies on 
informal sources of funding for his business, expressed his frustration to me45. 
We mainly need finance for land acquisition. Banks only provide financing to cover 
construction costs, but this is useless because developers do not need financing for 
construction... We can raise this money through customer finance [i.e., pre-sales]. 
It is the land cost that developers struggle with
46
. 
Hussain’s concern is shared and acknowledged by bankers too. In his annual 
statement to shareholders in 2015, Deepak Parekh, chairman of Housing 
Development Finance Corp. Ltd (HDFC), India’s largest and oldest mortgage lender 
noted: 
The regulators [have] prohibited banks and HFCs [Housing Finance Companies] 
from funding land transactions. Such actions may be justifiable when there are 
fears of asset price bubbles. Over two years ago, the regulators reduced risk 
weights on exposures to commercial real estate and residential housing. This 
signaled that there were no fears of any speculative bubble. Then logically, the 
regulators now need to relax this age-old restriction (Rebello, 2015). 
Parekh went on to suggest that regulators should either allow banks and HFCs to fund 
all land transactions within pre-specified limits or allow full funding for land 
purchases meant only for residential purposes. According to Parekh, this is a simple, 
doable solution, and will bring residential prices down, increase the stock of 
affordable housing and fulfill the aspirations of more Indians becoming homeowners 
(ibid). Parekh added that the high costs developers incur while borrowing for 
purchasing land is the key reason for housing being unaffordable in India. He further 
noted that at the initial stage, it is the private equity players, the non-banking finance 
                                                        
45 Hussain’s skepticism to formal finance is partly a reflection of the financial exclusion of Indian 
Muslims. A report on the Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community by the 
Government of India (2006) highlights the extent of financial exclusion among Indian Muslims. On 
average, the amount outstanding per account for Muslims is about half that of other minorities, and 
one third of non-minority borrowers. 
46 Cost of land generally constitutes 30 to 50 percent of a project’s sale price in Mumbai. In comparison, 
construction cost is in the range of 8 to 10 percent. Even in case of slum redevelopment, which has a 
relatively low cost of land acquisition, the total upfront cost that developers have to incur to clear the 
land, runs up to 25- 30 percent of total sale value of the project.  




companies, and informal private lenders that fund developers to acquire land at 
prohibitive costs, ranging between 18-24% per annum
47
. It is only at the construction 
stage and after requisite approvals are obtained that banks and HFCs are allowed to 
fund projects, by which time, developers are already saddled with high-cost debt to 
service.  
Private Equity investors, who benefit from the current policy, present a different 
picture. Sunil Mhatre, managing director at a Mumbai-based equity firm, mentioned 
to me, that the risk associated with investments during land aggregation and approval 
stages justify higher rates charged by PE firms. According to Mhatre, it takes 
developers a lot of time to obtain approvals after buying land, and if they take a bank 
loan at this stage, developers would find it difficult to service interest costs. S 
Srinivasan, chief executive at Kotak Realty Fund, on the other hand, believes that 
irrespective of whether it is banks, PE firms or Non-Banking Finance Companies 
(NBFCs) lending capital to developers, the risk of extending loans at the land 
acquisition stage is extremely high because of title risk and the risk of not getting 
plans and permissions in time for the project to generate cash flows (R. Kamath, 
2016b). 
Officials of the RBI meanwhile, maintain that bank lending for land purchase will lead 
to increased speculation, and thereby inflation of real estate prices. Such a view is in 
direct contradiction to Parekh’s claim that easier access to finance for land acquisition 
would bring down overall project cost, and therefore decrease housing prices. When 
questioned about the RBI’s policies being at odds with the Government’s housing 
agenda, Sudhakar Rao, a senior policymaker at the RBI retorted:  
If the Government wants to address the housing problem, they should use their 
own resources for that. Why should banks risk depositor’s money? Banks are 
answerable to their investors, just like any commercial enterprise. Banks are not 
                                                        
47 Normally, banks lend to developers at 13-15 per cent, PE firms at 20-26 per cent and non-banking 
finance companies (NBFCs) at 16-18 per cent. 
 




aid agencies... Real estate, all said and done, is a very risky business, and it is the 
role of the regulator to protect banks from excessive risk. 
The regulations governing the financing of land purchase is therefore caught between 
diverging interests and conflicting ideological beliefs over free markets and 
commodification of land. As things stand, developers in India cannot access bank 
finance for buying land, and must necessarily look for alternate, more expensive 
means to do so. However, since banks are keen to lend and developers keen to borrow 
(from banks), it is not uncommon for bank funds to be used for covering part of the 
land cost, through devious practices that I discuss in subsequent sections of this 
chapter.  
 The Exposure Limit for Real Estate 
In addition to restricting the use of bank finance in real estate development, the RBI 
also monitors the banking industry’s exposure to real estate, to mitigate risks to the 
banking sector. The regulatory body, in a circular dated 2006, advised banks to frame 
comprehensive prudential norms to set in place ceilings on: the total amount of real 
estate loans; single/group exposure limits for such loans; margins and security; 
repayment schedule; and availability of supplementary finance (RBI, 2006, 4.1.1).  
While the RBI does not specify what the exposure limit for real estate needs to be, the 
norm among most commercial banks is to cap their exposure to real estate at 5% of 
total credit. Similarly, most banks restrict their exposure to a single borrower at 10-
12% of total capital, with the limit being even lower in the case of real estate 
developers. An outcome of these restrictions is that bank lending to the sector has 
seen little growth, despite the sharp increase in real estate activity. Real estate 
experts claim it is because of these restrictions that bank finance contributes less than 
5% of total debt in the industry. As a result, the majority of development financing is 
served either through PE, or NBFC channels, or what is commonly known as shadow 
banking. NBFCs, however, in turn, rely on banks (among other sources) for finance 
capital, and therefore, financing through shadow banks is a roundabout route for 




developers to access bank funds, in lieu of the regulatory controls set by the RBI 
(Table 12). 
Table 12: Comparison of Commercial Real Estate, Retail and Industry credit in proportion to gross Non-
Food Credit (RBI, 2019) 
Sector 2007-08 2010-11 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 















Trade to NFC 5.62% 5.05% 5.89% 6.09% 5.82% 6.03% 6.07% 
Commercial 
Real Estate to 
NFC 
2.87% 2.65% 2.77% 2.77% 2.71% 2.61% 2.42% 
Accepting this to be a concern, the RBI has repeatedly warned of the regulatory gaps 
in the area of bank and NBFC operations in creating the possibility of regulatory 
arbitrage and hence giving rise to a potential systemic risk (Sinha, 2013).  
The RBI's concerns and the overlap in regulatory controls came to light when 
Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services (IL&FS), India’s largest infrastructure 
finance company, started defaulting on bank loans in 2018. When news of IL&FS’ 
crisis first broke in October 2018, it sparked panic among lenders and regulators alike, 
as the company had a total debt of about INR 91,000 crore, of which, nearly INR 
60,000 crore (or 66%) of debt was at the project level, including road, power and 
water projects. Although IL&FS does not have a large exposure to real estate per se, a 
major reason behind its troubles, according to industry experts, is complications in 
land acquisition, and cost escalation due to project delays (Shruti Srivastava, 2019) 
According to news reports, the 2013 land acquisition law, which increased the 
minimum compensation to landowners, and provided landowners more power to 
question the law of eminent domain, made many of IL&FS’s projects unviable 
(Karthik, 2019). In an immediate response to the crisis, Indian banks put a plug on 
NBFC lending, which reopened the debate over the banking sector’s role in promoting 




urban development and economic growth. Subhash Chandra Garg, Economic Affairs 
Secretary, Government of India, in a media interview following the IL&FS crisis, said:  
The Reserve Bank of India should provide more liquidity to non-banking finance 
companies in a bid to boost lending.... This situation still requires support of 
liquidity, and we need to continue to help manage the economy in such a way that 
they do get enough liquidity for at least their normal growth if not the 
extraordinary growth they were having.... I hope we should be able to ensure this 
working with the RBI (Sikarwar & Pandey, 2018). 
The government and the RBI were subsequently caught in a public clash, with the RBI 
accusing the government of meddling with its operations. Viral Acharya, deputy 
governor of the RBI, in response, warned:  
The governments that did not respect their central bank's independence would 
sooner or later incur the wrath of financial markets, ignite economic fire, and come 
to rue the day they undermined the regulatory institution (Financial Express, 
2018).   
The IL&FS crisis reveals the precarity of development finance in India, under which 
real estate actors operate. Despite being outside the regulatory purview of the RBI, 
shadow banking is affected by RBI’s prudential norms for real estate lending.  So long 
as land development and land acquisition are considered as high risk by regulators, 
bank lending to the sector, whether through direct or indirect means, will be tightly 
controlled (provided RBI’s autonomy remains uncompromised). More importantly, 
crises like these highlight the discord between different government agencies 
regarding risk-management and urban development, which inadvertently hinders 
the seamless production of new real estate.  
 FDI in Real Estate  
As discussed in previous chapters, since 2005, FDI restrictions in India have been 
eased through a series of ongoing policy changes. Per the latest amendment (in effect 
since 2018), up to 100% FDI in real estate development is permitted under the 
automatic route, i.e., without requiring any government consent (DIPP, 2017). 
Relaxation of FDI norms in real estate is significant because the infusion of foreign 
funds into the sector through alternate means, such as External Commercial 




Borrowings (ECBs) and Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs), is presently 
banned in India. FDI is, therefore, an important channel for attracting the much 
sought after equity into real estate development since debt is costly, especially when 
borrowed at the pre-land acquisition stage. However, despite the continued easing of 
FDI regulations over the last decade or so, several critical restrictions still hold, which 
suggests that India’s legacy of economic conservatism has not been wholly and 
seamlessly replaced by liberalization. Several clauses relating to FDI in real estate 
create onerous conditions that make the real estate sector less open to foreign 
investments than it is generally perceived to be.  
The prohibition on acquisition and transfer of immovable property by foreigners is 
one such example. The Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) of 2000 states that 
foreign nationals (except persons of Indian origin) shall not buy or sell land or 
property in India under no circumstance, barring few cases like setting up industry 
or business (RBI, 2000). The restriction means that India’s real estate market is closed 
to the outside world for all effective purposes. More importantly, the trade of land 
and real estate is restricted to domestic buyers only, and hence FDI investors can 
invest money in real estate development, but cannot claim ownership of land/ real 
estate produced. This conceivably poses a risk to foreign financiers when investing in 
Indian land development projects.  
Another such restriction, which discourages FDI participation, is the prohibition on 
foreign investments in the real estate business. The consolidated FDI policy issued by 
the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, states that FDI is not permitted 
in “real estate business,” which as per the circular is “the business of dealing in land 
and immovable property with a view of earning profit or earning income there from” 
(DIPP, 2017, p. 33). FDI investors, as a result, cannot invest in an Indian development 
firm, and may only invest in a development project. The logic behind such a policy is 
that FDI investors shall not directly profit from land speculation the way real estate 
developers do, and shall only seek financial returns from investment in productive 




(i.e., non-speculative) activities like building construction, or infrastructure 
development.  
Repatriation of invested capital is, therefore, just as cumbersome as putting money 
into land development. India’s FDI policy states that foreign investments cannot be 
repatriated before a period of three years. In fact, until 2018, the exit conditions were 
tighter, with exits being conditional to not only a lock-in period of three years but also 
the project’s completion, again, in order to curb land speculation. The latter 
restriction was, however, lifted in the 2018 amendment. While the new policy makes 
it relatively easier for investors to make an early exit, in reality, exits continue to be 
difficult, particularly in case of residential developments. This is because public issue 
of equity through Real Estate Investment Trust (REITs), an investment route that 
allows investors to divest their stakes, is not allowed under Indian laws (CRISIL, 
2019).  
In summary, despite wanting to open up the real estate industry to foreign 
investments, India’s FDI policy continues to be restrictive and conservative in regard 
to land ownership and land speculation. While foreign investors are allowed to invest 
and profit from land development, they have little protection against exploitation by 
local developers and land brokers, since title rights and stakes in local firms are not 
transferrable to foreigners. Moreover, under the current policy, the repatriation of 
invested capital is conditional too. This explains why the investment frenzy that 
immediately followed the relaxation of FDI rules died down very quickly, bringing FDI 
activity in real estate to a complete standstill.  
The stringent conditions on bank lending and FDI in real estate have meant that 
Indian developers have had limited access to affordable debt and flexible investments, 
despite changes in India’s economic policies. Although a significant amount of finance 
capital has entered the sector since liberalization (as reported in Chapter 3), the 
terms and cost of these investments are expensive for developers across the board. 
As a result, much of the available finance is unattractive, particularly for developers 
who are well versed in the risks of external borrowing in real estate development. 




The rush of expensive finance capital instead bolstered those developers who were 
least inclined to service debt obligations, precisely because of the loopholes in FDI 
rules. In the next section, I examine the nature of contention between developers and 
lenders/ investors, in lieu of the borrowing conditions imposed on land development.  
3.  CONTENTIOUSNESS AND POWER STRUGGLES 
India’s real estate industry is reported to have faced it’s biggest ever slowdown in the 
financial year 2017-2018, with new project launches declining 91% from the 
previous year, and stalling’ rates at an all-time-high (Kwatra, 2018) 48 . Local media 
and industry experts attributed the crisis to the three monumental policy/economic 
changes implemented in the country that year in quick succession: Demonitisation 
(the recalling of high denomination currency), RERA (introduction of the real estate 
regulatory bill), and GST (consolidation of the Indian tax structure into a single 
regime). It was during this period of crisis, which caused panic among investors and 
financiers, that I conducted much of my research for this chapter. Vasudev Krishnan, 
Director of a Mumbai-based Housing Finance Company that I had previously worked 
at, was my first point of contact in the finance industry. When I met with Vasu in 
September 2018 to discuss my thesis, he was perturbed about one particular 
developer his firm had lent to. Our conversation started off with a discussion about 
the case. Excerpts from this conversation, below: 
Vasu: This guy (referring to the developer) has not been paying his EMIs on time. 
The project is stalled because sales are slow, which I understand… but I hear the 
bugger bought three BMWs, one for each brother, using the money we disbursed 
for construction 
Anitra: Are you going to take punitive action?  
Vasu: No, I have to handle this delicately, or else he’s going to hang the project 
around my neck and wash his hands off. If he can't sell his own project, we as a 
lender definitely cannot either 
                                                        
48 Stalling rate is the value of stalled projects as a percentage of all projects under implementation. As 
of Q3 17-18, an estimated INR 2.5 trillion was stuck in stalled projects across India.  




Anitra: So why do you think he didn’t take the binding contract seriously? 
Vasu: You know; contracts are least enforceable with these mid-sized developers. 
The big guys obviously are conscious of their reputation and have a board that 
keeps them in check. The small guys on the other hand, who borrow from the 
underworld and politicians, cannot even think of swindling because their heads 
are on the line 
Anitra: So, what are you going to do now? 
Vasu: I’ll have to sit down with him and find a solution that works for both of us 
Through the course of this conversation, I realized that developers who I have 
classified as Group 3, are an interesting case to study, not just because they attracted 
majority real estate funding in the post-liberalization era, but also because they 
present an interesting paradox. While these developers are most indebted compared 
to other groups, and thereby necessarily locked into an obligatory position with 
financial institutions, they appear to be least inclined to oblige with the rules of 
borrowing. This is because, a defining feature of Group 3 developers, aside from their 
position in the market structure, is that many of them specialize in large-scale urban 
redevelopment 49. These could be projects as complex as slum redevelopment, which 
entails tedious negotiations with slum residents, or industrial redevelopments, which 
requires a series of approvals from various government agencies for land-use 
conversion in addition to getting consent from labor unions.  
From the data made available to me by PropConsulting, I found that among the top 
five developers in Group 3, 30% of their combined on-going projects accounted for 
redevelopment50. Similarly, among five randomly selected developers from the group 
                                                        
49 The mass sale of mill lands by the National Textile Commission in 2005, key changes to SRA policies 
in 2004 (coinciding with the first ever attempt to redevelop Dharavi), and the sudden increase in 
property prices are just some of the reasons behind the growth in redevelopment projects. Evidently, 
the new breed of entrepreneurial developers (Group 3) who emerged during this time, without the 
land banks that their predecessors (aka the dominant firms) had, found redevelopment work to be 
their ticket to success.  
50 Here, I consider projects to be redevelopment projects only when they are officially classified as 
such for the purpose of FAR calculation (since redevelopment projects qualify for higher FAR 
compared to other development projects). The three main redevelopment project types include: Slum 
Redevelopment, Industrial to Residential (I toR) redevelopment, and Society Redevelopment (large 
scale tabula rasa redevelopment of old residential clusters).  




(excluding the top 5), 21% of their total on-going projects constituted 
redevelopments. In comparison, the same percentages were at 11% and 3% for the 
top five developers in Group 2 and 4, respectively. These figures suggest that Group 
3 developers are poised as specialists in acquiring land and seeking approvals for land 
development, in a context where land is not readily available for development and 
sale. In a water-locked city like Mumbai, this work of converting un-tradable land into 
a tradable commodity is worth, as one of my developer participants put it, “more than 
what money is worth.” I argue that it is this idea that the work developers do 
(particularly in case of redevelopment projects) is highly valuable- possibly more 
than the value added by financial actors-, which dilutes shared beliefs in the 
hegemony of finance among developers and financiers alike. Support for this idea lies 
in the following claims made by my participants while discussing developer-financier 
conflicts: 
Financial actors cannot lead development projects 
While attempts have been made in the past by financial firms to develop land 
themselves, these attempts were largely unsuccessful. Citing the example of 
investment firms such as Heinz, TCG, Vernada, and IDO, that had ventured 
unsuccessfully into real estate development in India, the real estate experts 
unequivocally agree that that the model of financier-led development has not worked 
in India thus far. According to equity investors, the landscape of real estate 
development in India is such that reliance on local developers is unavoidable, not only 
because of ease of operations but also for protective measures. Financiers claim that 
in order to develop land in India, political patronage is a must, because of the 
discretionary powers held by politicians and government officials in determining 
land-use and development rights. In addition, the cash-component, colloquially 
termed as “black money,” in land transactions is generally very high – constituting 
anywhere between 30-50% of the land cost (Kumar, 2017; Searle, 2014, p. 69). 
Financiers, therefore, rely on developers to either convert “white” money to “black,” 
or infuse the project with cash from other sources, to be able to pay off bribes and 
purchase land. However, both activities: paying of bribes and dealing with 




unaccounted money are lethal for a financial firm (more so than for a developer), as 
it would be a blatant violation of the foreign corrupt practices act (FCPA). Financiers, 
therefore, prefer to be distantly involved with land acquisition and approvals, which 
means unwittingly handing over the reins to the developer. Developers, however, 
present a different perspective. According to Rustom Khambatta, CEO of a leading 
Group 3 development firm, it would be foolish for a financier to not let the developer 
lead. “If a developer does not have any skin in the game, he is going to steal for sure,” 
says Khambatta, adding that, “it is better to have the developer take ownership and 
stay interested than to isolate him because in any case, it is the developer who holds 
the keys to the treasury.”  Both perspectives point to the shared understanding among 
real estate actors that financiers cannot lead development projects in India. 
Developers are irreplaceable 
Partnerships between financiers and developers can, in theory, be terminated during 
the course of a development project, as per standard investment agreements51. The 
replacement of a developer or the exit of an investor is all the more easier on paper 
when a project is structured as a Special Purpose Entity, which many large scale 
projects in India these days are
52
. However, in reality, developer-financier divorces 
are drawn-out procedures that are far more expensive for the financier than it is for 
the developer. Rohit Khatter, a senior executive at a development firm that specializes 
in the redevelopment of old building clusters, attributes the difficulty in replacement 
of developers, to social relations. According to Rohit, developers establish bonds with 
landowners, residents, union leaders, municipal officials, and anyone else involved in 
the exchange of land. “These bonds cannot be transferred,” says Rohit, adding that, 
“slum residents, or a landowner (in case of Joint Venture developments) won’t accept 
                                                        
51 Exceptions include slum redevelopments- wherein the rules set by SRA calls for a re-election of the 
developer by slum residents. 
52  A special-purpose entity (SPE) is a legal entity created to fulfill narrow, specific or temporary 
objectives. SPEs are typically used by companies to isolate themselves from financial and legal risk. In 
case of real estate, developers and financiers both benefit from structuring projects as SPEs, as both 
parties are typically engaged in multiple projects with different partners.  




a new developer just like that.” Rohit claims that replacing a developer would cost the 
project at least a couple of years of delay, and hence it is wiser for a financier to just 
reconcile any differences with the developer and finish the project somehow. 
Arbitration lawyer Manish Vora, whose client list includes Piramal Capital, largely 
agrees with this sentiment, noting that, “when a financier pursues a case until the very 
end, it is generally about ego and not money.” Bankers and creditors, on the other 
hand, have slightly different concerns. Taking legal action against a defaulting 
developer would require the credit-issuing firm to report the default in their books, 
what, according to Vasu, most firms would like to avoid as much as possible to keep 
their non-performing loan rate low53. As a consequence, defaulting behavior is more 




Developers ought to receive higher returns on their investment than financiers 
Recent delays in project execution, slow sales, and plateauing property prices in 
Mumbai have exacerbated the debt load on developers, and under these conditions, 
financial actors imaginably eat into the developer’s profit. However, the reversal of 
profit distribution between developers and financiers, I found, does not reflect the 
return expectations of actors at the time of negotiating a deal or assessing the viability 
of a project. Manoj Gupta (Director, PropConsulting), who serves as an advisor to 
developers, investors as well as lenders, tells me that when a developer comes to him 
with a potential project for feasibility advice, they seek a minimum return of 30%. 
According to Manoj, “30-33% is what a developer is settling for, in today’s market 
                                                        
53 A non-performing loan (NPL) is a loan that is in default or close to being in default. Generally, loans 
become non-performing after being in default for 90 days. 
54  Since banks are required to increase their capital commitment in case of NPLs, in addition to 
showing reduced deposits, banks have an incentive to under-report NPLs.  According to my informants, 
there are various ways in which banks do this. The most obvious and traceable practice involves 
issuing a fresh loan to the defaulting borrower, for payment of the outstanding loan. Alternately, banks 
may re-value the underlying asset (land in case of real estate projects) with the intention of inflating 
asset value, so as to tweak the conditions of repayment. A third way, which is most difficult for 
regulators to detect, is round-tripping of loans. This refers to a series of transactions between 
companies that bolster the revenue of the companies involved but that, in the end, don't provide real 
economic benefit to either company. 




condition.... Traditionally, their expectations have been much higher – nothing below 
40%”. Manoj further noted that during the real estate boom in 2005, developers 
sought over 50% return, and some of them did actually earn something close to that. 
Investors, on the other hand, have significantly lower return expectations. According 
to Manoj, “Equity investors today would be satisfied with a return promise of 18-
19%.... The expectations are even lower in case of mezzanine structures, wherein 
there is a minimum guarantee of around 12%. In such cases, even a 14-15% return is 
considered good”.  Much like developers, financiers also have had to lower their 
expectations over the last decade. “When FDI investors were bringing in pure equity 
to the sector back in the day (referring to the period between 2005-2011), they used 
to ask for 23-25% ROI”, says Manoj. When questioned about the consistent disparity 
in return expectations of developers and investors, most developers pointed out that 
their risk and contribution to a project is very different compared to an investor. 
“Developers do not have any downside protection, which investors these days do,” 
noted one developer, adding that, “our return is based on the sweat equity we put in, 
in addition to our financial investment.” Financial actors share the opinion. “It is only 
fair that developers earn more returns because they are taking on the founder’s risk, 
which is far greater” responded one investor, adding that, “We [investors] ensure that 
our exposure is better protected by claiming first rights over the revenue generated.... 
The developer’s return comes out of the surplus, this automatically increases the 
developer’s risk”. Both developers and financiers, therefore, are in consensus about 
developers seeking higher profits from land development, even though actuality, it is 
the opposite that is realized during times of crisis.  
Power struggles and contestations between developers and financial actors may not 
be as visible or confrontational as conflicts that get played out in public, between 
landowners and developers. Nevertheless, the developer-financier relationship is 
less than stable, and the two parties are perpetually prone to disagreement because 
of struggles over profit distribution on the one hand, and local embeddedness of the 
developer, on the other. The shifting socio-political-economic planes within which 
real estate is produced, and the distinctiveness of each development project, means 




that the agreements between developers and financiers cannot be normative, but 
instead must be continually re-assed and negotiated, an exercise which is inevitably 
prone to conflict. Besides, for developers and financiers to move forward on an 
agreement, it is necessary for both parties to abide by the formal rules of borrowing.  
In the next section, however, I discuss how, no matter how tightly formulated these 
rules are, developers nevertheless look to the gaps that get produced as an inevitable 
consequence of land commodification to navigate the contentious landscape of real 
estate financing.  
4.  RULES OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 
Despite the matched fight for power, formal agreements that make an exchange of 
funds between developer and investor/lender legally binding, are, according to 
developers, always one-sided and in favor of financial actors. Developers claim they 
have little bargaining power at the time of negotiation, and up until the funds are 
released. In order to understand why this is so, and to delve into the perspective of 
developers on the issue, I met with Rustam Khambatta, CEO of Khambatta Developers, 
which I consider a typical example of a Group 3 developer. Khambatta, who has been 
successful in attracting investments from the largest funding sources in India, used 
the idiom, “He who pays the piper calls the tune,” to explain his position as a borrower 
to me. “Why would you sign an agreement that doesn’t suit your interests?” I asked in 
response, expecting an admission of the lack of funding options real estate developers 
have in India. Khambatta, however, looked at me with a gleam in his eyes and said, 
“My power lies in what’s not written in the contract.”  
On being pressed to elaborate further, Khambatta confessed that no matter how 
stringent and extractive financing contracts are, they have their limitations in the 
market for land. Khambatta went on to cite instances of the past wherein financiers 
have struggled to exercise close control over developer (mal)practices, despite legal 
stipulations. During the course of our conversation, I noticed that even though talks 
of transgression are commonplace if not fashionable in Mumbai’s real estate industry, 




Khambatta’s confession was actually a mere statement of fact, an unavoidable reality. 
Formal contracts, no matter how scrupulous, cannot but avoid the physical and social 
specificities of land. Khambatta’s little quip nevertheless explains why there is no 
coordination failure at the time of negotiation. However, his lax attitude gives 
financiers and their lawyers more room to tighten the noose, albeit on paper. 
Evidently, these contracts are even more exacting in the case of non-reputable 
developers who fall outside the lending norms of banks, and who rely on alternate, 
expensive means of financing for their projects.  
The standard covenants in debt and investment agreements for development finance 
have evolved over the last decade owing to critical changes in government regulations, 
particularly the introduction of the Real Estate Regulatory Act, which seeks to protect 
home-buyers, and boosts investments in the real estate industry. The Act, which was 
passed by the Indian Parliament in March 2016, establishes a Real Estate Regulatory 
Authority (RERA) in each state for regulation of the sector and acting as an 
adjudicating body for speedy dispute resolution. The introduction of RERA was seen 
by many as recognition of the problems plaguing India’s real estate industry, by the 
central government (S. Jain & Madan, 2017; Zia, 2019). Designed primarily to monitor 
the actions of real estate developers, RERA is expected to bring the much-needed 
structure, transparency, and accountability to the real estate sector, post the decline 
in FDI flows in India (FICCI & Grant Thornton, 2016). Referring to RERA as a 
watershed moment for Indian real estate development, Ashul Jain, MD Cushman & 
Wakefield, noted in an op-ed piece:  
Just as the Securities and Exchange Board of India [established in 1988] cleaned 
up an unregulated public market space, ending decades of malpractices, 
misrepresentation, and misuse of public money and restored investor faith in the 
functioning of the stock markets, RERA will inspire trust through its provisions and 
punitive actions (A. Jain, 2017). 
Changes in the regulation of real estate practices have been accompanied by new 
kinds of financial instruments that are geared to mitigate the risks of developer 
default. Most significant of these new instruments is Mezzanine debt, which is what 




most developers relying on formal, non-banking channels, utilize for their projects. 
Mezzanine debt is a hybrid between debt and equity, which gives a lender the right to 
convert to an equity interest in the development firm (or SPE) in case of default. The 
rules of financial exchange, according to my informants, are continually evolving and 
adopting stringent measures to curb developer opportunism. But as is common in 
financial crimes all over the world, new tactics are constantly being discovered by 
those wanting to evade regulatory controls. In the Indian real estate sector, recent 
modifications to financing rules that have affected developers’ operations include 
rules relating to funds disbursals, project risks, and repayment of dues.  
Until not too long ago, financial firms would disburse funds directly into the bank 
accounts of developers in a lump sum. In recent times, this has changed, and 
disbursals are now closely controlled and monitored by the financing agency, in order 
to prevent misuse of funds. While I could not access a working contract issued to a 
developer, lawyers that I met with, in connection to this chapter, guided me through 
the covenants of a standard financing contract. According to my lawyer participants, 
as per revised contracts, disbursals are linked to development schedules and are 
directly credited into the accounts of vendors or service providers (such as cement 
supplier, labor contractor, etc.), rather than the developer. While the new method, 
according to lawyers and financiers, ensures greater transparency and accountability, 
developers argue that such strict control on disbursals is not only inefficient for the 
development process, which requires developers to have cash available at hand at all 
points but also displaces the developer from the driver’s seat.   
Similarly, in the early days of liberalization, when pure equity was available to 
developers, project risks like delays in getting planning permissions or land 
acquisition, and slow sales due to cost escalation, would be shared by the investor, by 
virtue of being a development partner in the project. In case of debt, if a project faced 
temporary hurdles or setbacks, banks would refinance loans, and if the situation got 
worse, the project would be dissolved, in order for banks to recover perhaps not all, 
but some part of the outstanding loan, just as in the case of any other entrepreneurial 




venture. In both instances, the developer was rarely held accountable for any 
mismanagement of time and cost, in part, because escalation in real estate/ land 
prices have always shielded developers from time and cost overruns. However, under 
the mezzanine debt structure, investors are better protected. At the slightest 
deviation from the envisioned development schedule, debt converts to equity, and the 
developer loses control of the project. Therefore, as regimes of financing become 
stronger, developers face the imminent threat of being replaced from projects, should 
its economic performance not match the pre-set expectations.  
Another major shift in rules of financing pertains to the modes of repayment.  In 
earlier agreements, investors, as well as lenders (i.e., banks), would have first rights 
over any incoming cash generated through the sale of property in a development 
project. As part of this arrangement, customer payments would be deposited into an 
escrow account, from which a fixed percentage would directly go towards repayment 
of investment or debt. For instance, for every hundred pounds deposited, sixty would 
go back to the investor, and the remaining forty would be used for meeting 
construction cost. This cycle of repayment would continue until a watershed rate (for 
example, principal amount + 15% interest) is reached, only after which the developer 
gets to access the project’s earnings. However, financiers claim that many developers 
concealed actual earnings and circumvented the arrangement, by accepting part of 
the customer payment in cash (which also serves as a source of black money for the 
developer). In order to outdo the developer at this game, investors began pegging 
every registered sale to a fixed rate that is reviewed biannually. Therefore, for every 
sale registered, the developer would have to pay the investor a fixed amount, 
irrespective of the actual selling price of the property. This new mode of repayment 
impinges on the profit expectations of the developer, as delayed earnings decrease 
developers’ opportunity to gain from re-investment of earnings, besides putting a 
plug on the siphoning of funds.  
In summary, the rules of development finance appear to serve the interests of 
financiers, by providing them greater protection against developer default, despite 




the contentious power dynamics between developers and financiers. In fact, financing 
agreements have undergone critical changes in recent times to become all the more 
scrupulous, because of wider regulatory controls imposed by the central government 
on the one hand, and the bitter experiences of financiers, on the other. Developers 
nevertheless continue to forge, what they deem as one-sided agreements with 
financial actors, on the assumption that hurdles posed by the (problematic) 
commodification of land will provide them room to wrestle out of untoward 
obligations. In the next section, I draw on the example of Omkar developers and the 
Dhobi Ghat project, to show how developers navigate, or rather circumvent, the rules 
imposed on them, in their attempt to develop land, which exacerbates their 
relationship with financiers and adds to the precarity of financing arrangements.  
5.  REAL ESTATE FINANCE: IN PRACTICE 
The meteoric growth of Group 3 developers is indeed evidence of the remarkable 
effect finance capital has had on Mumbai’s real estate industry. The developers I refer 
to have been able to increase their supply, in both volume and value, and in a short 
span of time, by making use of the new sources of finance available to them. Omkar, 
for instance, is a great example of such production-oriented behavior. The firm was 
founded in 2003 by two friends: Babulal Varma and Kamal Kishore Gupta, who had 
no prior experience in real estate, but had, as quoted in the company’s website, “the 
zeal to redefine real estate in Mumbai” (Omkar, 2018). Verma and Gupta began their 
real estate career with small residential redevelopments in the outskirts of Mumbai 
and quickly graduated to very large-scale slum redevelopments in the most expensive 
neighborhoods in Mumbai. Within a span of ten years, Omkar’s real estate supply 
volume grew 300 times (personal interview). This rapid growth was only possible 
because of the institutional funding that backed most of their projects. In fact, Omkar 
was one of the first few developers in India to secure PE funding for slum 
redevelopment work (Nandy, 2011). Until then, slum redevelopments were 
considered high risk, and beyond the purview of formal finance. 




Omkar is not the only developer to utilize institutional finance for boosting slum 
redevelopment activity. Other developers who also specialize in slum redevelopment 
work, like Transcon and Radius, share a similar growth story (Babar, 2017b; R. 
Kamath, 2016a). During Mumbai’s construction boom of 2012-15, these developers 
and their ability to draw funding made regular headlines. Sanjay Chhabria from MD. 
Radius Developers was recognized as “Mumbai realty's go-to man,” by the Business 
Standard Newspaper (R. Kamath, 2016a). The same news article commended the 
two-year-old firm for developing 12.5 million square feet of real estate in Mumbai; a 
fourth of what DLF, the country's largest realtor, was developing at the time. However, 
such production-oriented behavior is unusual for Indian developers, especially one 
that specializes in slum redevelopment, since slum redevelopment work, as I have 
discussed previously, cannot be carried out through standardized practices, because 
of the specificities of each project. Rather, the acquisition of slum land requires the 
adoption of ad-hoc practices that do not guarantee success.  
Deconstruction of the practice of real estate financing, however, reveals the cracks 
underneath developer growth stories and demonstrates how real estate financing is 
far from being a linear, rule-bound practice that is production-oriented. In fact, the 
attempts to institutionalize land development by financial firms actually leads to 
further fragmentation and deviation of development goals, thereby exacerbating 
opportunistic behavior among developers. The rest of this section breaks down real 
estate financing practices to demonstrate just how precarious and unpredictable real 
estate production, or rather, the financial agreements backing real estate activities, 
actually is. I pieced together these details from the accounts of five developers (three 
of which were Group 3), six financiers, five real estate consultants, and three lawyers 
– all of whom I interviewed between May 2017 and January 2019. In order to support 
the accounts of my participants with substantive evidence, I refer back to the case of 
Piramal Mahalaxmi and the story of Omkar in particular.  




Borrowing for land development 
Cash outflow in a development project is linked to spending on land, approvals, and 
construction. Financial firms, therefore, base their disbursements on the above three 
costs. While the rules of the lending state that disbursements shall be made to the 
beneficiary’s account directly, in reality, this is difficult in case of land acquisition, 
particularly in case of redevelopment of inhabited lands wherein there are multiple 
(official and unofficial) claimants; and in case of approvals, wherein bribing is 
involved. Financiers, therefore, acknowledge that they need to be flexible in this 
regard, and hence land and approval costs are, in actuality, paid to the developer for 
further distribution. In the case of slum (and society) redevelopments, however, 
financiers do not disburse land cost until the land is fully cleared. That is, the 
developer is reimbursed for land cost only after all residents have vacated the site. 
However, land acquisition can take anywhere between 2-5 years (or longer), during 
which time land prices could change greatly. This poses the challenge of determining 
the reimbursement amount for land cost. Developers claim, irrespective of how much 
they actually spent on land acquisition (which is difficult to decipher in any case, since 
transactions are partly made in cash), financiers must pay them an amount equivalent 
to current land price, or what is known as “replacement cost” in real estate lingo 
because the money they receive would go towards the purchase of their next land 
parcel, as opposed to the reimbursement of costs already incurred. This combination 
of ambiguous land cost and non-transparent spending encourages developers to 
assume the role of a landowner (i.e., benefit from increased land valuation) whilst 
acting as a developer.  
Spending on construction costs, on the other hand, comes with a different set of 
challenges for a financier. The rules of financing state that funds for construction shall 
be released: as per construction progress and directly into the vendor's account. 
Financiers, however, do not have any say in the selection of the vendor, and in 
determining the pace of construction activity, both of which financiers agree, are best 
left to the developer to decide. Developers, therefore, make use of this loophole in the 
system to embezzle funds via kickbacks from their preferred vendor and juggle 




around construction materials across different projects based on the opportunity (i.e., 
arbitrage) they foresee. While most developers I talked to, refrained from 
commenting on embezzlement, few justified the practice of manipulating the 
distribution of construction resources across projects. Developers claim that it makes 
the most sense (for them) to direct resources to projects that are selling faster and 
stall construction of projects with low demand because that would increase their 
financial liquidity. The result of such a practice, however, is that developers become 
speculators and brokers of construction supplies, rather than producers of real estate.  
In the case of Piramal Mahalaxmi, Omkar received a total of £280 million + 40% profit 
share in exchange for land acquisition, project approvals, and construction of the 
resettlement buildings. As per calculations provided in Chapter 3, the project could 
earn anything between £463 million to £700 million, which means that Omkar would 
be paid something between £322 million to £344 million for carrying out the work 
expected of them. The known costs to be incurred by Omkar for this work include: 
payment of rent to residents, payment of the land cost to the BMC, standard approvals 
and development rights from SRA/BMC, and construction of new flats for 2,215 
households – all of which amounts to a total of approximately £45 million (calculation 
estimates below, Table 13). The balance amount of £277 to £299 million is, therefore, 
a mix of all the undocumented costs borne by Omkar, and the firm’s gross profit. The 
line between the two is, however, impossible to trace, for anyone but Omkar.  




Table 13: Cost break-up of development costs incurred by Omkar for Dhobi Ghat’s redevelopment (Author, 
2020) 






Includes scrutiny fees, building permits, FAR premiums, 
and other development charges 
4 crore 416,000 
Land Includes development of basic infrastructure & land cost 2.30 crore 240,790 
IOD deposit Deposit to be held by SRA until the project’s completion 715,267 7,470 
Maintenance Corpus fund for future maintenance of rehab building 9 crore 925,220 
Labor cess 
Contribution towards the welfare of construction 
workers 
3 crore 314,860 
Construction The building of 2,215 rehabilitation flats for residents 295 crore 30.8 million 
Rent 3-years worth of rent for displaced residents 119 crore 12.4 million 
Total cost   45 million 
Aside from the difficulty in determining actual project costs, a financier would also 
find it hard to monitor the final destination of project resources. In Omkar’s case, for 
instance, at the time of land acquisition and construction of the resettlement buildings 
for Piramal Mahalaxmi, Omkar had ten other projects under construction, and two 
other projects in the acquisition stage, all at varying levels of economic productivity 
(see Table 14). To ensure that funds remain project-bound, in such a case, is almost 
impossible, and that the developer would indulge in the diversion of funds, is 
inevitable.  
Having said that, there is no way for researchers like me to prove financial 
discrepancies. The use of Omkar as a case is to merely illustrate that while new 
sources of formal finance made it possible for developers operating in the risky 
business of slum redevelopment to increase their pace of production and land 
acquisition, it paradoxically opened new doors for developers to adopt practices 
outside of formal contracts, to service the increased in pace and scale of operations. 




Table 14: Omkar’s year-wise supply of units (Liases Foras, 2018) 
PROJECT builder group LOCATION Min Start Date Max End Date Sales Value 
Umiya Tower Omkar Realtors Mulund (E) Jan 08 Dec 11 1.73% 
Nirmal Kunj Omkar Realtors Nerul Apr 10 Feb 11 12.30% 
Omkar Roga Omkar Realtors Chembur (E) Jul 10 Dec 12 3.65% 
Omkar Vayu Omkar Realtors Mahim (W) Sep 11 Dec 16 1.47% 
1973 Omkar Omkar Realtors Worli Jan 12 Dec 19 0.76% 
Alta Monte Omkar Realtors Malad (E) Oct 12 Dec 21 1.04% 
Omkar Veda Omkar Realtors Parel Jun 11 Mar 16 1.04% 
Omkar Meridia Omkar Realtors Bandra (E) Jun 13 Apr 18 1.38% 
Omkar Ananta Omkar Realtors Goregaon (E) Mar 14 Dec 17 1.50% 
Kenspeckle Omkar Realtors Andheri (E) Oct 14 Dec 19 0.25% 
Omkar Vive Omkar Realtors Bandra (E) Feb 16 Dec 20 2.02% 
Omkar Signet Omkar Realtors Malad (E) May 17 Dec 20 3.94% 





Baner Aug 08 Oct 10 3.40% 
Crescent Bay L&T Realty Parel Jan 12 Dec 22 0.93% 
Piramal 
Mahalaxmi 
Piramal Realty Mahalaxmi Jan 18 Jun 25 3.44% 
  
Putting borrowed money to use 
One of the main risks for a financial firm when lending to, or investing in a land 
development project, is the diversion of funds by the developer. It is for this reason 
that over the past ten years, the rules of financing have gotten tighter to ensure that 
cash outflow and income in a project remains dedicated to the project. However, 
because developers normally rely on a combination of financing sources for a single 
project, and most real estate financing is debt-based, financiers admit to not being too 
vigilant about the flow of funds, so long as the developer is not defaulting on 




repayments. Developers, on the other hand, acknowledge that the practice of funds 
diversion is rather common, especially when sales are good. According to developers, 
the practice is at its peak when the market is doing well because that is when 
financiers have their guards down. Developers may, therefore, divert revenue earned 
from one project through customer advances, towards the purchase of new land 
parcels for future development (instead of using that money for project completion). 
Since financing provided by customers comes at zero cost, any increase in the value 
of the newly purchased land is pure profit for the developer. Although, with the 
recently introduced real estate regulatory act, RERA, customer payments are 
protected in an escrow account, developers are able to bypass the restricted access 
to customer payments by delaying official registration of the property sale and 
collecting a large amount of pre-payment in the form of cash. According to my 
participants, a developer may typically collect up to 25% of the sale price from 
customers within the first three months of booking, while registration of the sale may 
only take place after all approvals have been received, which could be as much later 
as four years, or more.   
When real estate sales are slow, and developers have access to thinner streams of 
income, their goal shifts from portfolio expansion to debt management. At such times, 
developers strive to service their debt obligations by typically replacing expensive 
debt (PE money, for instance), with less expensive debt (such as customer advances, 
or bank borrowing). Since developers usually have multiple on-going projects at any 
time – all at varying levels of economic productivity (as highlighted in Table 14) this 
practice also entails the diverting funds from one project to another to ensure that 
their overall earnings, or more accurately, their EBIDTA (Earnings Before Interest, 
Tax, Depreciation and Amortisation) stay healthy. While financial firms receiving the 
repayments should ideally flag this practice, financiers acknowledge that they rarely 
carry out the due diligence to ascertain whether the sources of repayments are fresh 
sales, further borrowing, or diverted funds from another project. Therefore, the 
practice of debt management by moving project resources around – though illegal – 
is commonly accepted by developers as well as financial actors. The logic behind this 




practice is, however, peculiar, notes Vasu (ex-chairman of a housing finance 
company). According to Vasu, most businesses operate on a reverse logic. That is, 
when the firm is cash-rich, they pare debt. Developers, on the other hand, behave 
abnormally by leveraging themselves further in good times and settling their debt 
when most-pressed for cash. Vasu observes that Indian developers behave this way 
because they have been traditionally deprived of funding, and hence their actions 
reflect what he calls a “scarcity mentality,” which compels them to prioritize resource 
administration over real estate production. 
I discovered this to be true for Omkar when I analyzed their sales records (made 
accessible to me by PropConsulting). A study of Omkar’s growth behavior till date 
shows a significant linear correlation (Pearson R= 0.92, p<0.05) between the firm’s 
sales and production (Figure 31). This means that Omkar’s production of new real 
estate coincided almost perfectly, in terms of timing, with their sale of produced real 
estate. In other words, the revenue earned from sales was invested almost instantly 
towards further production (note: there is no linear growth from year to year). 
However, a strong linear correlation between sales and production is peculiar for a 
real estate developer, especially one that is exclusively engaged in slum 
redevelopment work, which entails a long period of waiting for land acquisition. This 
is because the land would need to be procured at least four years before production 
begins, and since customer payments are generally staggered over time, the full 
earnings from a property sale would not be collected until at least a year after the sale 
is recorded. Given that financiers never lend or invest towards the acquisition of slum 
land at an advanced stage, and that developers rarely invest their own funds in 
development projects, it is highly possible that Omkar utilized funds reserved for the 
completion of an on-going project, for the acquisition of future ones.  





Figure 31: Correlation of Omkar’s total supply and total sales from 2008 to 2018 (Liases Foras, 2019) 
Repayment of dues 
While the exact rules of repayment vary from deal to deal, developers are by and large 
compelled to repay their lenders or investors as soon as a sale is made, an amount 
that is, in most instances, pre-fixed. In case a developer defaults on this commitment, 
or if the project does not generate as much income as imagined, financiers have the 
legal right to take over the project from the developer. Under these circumstances, 
developers are under pressure to demonstrate to financiers that a project is 
performing well and in line with debt obligations while safeguarding their own self-
interests. Therefore, depending on the contractual constraints and the level of 
indebtedness, a developer may either artificially boost sales or conceal sales, in order 
to achieve all of the goals at once. One commonly adopted practice, I was told, includes 
selling a new supply of property to bogus buyers. As part of this practice, developers 
create the illusion of high sales by selling several apartments to benami (literally 
translating to anonymous) customers, who may, in reality, be relatives or known 
associates of the developer. The practice allows developers to buy more time to 
arrange for funds, or until the financier realizes that a project is under financial stress. 
Interestingly, benami transactions also serve as a means to replace expensive debt 




with cheaper debt, since the interest rate on home loans in India is at least 6% 
cheaper than developer loans. The practice is, therefore, a roundabout way of utilizing 
mortgage finance for the purpose of land development. A slight variation of this 
practice involves reporting (fake) sales at a higher than normal price, to distort the 
project’s economic projections. By doing so, developers are able to attract fresh 
funding on the basis of “good sales,” which, however, may later be canceled.  
The opposite practice of concealing sales is also common, according to financiers, who 
claim to have been duped by developers. As part of this practice, developers use their 
unsold inventory as proxy money for paying off officials, politicians, or anyone else 
needing monetary compensation for their role in land development. Developers, 
therefore, informally trade their unsold inventory in lieu of liquid finance capital, with 
the intention of releasing the pawned inventory back into the market should a real 
buyer come by. According to financiers, this practice is akin to providing the same 
security to multiple lenders without anyone’s knowledge. Another similar 
malpractice involves the double selling or overbooking of property. Financiers note 
it is not uncommon for developers to sell the same property to two different buyers, 
or sell more apartments than is being built/ planned in a project, in anticipation of 
successfully finagling development rights in the future, to accommodate the extra 
sales. While the practice allows developers unrestricted access to customer payments, 
it grossly increases the risks associated with the project. In recent years, several 
developers have got caught trying to pull off this practice of speculating on building 
approvals, resulting in the abandonment of the project until a lengthy legal process 
unfolds.  
For example, Lodha, Mumbai’s largest developer, recently found itself embroiled in a 
legal case after the developer failed to deliver what was promised to a flat buyer: a 
flat on the 60th floor in their project Lodha Dioro, in Eastern Mumbai. It was later 
discovered that Lodha only had permission to build up to 45 floors, and yet, according 
to the complainant, Lodha continued to demand payments from the customer, for 
over a year, until it was discovered that Lodha had been accepting payments for a 




non-existent flat. In Omkar’s case, I found evidence of the contrary practice. The title 
deed relating to the acquisition of Dhobi Ghat slum, mentions several accounts of 
undocumented trade of flats between Omkar and various parties. In the ninety-page 
document, the phrase “flats allotted” appeared seven times (example below, Figure 
32), which highlights transactions pertaining to past projects that Omkar had to 
declare to Piramal Capital at the time of drawing up a deal for Piramal Mahalaxmi. 
These findings are an indication that Omkar’s reported stock of unsold inventory may 
not be dormant capital after all, and that Omkar too may be involved in the practice 
of off the books trading.  
 
Figure 32: Excerpt from Dhobi Ghat’s title deed. The phrase “flats allotted” appears seven times in the 90-
page document (MahaRERA, 2019) 
6.  DISCUSSION  
An investigation of how real estate projects are financed in Mumbai revealed that 
access to finance is cumbersome for most developers, despite the liberalization of 
India’s real estate sector nearly fifteen years ago. This is because the rules of 
development finance are embedded in diverging agendas of pro-urban growth, anti-
land speculation, and risk mitigation. Under these conditions, the funding that does 
become available to developers is highly conditional and expensive, which either 
deters or restricts developers from utilizing institutional finance for land 




development. Developers who do resort to utilizing new sources of real estate 
funding have demonstrated quick growth, by virtue of increased land bank, and 
project size, but are the same developers, who appear to be faulting on their debt, as 
well as production commitments. This is because, production-oriented behavior is 
impossible to establish no matter how capable a developer may seem, given the many 
loopholes in financing regulations on the one hand, and the challenges linked to land’s 
specificities, on the other. 
The tendency of developers to deviate from formal obligations means that developers 
are subject to close control by financial firms. An analysis of the institutional 
frameworks that govern real estate financing in Mumbai, however, revealed that, 
while stricter rules of borrowing do influence developer actions, the rules are difficult 
to enforce; at conflict with fundamental beliefs over the hegemony of financial actors; 
and not necessarily in the best interest of financiers. A closer study of financing 
practices confirmed that the practices adopted by developers, although common, are 
not shared informal norms because: 1) the practices are not talked about openly as 
they are mostly illegal, 2) practices take place in a dynamic regulatory environment, 
and 3) use case of each practice varies greatly, i.e., its application does not always 
guarantee success. I, therefore, argue that developer actions are ad hoc, creative 
responses to highly context-specific problems that, while useful in the short term, end 
up becoming hurdles for the marketization of real estate in the long run. 
This is because the deconstruction of the financing practice revealed that there exist 
several opportunities within the practice itself, for developers to earn a profit outside 
the planned sale of a property. Developers can, therefore, make money off the 
different components of the financing practice, such as: procurement of resources, 
deployment of borrowed funds, and the coordination of sales. Since developers are 
able to access these additional profits outside of official records, and starting at the 
early stages of the financing practice, the project’s completion and its final economic 
outcome become less consequential for the developer compared to the financier. In 
other words, profit may be accrued by the developer, irrespective of the completion 




of the development cycle. More importantly, developers who received the most 
funding from the new financial sources made available to the sector post-
liberalization are least likely to engage in shortsighted opportunism, which 
paradoxically sustains the perception that they are “capable developers,” and hence 






1.  THE LIBERALIZATION PROJECT DERAILED 
Fifteen years since the Indian real estate sector liberalized, Mumbai’s real estate 
industry continues to scramble for money. The neighborhood of Lower Parel, which 
adjoins the now-stalled Dhobi Ghat redevelopment, is visual proof of the cash crunch 
that has derailed real estate production in the city. Here, a dusty, golden-colored 
Trump Tower, under development since 2012 (but expected to be complete in 2020), 
stands on a site that once housed a textile factory. While news reports claim that 80% 
of the 400 luxury apartments in the tower have been “sold,” reports also claim that 
Lodha Group, the local project partner, is seeped in debt of 190 billion INR (2 billion 
GBP) (Schultz, Raj, & Lipton, 2020). The firm was downgraded with a negative outlook 
by two global rating agencies in August 2019: Moody’s and Fitch Ratings, on concerns 
of liquidity and falling sales (Kelkar, 2019). In fact, of the thirty-nine projects 
currently under development in Lower Parel, over 90% are stalled due to financial 
stress and slow sales, according to my colleagues at PropConsulting.  While the 
number and scale of projects underway in the neighborhood mark the enthusiasm 
with which finance capital had once flowed into Mumbai’s real estate sector, their 
current state of uncertainty reflects a bumpy unfolding of the liberalization project.   
When Mumbai’s urban development was thrown open to foreign participation, 
politicians and financial consultants had envisioned land and property in the city to 
turn into globally legible vessels of finance capital and means of spectacular 
accumulation. Mumbai was to become yet another “global city,” a piece of which 
investors from afar could own and sell when they please. In 2004, Manmohan Singh, 
the then Prime Minister of the country, dreamt of India becoming Shanghai. “I share 
this aspiration to transform Mumbai in the next five years in such a manner that 
people would forget about Shanghai,” Singh said while addressing his party workers 
in the city ahead of the state assembly elections (Anand & Rademacher, 2011). 
Around the same time, consultants talked of boosting investments into real estate 




development in urban India, by pitching what Llerena Searle calls “The India Story.”  
One such pitch by consulting firm Colliers India noted: 
As one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, India’s real estate sector is 
booming. With the growth in the economy, property prices are rising. Investors 
predict that the consumption-driven growth of the Indian economy is translating 
into rising demand for homes, shopping malls, multiplexes and luxury hotels. The 
number of shopping malls alone is expected to grow four times to 358 by 2007. 
India’s emergence as a favored destination for global outsourcing makes the 
prospects for investment in property especially attractive (Colliers India, 2004) 
The ambition to physically and economically emulate Shanghai has, however, proven 
to be farfetched, and so have plans to financialize the real estate market.  Efforts by 
policymakers and financiers to introduce financing tools such as REITs, and the public 
issue of real estate bonds have failed to take off (Agarwal, 2019). While there are 
several reasons for this (low rental yields coupled with high tax being one of them), 
the structural opposition to easy liquidity of real estate products, as I have discussed 
in Chapter 7, has been one of the most notable obstacles to the marketization of real 
estate. As per existing regulations, at least 80 percent of REITs funds must be invested 
in completed, income-generating, commercial properties, to ensure the protection of 
investors, as opposed to the development of new residential projects that, in reality, 
constitutes for maximum real estate activity in India. What this means more generally 
is that regulations governing investment in real estate development are torn between 
diverging agendas of pro-urban development, protection of land rights, and risk 
mitigation.  
Local developers were to play an important role in executing the liberalization project, 
by absorbing the risks of land development, which was of utmost concern to foreign 
and local investors. Developers were to carry out the social work of converting land 
into commodity form, by acquiring land, clearing it off its inhabitants, seeking 
necessary government approvals for development, and setting an exchange value to 
enable its commensuration. Developers who projected themselves as being capable 
of “getting the job done,” earned anything between 20-30% of overall project value 
from land development partnerships. However, despite the hefty remuneration and 




acknowledgment of the developer’s importance, the delivery of commodified land has 
been patchy. Instead, what one finds now are dusty, unfinished buildings, perhaps in 
tradable form, but entangled in new kinds of uncertainties, such as the invalidity of 
development rights, legal disputes over compensations to displaced residents, and 
financial liabilities attached to projects.  
2.  OBSTACLES TO MARKET-MAKING 
Distraught homebuyers in Mumbai have frequently taken to the streets to express 
their concerns over development projects.  In one such case, where a redevelopment 
project faces a six-year delay, residents, many of who had invested their life’s savings 
in the project, sought intervention by the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory 
Authority to receive compensation and/or ensure completion of the project at the 
earliest.  Mamta Tiwari, one of the protesting residents’ complained: 
We had to sell all the gold we owned, including my mangalsutra (wedding chain), 
to be able to pay the advance. Even though they had given us an allotment letter, 
which clearly says the possession of our flat would be given to us by 2013, now 
they are not even willing to commit to a date of completion. When we had booked 
the flats, we had hoped that our families would move into a two-bedroom house. 
Now, my daughter is getting married, and we have no idea when the construction 
will be completed (A. Sarkar, 2017). 
Mamta’s plight, while highlights the lengths to which people have to go to own 
property in Mumbai, demonstrates that public anger in such instances is targeted not 
at the marketization of land or the housing unaffordability it produces, but rather at 
(unscrupulous) development practices.  
Discontentment to capitalistic land development is often conceptualized from a 
Polanyian double movement perspective. This is because critics of neoliberalism have 
increasingly recognized Polanyi, for his “analysis of the pathogenesis and malign 
consequences of a free-market economy,” and his “trenchant critique of laissez-faire 
capitalism’s ‘Satanic Mill’” (Zhang, 2013, p. 1609). In Polanyian interpretation, the 
dynamics of marketization is driven by an on-going double movement – the 
liberalizing movement to expand the scope of the market, and the protective counter-




movement that emerges to resist the disembedding of the economy and to protect the 
society against its perils (Polanyi, 2001, pp. 79, 136). Neo-Polanyian scholars, 
therefore, conceptualize the ‘counter-movement’ as a social backlash, by actors with 
a political agency (Block, 2008; Zhang, 2013). 
In this dissertation, I have argued that while anger among homebuyers and displaced 
residents in Mumbai, takes the form of social agitation ever so often, such agitation is 
rarely a retaliation against land commodification per se. Rather, it is symptomatic of 
the more commonplace, but less visible obstacles to capitalistic land development. A 
multitude of such obstacles linked to land’s specificities continually hinder capitalistic 
processes, such that the commodification of land always remains problematic. I 
propose that hurdles to the marketization of land development often emerge in the 
form of fragmented social arenas within which interactions in a land market take 
place, and the incoherent institutions that govern land market practices.  
Ambiguities and inconsistencies in institutions, in turn, encourage developers to 
adopt ad hoc practices that are more often than not, opportunistic. In Chapter 7, for 
instance, I discuss how developers often siphon funds towards acquisition of new 
projects because of the restrictions imposed on financing of land acquisition in India. 
In Chapter 5, I provide an account of how developers tend to inflate project valuations, 
again in order to get hold of funds to acquire new land. To justify these valuations, 
developers, as I discussed in Chapter 6, impinge on development rights, with the 
expectation that future changes in development rules would make right their decision. 
Although most of these practices serve as solutions to very complicated land 
development problems, which need overcoming for land to become commoditized, 
these practices inevitably derail the goal of producing new real estate for sale, and 
unwittingly hinder the marketization of land development.  
3.  PRACTICES OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 
Identifying and understanding the nature of obstacles to land’s commodification 
requires an acknowledgment of the ambiguities and contradictions in land’s 




treatment as a commodity. In Chapter 1, I argued that a non-dualistic, hybrid 
conception of land allows one to recognize the patchwork and precarious 
arrangements that make land exchange possible.  This is because land’s specificity 
restricts the establishment of institutionalized practices, shared conventions, and 
distinct and uncontested property rights.  Therefore, even if land becomes a resource 
available for global investment through patchwork solutions, or an assemblage of 
heterogeneous elements, these arrangements cannot but shape-shift over time. The 
meaning of “commodified” and “non-commodified” land is thus turned on its head, 
with the many socio-legal transformations that land undergoes within just a single 
development cycle. Development practices in Mumbai are particularly telling of these 
shifts in land’s treatment as a commodity, due to the length of project timelines, the 
popularity of slum redevelopments, and the capriciousness of development 
regulations. Below, I present a recap of the land development process in Mumbai to 
make clear how, with each step towards land’s development and marketization, the 
distinction between commodified and non-commodified becomes increasingly 
ambiguous and problematic. 
 In Pursuit of Commodified Land  
In Chapter 3, I discussed how Mumbai’s unique topography and high population 
density contributes to the scarcity of land, and why despite being affluent, the city has 
one of the worst housing conditions in the world. Over the last two decades, state 
authorities have attempted to ameliorate the city’s housing crisis by incentivizing 
redevelopment of land. This most notably involved the scrapping of protective 
policies such as the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, diluting laws governing 
the redevelopment of industrial lands, and the demolition of slum settlements. 
Redevelopment efforts in the city, however, highlight the difficulty to commodify land, 
i.e., strip land off its social ties, despite the state’s support in doing so. I propose that 
the complications that accompany land’s redevelopment are the most defining 
feature of Mumbai’s land market. In Chapter 4, I unpacked the redevelopment process 
at Dhobi Ghat, which has taken over ten years to develop, to establish just how 
complicated redevelopment work can be, even for the most experienced developer.  




Experts claim that unclear property rights in Mumbai hinder land from becoming 
“economically productive.” Alain Bertaud, an urban planner popular among Mumbai’s 
policymakers, writes:  
Land use efficiency is not produced by clever master plans but by the continuous 
trading of property, which progressively reallocate land to reflect current demand 
from consumers. The trading of properties depends on clear property rights. Any 
fuzziness in titles or in the right to dispose of property decreases the volume of 
real estate transactions and eventually freezes urban land into obsolete 
uneconomical land use (Bertaud, 2004, p. 6) 
Industry professionals, many of whom are engaged in the development of tile 
insurance products, share Bertaud’s sentiments on fuzz-free land titles. “Real estate 
projects have got stalled on account of various defects in the title of the owner/ 
developer to the property,” writes Divya Malcolm, a practicing lawyer specializing in 
Indian property law (Malcolm, 2020). Consequences of the “defects” that Malcolm 
refers to, may include: litigation by a co-owner who was not made a party to the sale 
of land; boundary disputes with neighboring plot owners; non-availability of the 
requisite approvals, and so on.  
The recently introduced Real Estate Regulation & Development Act of 2016 (RERA) 
has made it compulsory for developers to obtain insurance against any discrepancies 
in the title of the land and buildings in their projects. However, there has been little 
progress on this front. While a number of companies have started offering title 
insurance products since 2016, there have been few takers for it (S. Roy & Law, 2019). 
HDFC Ergo, a subsidiary of India’s largest housing finance company, for instance, sold 
only two such insurance products, in three years (ibid). Legal and financial experts 
claim this is because title insurance in India is an expensive product, with marginal 
protection for buyers. With a premium ranging from 0.5% to 3% on the gross 
developed value (which includes the value of land, cost of construction, and profit 
margin of the developer), title insurance is a significant added cost to real estate 
production, particularly when sales are already slow due to high prices. Besides, title 
insurance only covers past discrepancies, leaving out risks of future and present 




disputes. Delays on account of government approvals are also excluded from the 
ambit of title insurance, making it all the more unattractive (Malcolm, 2020).  
Without the support of private insurers and the state to protect against risks of 
project delays due to ownership disputes, the onus of navigating the discrepancies of 
private property and development regulations lies entirely on local real estate 
developers. Managing multiple future uncertainties in land development, however, 
requires the adoption of ad hoc strategies geared towards solving highly context-
specific problems, since the core practices of land development, including land 
acquisition and approvals, cannot be institutionalized, as demonstrated in the 
empirical chapters of this dissertation. And yet, these ad hoc solutions do not 
guarantee success, even when implemented by the most competent and experienced 
developers.  
Omkar’s struggle to turn slum land into a tradable commodity, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, is the reason why developers who are successful at acquiring land and 
navigating development approvals, receive recognition and fame in Mumbai. In 
Chapters 3 and 7, I demonstrated that entrepreneurial developers like Omkar, who 
are known to be experts in redevelopment work, are supported by funding agencies, 
no matter what the developer’s financial credibility is. Their empowerment 
paradoxically undermines the establishment of market order since the same 
developers are also least inclined to adhere to debt obligations for several reasons, 
including their embeddedness in local communities. Such a paradox is highly telling 
of the faults in a binary conception of land commodification. 
 Managing Sentiments 
Newly empowered developers, I found, followed a quick and consistent pace of 
project launch, irrespective of market conditions. In Chapter 5, I discussed my 
empirical findings, which indicate that developers in Mumbai distinguish themselves 
from each other, not through pricing of their products or speed of sales, but by the 
number of projects in their portfolio. There is also an observable pattern and 
similarity in the pace of portfolio expansion among developers with a relatively high 




project count. For instance, developers who have built up an initial momentum, 
continue to launch new projects at a steady pace of roughly 1-2 projects per year, 
irrespective of their development capacity, size of projects, or changes in market 
conditions. This is peculiar since there appears to be no positive impact of growth in 
project launch, on the economic performance of a development firm. 
The tendency of experienced developers to adhere to a normal pace of project 
acquisition/launch indicates that developers may not be inclined towards becoming 
adept at the business of real estate development, but rather inclined only towards 
accumulating land and increasing their portfolio size. I attribute this tendency to 
constraints posed by the social meanings and prestige associated with the acquisition 
and development of land in the Indian context, as is evident in this excerpt from a 
news article covering the rise to fame of a prominent Mumbai developer: 
Sanjay Chhabria, 45, managing director of Mumbai-based Radius Developers, 
comes across as calm and seasoned. However, his two-year-old company seems in 
a hurry. What really sets it apart from other developers is that the company has 
taken bold bets… His two-year-old firm, Radius, is developing 12.5 mn sq ft in 
Mumbai; that’s a fourth of what DLF, the country’s largest realtor, is developing (R. 
Kamath, 2016a) 
Chhabria’s rise to prominence has a back-story. Chhabria had previously worked at 
Wadhwa Group, another well-known development firm owned by his relative Vijay 
Wadhwa, for twenty years, where he managed over sixty projects. However, when 
Chhabria was superseded by Wadhwa’s son-in-law, as part of a business 
restructuring plan, a miffed Chhabria quit the family business and went on to start his 
own company, which has very quickly taken over the Wadha Group in project count. 
The competition between the two rivals is now down to the project pace, with both 
developers striving to launch two projects a year (Bharucha, 2014). 
In Chapter 7, I discussed how the growth of land bank for young developers, such as 
Radius, who operate on a small base capital, comes at the cost of expensive and 
conditional debt. With the build-up of unsold inventory, developers in Mumbai can 
no longer rely on land price appreciation to adjust against finance costs, which has 




worked as a strategy for developers until now. Nevertheless, in Chapter 5, I provided 
accounts of how developers are reluctant to pare debt by shrinking land bank size, 
even in tough times. Many developers instead prefer to secure partners and co-
investors to fund their on-going projects. “There are only two strategies left in this 
market. One is to divest whatever you can, and what you can’t divest, get into 
partnership with somebody else because there is no capital available for everybody,” 
notes Mohit Saraf, senior partner at L&L Partners, a Mumbai-based law firm in a news 
interview (Sapam, 2019).  
Holding onto existing projects by getting into joint-venture agreements or any kind 
of development partnership, however, is prone to complications, and therefore just 
as risky as increased indebtedness. In Chapters 5 and 7, I discussed how conflicts over 
valuation and profit share are commonplace and inevitable, because evaluation 
practices in Mumbai’s real estate industry are loosely defined, and non-
institutionalized. Besides, the embeddedness of developers in redevelopment 
projects, makes it all the more difficult to set profit boundaries based on exchange 
value of land alone. Therefore, the more developers get caught in the trend of 
increasing land bank size, and the longer they hold on to their land, the messier and 
more uncertain the fate of their projects, as well as market positions, become. I 
understand this to be almost a reversal, if not break down, of land’s conception as a 
commodity.  
 Overcoming Uncertainty 
To keep up with their expanding portfolio of projects, developers must maximize the 
development potential of projects, to assuage the adverse financial implications of 
debt-based acquisitions in a low-growth real estate market. Since development 
potential is closely linked to land-use and building regulations, the infringement of 
regulations serves as a tactic to increase profit expectations under conditions of 
uncertainty. In Chapter 6, I provided accounts of how developers skirted around, 
manipulated, or interpreted development regulations, in ways suitable to their 
financial interests. In Mumbai, impinging on building heights, or more accurately, 




Floor Space Index (FSI), is the most common way to expand profitability. This practice 
is so common, that even developers of high repute succumb to it, despite the 
reputational loss that comes with getting caught.  
The stretching of FSI norms, though hailed as a necessary measure to combat density 
in some cities, has had disastrous consequences in Mumbai, such as building collapses, 
as discussed in Chapter 6. Mumbai-based architect and activist Shirish Patel has 
frequently called into attention the dangers of indiscriminately stretching FSI limits.  
He notes: 
Going vertical, in other words, raising the FSI blindly, without understanding the 
complexities and limitations [of ground realities of street congestion], seems to be 
the “solution” currently on offer to address Mumbai’s steadily worsening housing 
situation. [However], raising the FSI, especially for the poor, will only make 
matters worse, and life in the city will become more intolerable (S. B. Patel, 2013, 
p. 72) 
The violation of FSI norms is therefore, akin to “the social and cultural destruction 
wrought upon society and nature by the treatment of land as if they were 
commodities” (Lacher, 1999, p. 319) 
 
Developers, however, see betting on development permits as unavoidable, because 
building regulations are never constant. Lodha Group’s recent hearing with The 
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) brought to light this 
perspective shared by developers (Ali, 2019). Lodha, it seems, had failed to deliver on 
their promise of a 60th-floor apartment in their project Lodha Dioro to a consumer, 
because the project only received permission for building up to 45 floors. Lodha, 
however, claims that it was far into the project’s development and after the initial 
approvals for the 60 floors were granted, that the Civil Aviation Authority woke up 
and took notice of the building’s height. Lodha, therefore, suggests that what is 
publicly perceived, as speculation on building heights, is, in fact, a situation of 
shooting the dart in the dark.  
In Chapter 6, I described several other accounts of the ad hoc, albeit opportunistic, 
practices adopted by developers when seeking development approvals. In the same 




chapter, I also discuss how succeeding at the approvals game, is viewed as a heroic 
feat by most developers. This is because, as mentioned earlier, seeking approvals 
entails interpreting development regulations that are continually shifting, while also 
navigating an equally inconsistent bureaucratic system that processes approval 
applications to unpredictable results. While developers are often required to tug at 
their ties with several actors involved in the approvals process such as civic officials, 
politicians, liaison architects, RTI activists, etc., these social ties cannot be purchased 
or transferred, or extended indefinitely, since these are bonds built over time, as 
opposed to class or caste proximities.  
While managing uncertainty by tweaking development regulations is often seen as a 
heroic feat, no matter the means adopted, FSI violations nevertheless bring multiple 
risks to developers. Not only are the outcomes of the approvals process unpredictable 
and thereby expensive (when results do not match the effort), but the risks of getting 
caught are high too. In Mumbai, a long list of projects stands abandoned because of 
FSI violations. In many cases, delays caused by the lengthy legal investigations that 
follow recognition of a violation, bring tremendous financial stress to projects. This 
not only derails the capitalistic processes of land development but also imperils the 
life expectancy of development firms. The attempt to treat land as a commodity by 
chiseling at protective norms, therefore, creates new complications for developers 
and the project in question, thereby blurring land’s conceptualization as a commodity.  
 Adhering to Contracts 
With development firms slipping into precarious positions because of their inability 
to manage financial uncertainty, the legal procedure for debt recovery, especially in 
the case of stressed firms, has gotten tighter. In Chapter 7, I discussed how financing 
agreements have undergone critical changes in recent years, to become all the more 
scrupulous, because of wider regulatory controls imposed by central and state 
governments on the one hand, and the bitter experiences of financiers, on the other. 
Most recently, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), has ushered in a 
speedy and effective mechanism for reorganization and insolvency resolution of 




stressed companies, including development firms. As part of this change, individual 
homebuyers can now register a case against a defaulting developer. Until September 
2019, 10,860 bankruptcy cases were registered against developers, of which, 1,821 
cases (or 17%) were cases filed by homebuyers (G. Das, 2019).  
Developers are predictably displeased with the changes to the IBC, particularly the 
rights provided to homebuyers to move the courts directly in case of delayed projects. 
Developers allege that some homebuyers are misusing the new law and that the 
frequency of such cases is causing (further) delay in the construction and delivery of 
projects. Developers are therefore demanding that consumer complaints be heard 
first by the real estate regulatory body RERA before insolvency proceedings are 
initiated. “Even a single home buyer is approaching (the courts) with grievances 
against real estate developers…. Their pleas are being admitted in many cases. This is 
becoming an epidemic,” Rohit Raj Modi, a spokesperson for the developer body 
CREDAI, is reported to have said, adding that, “the government’s intention to protect 
homebuyers’ interests is being abused, as the insolvency law is being implemented in 
a wrong way” (Shah, 2019). 
In Chapter 7, I presented similar accounts of displeasure among developers regarding 
the rules of debt recovery. Developers point out that they have little bargaining power 
when forging agreements with investors or creditors. Besides, the use of new 
financing arrangements, such as mezzanine debt structures, is also perceived as being 
one-sided. Mezzanine debt, as explained in Chapter 7, is a hybrid between debt and 
equity, which gives a lender the right to convert to an equity interest in the 
development firm or project, in case of default. The term default, however, has a broad 
interpretation in financing agreements, including deviation from project timelines. 
Therefore, should a development project take longer than planned to execute, 
perhaps for reasons linked to land acquisition or approvals, which are not entirely in 
control of the developer, then the developer loses control of the project, if not the firm.  
Reforms in both the regulation of the real estate sector and the bankruptcy and 
insolvency regime, have been critical in alleviating the distress caused by severed 




contracts. However, the combination of multiple interventions has produced a messy 
situation between developers, homebuyers, and creditors. Goals are now torn 
between providing primacy to creditors through quick liquidation of a project and 
attempts to put consumers before creditors by finding the best possible solution to 
complete a project. Acknowledging this to be a “fundamental contradiction” a report 
by The Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India, notes:  
While IBC was passed with the intention to smoothen the process of “closing the 
business,” RERA has been implemented to “regulate and formalize the real estate 
sector.” But, in case of insolvency, the objectives of these two acts are often getting 
pitted against one another (ASSOCHAM, 2018) 
Inconsistencies in the resolution of stressed real estate companies have, therefore, 
resulted in projects being mired in greater complications. Industry members fear that 
if insolvency proceedings are admitted against a development firm that also has many 
home buyer complaints pending before RERA, it is likely that the bidders of stressed 
projects may either seek to limit their liabilities by distancing themselves from the 
complaints of buyers or avoid bidding altogether.  
Disputes concerning developer defaults are, therefore, not so easy to resolve, no 
matter how stringent the laws governing real estate financing become. In Chapter 7, 
I demonstrate that this is because developers are embedded in the very land they are 
meant to commodify, which makes it difficult for debt recovery agents to replace or 
evict developers from non-performing projects. Moreover, the different institutions 
governing developer behavior, such as RERA, SRA, IBC, etc., are all caught between 
different, and often, diverging goals such as protection of consumers, and/or 
creditors, promotion of housing production, establishment of transparency and so on. 
Therefore, the harder these regulations tug in a certain direction, the more gaps they 
produce between them, for developers to take advantage of. This, I argue, hinders 
strict enforcement of contracts and, thereby, the deployment of finance capital for the 
marketization of land development.  




4.  THE HERO NARRATIVE 
Sociologist Lyn Lofland who has written a paper titled The Real Estate Developer as 
Villain points out that developers in the United States face an occupational stigma. 
She writes that her field notes are replete with stories of those developers, who have 
“reneged on promises, bribed officials, torn down historic structures in the middle of 
the night, misrepresented their aims, broken or at least skirted the law, trampled on 
the environment, and reaped ignominious profits” (Lofland, 2015, p. 93). In the case 
of Indian developers, I argue that these very same qualities that Lofland attributes to 
the occupation’s stigmatization results in the valorization of developers, and the 
strengthening of their role in the land market. In a context where land development 
is prone to multiple hurdles, mobilizing finance, negotiating with landowners, 
overcoming bureaucratic red tape- all the standard activities of an Indian developer- 
are seen as acts of heroism. 
Rather than feeling stigmatized, Indian developers perceive themselves as deliverers 
of progress- one whose job it is to turn Mumbai into Shanghai. Developers frequently 
tell stories of their persistence, entrepreneuralism, and willingness to get their hands 
dirty to achieve India’s developmental goal. By making explicit their supposed resolve 
to deliver projects as promised, no matter the means adopted, real estate developers 
flip the perspective on their “villainous deeds” to qualify as actors worthy of 
recognition and reward. A good developer is, therefore, one that finds different modes 
of accommodating reality, depending on the orientation of the situation, by defying 
social norms and moral thresholds, if required, to deliver a project (on time).  
In this dissertation, I have argued that the social expectations riding on developers to 
deliver on the future promise of commodified land, and the prestige that comes with 
being successful at it, serves as an orienting schema that guides action in Mumbai’s 
land market. As discussed in the sections above, land’s specificities, and the 
ambiguous distinction of land as a commodity, produces great uncertainty for land 
market actors. The uncertainties pertaining to fragmented institutions, capricious 
rules, and the inability to institutionalize development practices are, however, 




temporally closer concerns (than say, demand-supply mismatch) that 
overwhelmingly capture the imagination of land market actors. In other words, the 
future, that primarily occupies the imagination of land market actors in Mumbai, is 
one in which land is free of social, political, and bureaucratic encumbrances, as 
opposed to one, where property prices go higher. Real estate developers, market 
actors believe, are poised to overcome these uncertainties, to deliver on the 
imagination of commodified land.  
The role of a developer is, therefore, pivotal to the land market because predictions, 
and thereby the participation in the market, are pinned on the ability of a developer 
to commodify land. Market actors, as a result, bet not on the accuracy of predictive 
models, but rather on the accuracy of a developer’s self-assessment: Will the 
developer be able to acquire land, get approvals, construct the building within the 
time/ cost frame he has set for himself? The more a developer is perceived to be ever 
successful at overcoming hurdles, the more market actors are willing to bet on him. 
The idea of an entrepreneurial, albeit opportunistic developer, who can effectively get 
things done, even if it means flouting development rules, or intimidating slum 
residents, is therefore powerful in a context where the future of land development is 
riddled with uncertainty.  
While uncertainty pertaining to land acquisition, development approvals, and project 
financing, provides developers the opportunity to protect their position in the land 
market, it paradoxically distracts them from other important concerns such as inter-
firm competition, and the changing appetite for new real estate. In their eagerness to 
emerge triumphant against the hurdles of land commodification, the establishment 
of long-term institutional order, which is necessary for markets to function, seems to 
be a forgotten goal for developers in Mumbai. The growing number of insolvencies 
among them highlights developers’ inability to execute projects all the way through 
and meet their debt obligations after the initial success of land acquisition. In fact, 
with financing agreements now pinned on stringent timelines for land acquisition, 
even this success may not be so profitable for a developer, after all.  




Today, few news reports acknowledge that developers themselves are to blame for 
their dire situation. “When they diverted funds from one project to another, and their 
indisposition to paying off loans quickly so that banks could find them reliable in the 
future... It had a cascading effect on the entire ecosystem”, notes a news article, which, 
ironically, regards Niranjan Hiranandani, one of Mumbai’s largest developers, as “a 
man extraordinaire,” for his continued efforts to “build iconic structures” (Mendes, 
2020). Hiranandani, not unlike other developers in Mumbai, has been embroiled in 
several legal disputes, for wrongful doings, including hoodwinking investors and 
usurping land meant for social housing (Samervel, 2018). Yet, the ability to turn 
Mumbai into a luxurious paradise remains to be in people’s imagination a heroic feat, 
carried out by men extraordinaire.  
5.  FINAL COMMENTS 
Mumbai’s real estate industry faces a crisis, which serves as the starting point for this 
dissertation. Fifteen years since the liberalization of India’s real estate sector, the 
reality on the ground looks bleak. After an unprecedented flow of finance capital into 
real estate production in Mumbai, today, hundreds of real estate projects lie 
unfinished, abandoned, and/or unsold. The stock of unsold inventory is steadily 
mounting as project launches outpace sales by a significant margin. Investments in 
real estate development from both local and international sources have thinned out.  
Worse still, several developers in the city, many of whom emerged as a consequence 
of the new sources of finance available to the sector, have filed for bankruptcy, leaving 
thousands of small investors and home buyers stranded. This crisis, as I have pointed 
out, is puzzling because the demand for housing and real estate, in general, remains 
as high as ever before in Mumbai.  
When development projects do not go as planned, it is those who are least responsible 
for the execution of projects that bear the maximum brunt. Mumbai’s real estate crisis 
presents examples of housing insecurity that go beyond forced displacements, such 
as: losing your life’s savings in a project that has gone bust, or being indefinitely 
displaced until your slum or building gets redeveloped, or ending up with a flat that 




bears no resemblance to what was promised to you, and so on. Mumbai, however, is 
not the only city, which faces these concerns. Other cities that straddle between high 
property prices and low “transparency,” such as Moscow, Sao Paolo, Lagos, and 
Johannesburg, which have been subjected to sudden growth in real estate activity 
post economic liberalization, face a similar crisis-prone future. It is important to study 
the consequences and causes of this crisis because millions of new housing units must 
be developed to address the existing housing inadequacies in the cities I mentioned.  
Considerations about land have significant theoretical implications because, as Brett 
Christophers (2015) puts it: “once land exists, so too does political economy, and the 
latter cannot be understood except in relation to the former.” The particularities of 
Mumbai’s real estate crisis are all the more pertinent for a sociological inquiry into 
land since it provides a window into the mechanism and processes of marketized land 
development that would be otherwise obscured in contexts where the 
problematization of land’s commodification is not so visible. Mumbai, therefore, 
offers important insights into the often-overlooked obstacles to land’s 
commodification that guide urban spatial (re) distribution, which I argue, cannot be 
studied effectively through the lens of the Polanyian double-movement. The 
theoretical significance of this dissertation, therefore, is that it builds on key debates 
around land’s conceptualization as a commodity, by capturing the non-binary, hybrid 
nature of land, and the nuances of its marketization.  
By adopting an economic sociology perspective and leaning into my instincts to think 
like an architect, I was able to study the practices of developers to identify and 
understand the obstacles to land’s marketization. I recognized that the social arenas 
within which interactions in a land market take place are fragmented and that the 
institutions that govern land market practices are incoherent. More importantly, I 
recognized that land’s specificity dictates as well as triggers the patchwork and 
precarious arrangements on which land exchange rests. Land’s commodification is 
therefore riddled with uncertainty, if not impossibility, by virtue of the complexities 
that accompany any effort to disassociate land from these specificities. In this 




dissertation, I show how the need to overcome uncertainties in land development, led 
to the rise of a certain type of developer in Mumbai, considered to be experts in land 
commodification. This group’s struggle to follow through with the execution of land 
development has paradoxically resulted in several abandoned projects and driven 
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Annex  B: Eligibility count for Dhobi Ghat (SRA, 2018) 
 






Marketable Supply (mn sqft) Sales (mn sqft) Sales (units) 
Q2 15-16 2.98 0.08 34 
Q3 15-16 2.9 0.07 18 
Q4 15-16 2.83 0.03 9 
Q1 16-17 2.87 0.01 7 
Q2 16-17 2.59 0.04 14 
Q3 16-17 2.55 0.09 22 
Q4 16-17 2.46 0.04 10 
Q1 17-18 2.46 0.06 18 
Q2 17-18 2.36 0.08 36 
Q3 17-18 2.24 0.13 41 
Q4 17-18 2.66 0.09 45 
Q1 18-19 3.32 0.02 9 
QoQ Change 25% -75% -80% 
YoY Change 37% -66% -50% 











No. Actor Title Date No. of 
interviews 
Place Data 













3 Developer Project Engineer 24-06-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
4 Developer Co-Director 29-04-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
5 Developer Ex-COO 29-04-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
6 Developer COO 03-05-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
7 Developer Project Manager 24-05-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 







9 Developer Project Manager 27-05-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
10 Developer Director 01-06-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
11 Developer Director 08-06-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
12 Developer Managing Director 08-08-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
13 Developer Executive Director 12-08-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
14 Developer Business Head 23-08-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
15 Developer AGM, Operations 21-08-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
16 Developer Project Manager 
07-05-2018 
05-05-2018 
2 Mumbai Case Study 
17 Developer Project Assistant 07-05-2018 1 Mumbai Case Study 
18 Developer Managing Director 
14-01-2019 
15-05-2019 
2 Mumbai Case Study 










24-04-2018 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
21 Developer Head Liasioning 05-09-2019 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 

























06-05-2017 1 Mumbai Case Study 
27 Resident Resident at DG 22-06-2017 1 Mumbai Case Study 
28 Resident Resident at DG 
05-05-2018 
27-04-2018 
2 Mumbai Case Study 
29 Resident Resident at DG 05-05-2018 1 Mumbai Case Study 




14-05-2017 1 Mumbai Case Study 
32 Resident Resident at DG 01-07-2017 1 Mumbai Case Study 
33 Resident Resident at DG 01-07-2017 1 Mumbai Case Study 









35 Consultant General Manager 23-04-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 







37 Consultant Chairman 12-06-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 






No. Actor Title Date No. of 
interviews 
Place Data 
39 Consultant Project Lead 11-11-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
40 Consultant Project Lead 01-05-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
41 Consultant Partner 12-08-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 









43 Architect Principle Architect 13-09-2019 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
44 Architect Principle Architect 16-06-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
45 Architect Principle Architect 03-06-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
46 Architect Principle Architect 27-04-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
47 Legal Expert Manager 23-04-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
48 Legal Expert 
Counsel, Bombay 
High Court 
15-08-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
49 Legal Expert Partner 27-09-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
50 Legal Expert Partner 27-09-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
51 Legal Expert Partner 17-12-2018 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
52 Financier Managing Director 23-01-2019 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
53 Financier Managing Director 11-01-2019 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
54 Financier Ex-Director 05-01-2019 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
55 Financier Ex-Chairman 
21-12-2018 










































10-09-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
60 Activist Director of NGO 24-09-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
61 Activist Housing Activit 06-05-2018 1 Mumbai Case Study 
62 Journalist Senior Editor, TOI 22-04-2017 1 Mumbai 
Independent 
Interview 
Annex  F: Interviewee list 
 
 
